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1
THE IP WORLD
1. Decoding
Exclusive rights regimes (e.g. patents) are just one of a larger mix of available 
public policy tools to spur scientific and technological innovation. At present, 
innovation ecosystems have become more sophisticated and are now built on 
more internationalized, collaborative, open innovation models. However, the 
importance of non-patent based innovation is often downplayed in order to 
frame patent systems as the driving force behind innovation. 
Nowadays, our legal infrastructures for innovation are entrenched 
within the mantra of proprietary knowledge. Under this flagship, mainstream 
public politics and policy are ratcheting up standards of proprietary knowl-
edge and market exclusivity (monopoly).
From a legal perspective, patents are government-sponsored exclusive 
rights dealing with a unique commodity: knowledge. The exclusive rights re-
gimes in which these are embedded are designed to remove the general au-
thority to act on given information, by locating that authority in the hands of 
a given private agent (patent-holder). 
In principle, inventors secure remuneration for their work through pat-
ents. The argument behind this government-sponsored private retribution 
is that the exclusive rights-based innovation of patent systems increases the 
inventors’ incentive to pursue inventions. 
However, by designing the system in this way, patents systems do not 
respond to unmet public demands, but instead to the ability to pay. Patents 
embed vertical control over the use of information in things and activities; 
read goods and services, respectively. 
Nowadays, the physical property of any traded good yields to the intan-
gible property. In this regard, in accordance with article 51 of the 1996 WTO 
Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
non-IP complying assets in 159 state jurisdictions can be physically destroyed 
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by courts in at least those cases of trademark counterfeiting or copyright pi-
racy on a commercial scale.1 Hence:
– The intangible is given precedence over the thing (or ‘physical carrier’)
– The property of the intangible is given precedence over the propriety of the thing
– The proprietor of intangibles is given precedence over the proprietor of the thing
The meaning of this structural change of paradigm over property can-
not be underestimated.
Patents entail the artificial creation of scarcity by radical state interven-
tion.2 In this regard, the conceptual nature of abstract objects (or incorporeal 
rights) created by intellectual property is particularly challenging.3 
As Cohen explained in 1927, whatever technical definition of property 
we prefer, we must recognize that a property right is a relation not between an 
owner and a thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference 
to things: a right is always held against one or more individuals.4
Patent ecosystems grant government-sponsored legal monopolies and, 
as such, are non-market mechanisms. Currently, global markets lack common 
rules regarding fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms for 
the use of patents under automatic mandatory licensing. In short, any possi-
ble negotiation over the granting of a voluntary license under these non-mar-
ket mechanisms is conventionally considered to be under the pervasive and 
expansive freedom of contract. Thus, patent-holders appropriate knowledge 
and trade it or not (voluntary licensing), whatever the impact on innovation, 
by clearing prices aside from market-based mechanisms.
In addition, the mechanisms through which governments grant com-
pulsory licenses (CL) are generally stochastic and discretionary, as well as 
time-consuming and hazardous. 
The patent system is itself an idea and, as such, an invention of the 
mind. Arguably, however, it is probably not the best of ideas, as it legalize le 
1  See Section 4 of Part III on enforcement in TRIPS agreement (article 51 and 
accompanying legal footnote 14) and section 2 in chapter 8 below.
2  See S. Picciotto & D. Campbell, ‘Whose Molecule Is It Anyway? Private and So-
cial Perspectives on Intellectual Property’, New perspectives on property law, obligations 
and restitution, (Cavendish 2003) at 280.
3  See P. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Aldershot 1996) (chapters 
2 and 7).
4  See M. Cohen, ‘“Property and Sovereignty”’ 13 Cornell Law Quaterly 8 (1927): 
12.
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a world-scale mechanism, which not only inhibits the free dissemination of 
inventions for the promised lands of ‘free for all’ tomorrow, but grants mo-
nopolistic dominion over world markets, and thus trade.
In any case, the patents gospel in Western societies has spread and rit-
ualized incrementally, constructing a system for appropriation over intan-
gibles which began centuries ago. During the last two centuries, patent eco-
systems have regularly been perfected in domestic and international venues; 
until a minimum common denominator was created by multilateral interna-
tional law, in the final quarter of the 20th Century. 
The opening decades of the new millennium have witnessed an unprec-
edented acceleration of initiatives for the ratcheting up of IP standards and 
enforcement through a wide variety of world regulatory networks. 
The social impact of patents should not be underestimated. Once in-
ventors are granted a patent, this legal device essentially becomes a knowl-
edge monopoly, allowing the patent holder full control over the registered 
invention in related goods and services. From then on, the holder has the 
exclusive right to decide how, when and under what terms the invention is to 
be marketed (quantity, price etc) in any given domestic territory in which the 
patent has been obtained.
Profits as pay-back from ‘invention’ (whatever we decide inventiveness 
is) are boundless, as long as these are extracted during the patent’s term of 
protection (generally, a minimum 20 year period). This legal infrastructure of 
innovation (patents as time-limited propertization of inventions) potentially 
embraces the whole world, as inventors can file as many patent applications 
as possible, in almost as many jurisdictions as there are on earth.5
Provided that the patent application complies with increasingly stand-
ardized patent laws, the global patent game pays for those who know how to 
play the system, combining it with other IP assets (notably, trademarks and 
trade secrets).
The feasibility of obtaining world-scale profits from a given invention 
is only counterbalanced by the so-called doctrine of international exhaustion 
of IP. In this regard, imports are normally an infringement of the rights of the 
patent holders, excepting when a country applies the doctrine in its territory.6 
5  159 Members (and 25 observers) of WTO as of December 2013.
6  See F. Abbott, ‘First Report (Final 1997) to the Committee on International 
Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel importation’, 
1 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (1998): 607–636 and M. Pugatch. The In-
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Importation without the authorization of the patent-holder is called 
‘parallel importation’, or also ‘parallel trade’. However, such practices are not 
common, as a result of industry and inter-state peer pressure. 
In the brave new world of IP global politics, any infringement of a pat-
ent granted to a foreigner by a patent office is enforceable in domestic courts 
(from 1 to at least 159 jurisdictions). Technically, this implies that a global 
company may decide to protect an IP asset throughout practically the entire 
world, which amounts to a tremendous amount of government-sponsored 
power. 
In any case, in pure economic terms, less than 50 societies are of poten-
tial interest for patent-holders (mainly OCDE + E7 economies),7 as consumer 
purchasing power and/or government procurement programmes in these so-
cieties are not adapted to their business model, which is oriented towards the 
wealthy societies. 
Needless to say, the architects and major players of patent systems are 
currently global companies, as they have the resources for regulatory capture 
(architects), and subsequent patent enforcement (players) in multiple juris-
dictions of the world. 
Are these corporate inventions? They are in legal terms. Notwithstand-
ing the thousands of individual inventors searching for golden inventions, the 
patent game is controlled by hard core repeat players; that is to say, the large 
patent-holding corporations. Nowadays, the inventions devised by those mul-
titudes of brilliant individuals are activities performed under contract and, as 
such, labour output.
The real individual contribution by those scientists working within cor-
porate research departments and centres of major global firms (the physi-
cal creators of inventions) is regulated by employer-employee relationships. 
Notwithstanding the fact that innovation is intellectually and physically per-
formed by individuals (not legal persons), ‘invention by contract’ makes the 
legal term ‘inventor’ an empty shell, likely to be occupied and thus appropri-
ated by legal proxies of capital-holders operating through the corporate form 
and structure. 
As a result, the vast majority of patents currently enforceable in do-
tellectual Property Debate: Perspectives from Law, Economics and Political Economy 
(Edward Elgar 2006), pp. 180–181.
7  The so-called E7 emerging economies are China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, 
Indonesia and Turkey. 
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mestic courts are held by corporations.8 In fact, exclusive rights over inven-
tions and other proprietary knowledge assets are increasingly concentrated 
in strong IP portfolios through strategic buying and selling, mergers and ac-
quisitions added to corporate programs of patent productivity. 
2. ‘Intangibles’ 
Proprietary innovation is the master-value of the patent system paradigm, as 
patents are structurally based on the propertization of intangibles, thus com-
modifying ideas by translating them into the language of property. 
The patent-based approach towards innovation is currently framed by 
a knowledge trade-off. The narrative was brilliantly portrayed half a century 
ago by Joan Robinson, coining the so-called ‘paradox of patents’. From then 
on, the patents game has been explained as a supposedly inevitable trade-
off: ‘by slowing down the diffusion of technical progress, patents ensure that 
there will be more progress to diffuse’.9 
Basically, mainstream frameworks and portraits of patents excuse the 
foreclosure of access to existing knowledge as an inconvenient side-payment 
for breakthrough technological innovation: in the absence of such power 
rules, society is said to face underproduction of inventive activity.10 In short, 
patents are conventionally pictured as a sort of social contract (between soci-
ety and inventors) in which available knowledge tomorrow is exchanged for 
restricted knowledge today. 
Unfortunately, this narrative has at least one relatively big question 
mark: to quote the centuries-old axiom, knowledge is power. In this regard, 
the government-sponsored power granted to patent-holders over informa-
tion and knowledge combined to build an invention is strong private power; 
or more precisely, legal monopoly power, having a strong effect on the func-
tioning of markets and states, and thus society. 
8  See C. Fisk, ‘Removing the ‘Fuel of interest’ from the ‘fire of the genius’: law and 
employee-inventor, 1830–1930’, 65 University of Chicago Law Review 4 (1998): 1127–1198. 
On the move to include corporations as inventors see also J. Boyle, Shamans, Software, and 
Spleens: Law and the construction of the information society (Harvard UP 1996).
9  J. Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital (Macmillan 1956), p. 87.
10  See K. Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion’, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princ-
eton University Press 1962), pp. 609–626.
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Technically, once a patent is granted, a legal monopoly over the inven-
tion is set up, since any (tradable) good and service containing traces of that 
proprietary knowledge operates under private control, and is thus enforcea-
ble, for a fixed period of time. The incentives in playing regulatory capture of 
such a power rule regime should not be taken for granted.
Nowadays, large corporations increasingly pursue profit-maximiz-
ing strategies by using ownership links and contracts exercising power over 
knowledge. The government-sponsored appropriation of knowledge further 
maximizes their exercise of (private) power, expanding long-term accumula-
tion of capital through the corporate form and structure. Thus, we should not 
be so naïve in the general discourse of proprietary innovation. 
The interdependence phenomenon coined as ‘globalization’ is com-
monly understood to be an historical phase in the evolution of market cap-
italism, whose development is essentially technological in nature.11 As the 
fine global policy practitioners emphasize, globalization is nothing if not the 
worldwide technology-driven spread of capitalism –a process which has been 
unfolding, in fits and starts, for three hundred years.12
Traditional political thinking, and thus the ideological frame of main-
stream policymakers (whether left or right), are challenged by these global 
transformative forces. For most informed observers, the policy space and mo-
mentum to substitute (read ‘provide an alternative’), re-engineer (read ‘medi-
ation’), or counterbalance (read ‘resistance’) global capitalism is weak, at best. 
However, there are plenty of people doing powerful things under a new 
non-proprietary information paradigm. In any case, the fact is that we all live 
in uneasy and perplexing times.
Capital holders concentrate power through corporate proxies, while 
public power is generally diminishing, and often adapting its capacity to 
transform societies to the special interests of the former. Given this state of 
affairs, current regulatory captures transforming science into proprietary 
knowledge come as no great surprise. After all, the ratcheting up of IP stand-
ards (legal monopoly on information) is an optimum policy for profit maxi-
mizing through corporate proxies, as societies increasingly trade in knowl-
edge-intensive goods and services. 
11  P. Lamy, Globalization and trade opening can promote human rights, WTO | 
Speeches and statements (5 June 2009).
12  P. Lamy, The need for ‘unity in our global diversity’, WTO | Speeches and 
statements (14 June 2011).
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People are not legal persons. Our social nature moves us to explore, un-
derstand, and collectively transform the fruits of our endeavors into tools that 
improve our life within community. In this regard, it is fair to sustain that 
inventions are essentially collective endeavors,13 and a natural by-product of 
inter-individual collaboration (cumulative innovation) that has been advanc-
ing relentlessly, in fits and starts, since our ancestors shared caves. 
Thus, the public-good nature of information should reasonably be 
translated into policy measures.14 There are multiple ways for financing 
knowledge public goods.15 Prizes and auctions are, for example, alternative 
ways of rewarding breakthrough inventiveness and thus also breakthrough 
inventions and innovation.16 
Informed observers and A2K (Access to Knowledge) advocates are mak-
ing quantum leaps in analysing as well as practicing non-proprietary alterna-
tives to patent systems and other IP vehicles for spurring innovation. Against 
the background of public-goods theories, these people build a strong case argu-
ing that exclusive right regimes for information lead to inefficiency (underuse 
of information) from both a consumption and production perspective. 
The information-commons paradigm has strong transformative power.
It is reasonable to suppose that the exclusion of those willing to afford the 
social cost of using information (individual time and efforts) will inhibit in-
novation. Those excluded cannot do socially useful things with proprietary 
information, thus leading to underuse by non-property holders or license 
have-nots.
13  R. Allen, ‘Collective invention’, 4 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organi-
zation (1983): 1–24 and A. Nuvolari, “Collective invention during the British Industrial 
Revolution”, 28 Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 (2004): 347–363.
14  Y. Benkler, ‘The Idea of Access to Knowledge and the Information Commons: 
Long-Term Trends and Basic Elements’, Access to Knowledge in the age of Intellectual 
Property (Zed Books 2010), p. 219.
15  On financing public goods see J. Love & T. Hubbard, ‘Paying for Public Goods’, 
Code: Collaborative Ownership and the Digital Economy (MIT Press 2005) at 207–229 
and T. Hubbard &. J. Love. ‘A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D’ 2 PloS 
Biology 2 (2004): E52. For comments see D. Baker, Financing Drug Research: What Are 
the Issues? (Center for Economic and Policy Research 2004).
16  For prizes in innovation see B. Wright, ‘The economics of invention incentives: 
Patents, prizes, and research contracts”, 73 American Economic Review (1983): 691–707 
and S. Shavell & T. Van Ypersele. ‘Rewards versus intellectual property rights’ 44 Journal 
of Law and Economics (2001): 525–547. For auctions see, in particular, M. Kremer, ‘Pat-
ent buyouts: a mechanism for encouraging innovation’ 113 Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 4 (1998): 1137–1167.
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Exclusive rights regimes reduce innovation and externalize social costs 
by reducing productive consumption of information goods.17 In this sense, 
the ‘invention’ of government-sponsored intangible rights raises some issues 
deserving care. In this regard, critics make a case for sustaining that the right 
global infrastructure for innovation, collaboration and flow of knowledge and 
ideas among ‘innovation players’ are comparatively more powerful incentives 
for breakthrough innovation (which arguably is where social progress stands) 
than exclusive rights regimes.
Alternatively, for advocates of the information-commons paradigm, 
non-commercial, non-proprietary, individual and peer production encapsu-
late a transformative policy vision of its own: shifting from the current pro-
duction model based on private means of production and the commodifying 
of labor (enclosed in proprietary knowledge) …to open models based on so-
cial means of production, non-proprietary knowledge and open information 
infrastructures. 
These inspiring currents of practice and thought could always sustitute, 
reform or at least counterbalance the hyper protection and enforcement of 
IP. However, the patent system and related IP vehicles somehow appear to 
be locked-in. Decision-making in this area is constrained by stringent inter-
national commitments. Therefore, rebalancing exclusive rights regimes and 
other public values is a key issue for all, whether living in Asia, Europe, Africa 
or America. Jagdish Bhagwati bluntly but clearly depicted the challenge pro-
duced by the TRIPS agreement:
Few believe that the optimum IPR is zero; and so do few believe that it extends as high as 
the 20-year patent rule that was forced into the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the 
business lobbies!18
Not only are such terms highly questionable for their insufficient deliber-
ation, but different types of inventions would also reasonably require different 
17  See M. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets’ 3 Harvard Law Review 111(1998): 621–88; S. Scotchmer, ‘Stand-
ing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law’, 5 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 1 (1991): 29–41 and R. Merges & R. Nelson, ‘On the Complex Eco-
nomics of Patent Scope’, 90 Columbia Law Review 4 (1990): 839–916.
18  J. Bhagwati, ‘Economic Freedom: Prosperity and Social Markets (Key Note 
Speech)’, Economic Conference on Economic Freedom and Development, Tokyo (June 
17-18, 1999).
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terms of protection.19 Last but not least, and notwithstanding the rules in place, 
there is no one universally optimum level of protection for all states.20 
Therefore, the stakes in global patent politics are high. On one hand, 
technology-importing countries generally argue for more IP flexibility and 
mandatory technology transfer. On the other hand, technology-exporting 
countries not only argue for the opposite but for ratcheting up IP stand-
ards; the former are often in the group of developing countries (leaving aside 
emerging economies), and the latter in that of developed countries.
There are no conclusive evidence that exclusive rights are capable of 
leading to higher levels of breakthrough innovation than nonproprietary al-
ternatives. In this regard, the public-goods nature of information advocates 
caution, and thus keeping IP regimes reduced to the minimum. Minimized 
exclusive rights regimes increase social efficiency, by giving more individuals 
a chance to innovate (cumulative innovation). 
However, setting up alternatives to patent systems is difficult. A com-
plex legal infrastructure regulating patents is already in place in both domes-
tic and international law. As mentioned above, the international patent sys-
tem is locked-in, as there is enormous public and private investment in its de-
velopment, too many vested interests, and too many people working within. 
In any case, history is never linear. In fact, the famous controversy over 
patents between 1850 and 1875 almost put the cause of patents under the 
wheels of laissez faire and free trade;21 thus, such critical events also suggest 
that policy room is not fixed but fluid, and can always be worked out in order 
to reengineer the international patent system. 
3. A matrix 
Arguably we should not frame the issue around a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to patent systems 
but instead focus on what is missing, what needs to be replaced or fixed. Any 
reform of the international patent system requires a balance between appro-
19  See W. D. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth and Welfare (MIT Press 1969) (par-
ticularly chapter 5), and F. M. Scherer, ‘‘Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A ge-
ometric reinterpretation’, 62 American Economic Review (1972): 422–427.
20  See P. Drahos, ‘“IP World”-Made by TNC Inc’, Access to Knowledge in the age 
of Intellectual Property (Zed Books 2010), p. 199.
21  F. Machlup & E. Penrose, ‘The patent controversy in the nineteenth century’, 1 
Journal of Economic History 10 (1950): 1–29.
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priation of knowledge (monopoly) and diffusion of knowledge (free-riding) 
and there are probably some cost-effective solutions for obtaining a proper 
balance. 
Following Meir Pugatch, the measurement levels for all IP protection 
can be geometrically portrayed as a three-dimensional matrix: a first dimen-
sion (the X axis) of the scope of protection (e.g. how widely is market exclu-
sivity granted), a second dimension (the Y axis) on the strength of exclusiv-
ity/degree of monopoly granted (e.g. how difficult are CL to obtain) and a 
third dimension (Z axis) on the periods of protection.22 
The content of this taxonomy has to be more seriously deliberated by 
society at large. In this sense, for example, the standard of real inventive-
ness should simply be very high, in order to reengineer the patent system 
towards breakthrough invention, not innovative techno-trinkets. In this re-
gard, inventions should pass meaningful standards of patentability (effective 
application of the tests of patentability in the public interest), and should be 
linked through penalties to full disclosure of know-how, as this permits the 
invention to be worked once the patent has expired.23
Reasonably, patents should not be granted easily. The overarching 
presumption of patentability means that doubts over patentability are of-
ten weighted by patent offices in favor of the patent applicant.24 As Llewelyn 
explains, although patents are said to reward inventors contributing to the 
public good, neither contribution nor public good is currently acting as the 
driving force behind the grant of such rights.25 
The reward of inventiveness lies at the heart of the grant of a patent. 
However, the functioning of the patent system currently rewards those who 
invest in the patent process itself. Thus, nowadays, the presence of break-
through inventiveness in patent systems is at a minimum. 
Defining what inventive step means (the standard of inventiveness to 
be set) is not easy. However, imposing a global standard of genuine creative 
22  M. Pugatch, ‘The international regulation of IPRs in a TRIPS and TRIPS plus 
world’ 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade 3 (2005):430–465.
23  P. Drahos, with J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowl-
edge Econ omy? (Earthscan 2002), p. 206.
24  For public-private regulatory partnerships in patent offices see P. Drahos, The 
Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and their clients (Cambridge University 
Press 2010).
25  M. Llewelyn, ‘Schrodinger’s Cat: An Observation on Modern Patent Law’ Death 
of Patents op. cit., p. 12.
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inventiveness is a priority, as the expansion of patent monopoly has created 
an incentive to invest in the patent itself, rather than in inventiveness.26 As 
a result, it is increasingly fair to say that not only is the validity of all these 
patents undermined but that of the patent system itself. 
Notwithstanding these and other alternatives, public rulemaking is 
steadily pushing for upward ratcheting of IP through a wide variety of (mul-
tilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral) initiatives. For this reason, the safe-
guards available in patent law are to be seriously considered. 
In this regard, current patent limits and exceptions (in both domestic 
and international law) offer significant policy space to readapt patent ecosys-
tems to the needs of knowledge-based societies, without recourse to major re-
forms. Hence, they are a powerful avenue to explore for balancing innovation 
and diffusion, as some policies in developing countries have shown. 
In fact, some governments are timidly reconsidering assumptions over 
the proper functioning of exclusive rights regimes. As a result, patent-re-
stricting decisions to protect innovation and/or development in technolog-
ical areas are beginning to take place. These interventions (notably through 
compulsory licenses and mandatory cross-licensing) rely on antitrust war-
fare. Policy initiatives in this area generally focus on limiting IP protection to 
secure innovation and market efficiency in critical technological areas (e.g. 
essential technological standards) but also on access to technology by have-
nots (e.g. exorbitant prices), among other objetives.
The power of competition law and policy should not be taken for grant-
ed. Notably, for example, some current interventions in the area of com-
munications technologies use out-of-court mandatory guidance to develop 
a dynamic balance of rights and obligations both (A) between individual 
patent-holders (e.g. Samsung vs Apple), and also (B) among groups of pat-
ent-holders in critical areas (e.g. essential technological standards). 
Also interestingly mobile communications and internet technologies 
are increasingly withholding patent protection. In fact, the current stage of 
technological development in this sector would have been severely inhibited 
if patent-holders had generally prevented others from using those inventions. 
Thus, the evolution of this highly innovative sector suggests that pub-
lic authorities can contribute to spurring innovation through a policy mix, 
based on softening (government-sponsored) exclusive right regimes, and se-
26  P. Drahos, ‘Death of the Patent System - Introduction’, Death of Patents (Law-
text Pub Ltd 2005), p. 9.
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curing (government-sponsored) open architecture and joint development in 
the long-term. 
This approach is being increasingly pursued in recent times. As a re-
sult, for example, antitrust authorities from key technology-exporting pow-
ers, such as the European Union and the United States, have up-scaled their 
surveillance over private negotiations and decisions regarding voluntary li-
censing of technology, and are now intervening in ‘licensing transactions’ re-
lated to essential patents on communication technologies. This policy trend 
aims at securing voluntary licenses for essential technologies through proac-
tive public intervention.
Civil society has a contribution to make in this area. In this regard, legal 
incentives for private antitrust actions against anticompetitive behavior in 
the IP world (treble damages, etc) should be enhanced in order to give more 
room to cause-lawyering and watchdog litigation against IP-based anti-com-
petitive behavior. 
Last but not least, the intensive use of technology in advanced socie-
ties would suggest a reform of the international patent system to implement 
an automatic (and cheap to license) global mandatory regime for essential 
technological inventions. There is a strong case for applying a flat fee equa-
tion-based license regarding payments for the use of patents without the need 
for authorization.
Interestingly, the European Union currently provides for mandato-
ry compulsory cross licensing of both patents and sui generis plant variety 
protection in sensitive cases: those involving follow-on innovations entailing 
significant technological progress of considerable general interest.27 This ex-
perience proves that there is some policy space for downward ratcheting of 
propietary-knowledge. 
In short, the establishment of non-exclusive rights regimes should be 
more seriously considered. Reasonably, as explained below, automatic licens-
ing based on compensatory liability regimes28 would be an easy to implement 
alternative for avoiding the increasing social costs of IP-based excludability / 
exclusivity in critical scientific and technological areas. 
27  See Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights 
(27 July 1994) and Directive 98/44/EC on biotechnological inventions (6 July 1998).
28  See S. Picciotto & D. Campbell, ‘Whose Molecule Is It Anyway? op. cit at 280 
and J. Reichman, ‘Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable 
Innovation’, Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Innovation Policy for 
the Information Society (Oxford University Press 2001), pp. 23–53.
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4. Index 
The current pages explore global IP policy developments in the area of 
life-sciences. To encapsulate its content, the book first explores the main pat-
terns and trends of the global ratcheting up of IP standards (chapters 2 to 
4), and goes on to explain some feasible pragmatic market-driven changes to 
make it work for the public interest (chapters 5 and 6). Subsequently, these 
pages explore the variety of ways in which the proprietary paradigm of knowl-
edge (the IP paradigm) relates to science (chapter 7), and society (chapter 8) 
to finally wrap-up with some conclusions (chapter 9). 
Specifically, the second chapter enters the current world policy battles 
on pharmaceutical patent protection, and the games of the so-called global 
forum shift in IP standard-setting. 
The globalization of IP law was subject to a strategic forum shift from 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the multilateral 
trading regime. IP was incorporated in the 8th round of GATT multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN), beginning in 1986 and giving rise to the TRIPS 
agreement on 1 January 1996.
However, this historical treaty-based device, producing top-down 
standardization, was drafted according to the terms of developed countries 
and their patent-holding and copyright constituencies, and thus did not take 
due account of its possible social effects on low-earning individuals, notably, 
but not only, in developing countries. As a result, developed and developing 
countries have, for more than a decade been involved in a rather tense re-reg-
ulatory process aimed at securing legal ‘flexibilities’ with respect to these 
rules. In this regard, the historical Declaration on public health and access to 
medicines at the launch of the Doha Development Round (2001) functioned 
as a legitimizing world policy framework for the quest to improve access to 
affordable medicines in developing societies.29 
The third chapter explains how trade in generics is a priority policy for 
both low-income individuals and health authorities in the developing world, as 
trade is margin cutting, and thus the most effective way of purchasing afforda-
ble medicines (read through global markets) when developing countries lack 
the manufacturing capacity to produce medicines under compulsory license. 
However, developed countries are strategically undermining the sus-
29  See WT/MIN (01)/Dec/2, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreements and Public Health (20 November 2001).
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tainability of production and distribution of generics for both domestic con-
sumption and export through a wide variety of global initiatives. In this re-
gard, the brave new world of increasing TRIPS+ schemes promoted by devel-
oped countries suggest legal ceilings should be established against extra IP 
protection and enforcement in life-sciences. 
The next chapter navigates the current segmentation of patent protec-
tion in the so-called ‘world markets’, and analyzes the traditional trade policy 
solution for enhancing access to medicines in the developing world. This pol-
icy change, taking trade back home to the multilateral system, could certainly 
out- compete the burdensome and strikingly ineffective state-driven mecha-
nism designed in 2003 to facilitate access to generics in developing countries 
that lack manufacturing capacity: the WTO 2003 Decision on the so-called 
paragraph 6 issue of the 2001 Doha Declaration. 
Alternatively, market-driven solutions need to be deployed. The mul-
tilateral trading system could improve access to affordable generic medicines 
in low-income countries by concentrating on what it does best, namely, pro-
moting world trade in brand-name and non-brand name drugs, and thus 
market formation on a global scale. 
The fifth chapter explains the power of competition as a TRIPS-com-
patible vehicle for accessing medicines in the developing world. In this re-
gard, there is a critical legal tension between the market-building approach 
to development of the multilateral trading regime, based on free trade and its 
comparative advantages, and the monopoly rights inoculated in this regime 
through IP linkage to trade. 
Arguably, the business of mainstream antitrust law and policy in de-
veloped countries is increasingly focused on price-based consumer welfare 
maximization under the limited rationale of dynamic oligopoly regulation. 
The point to make here, ironically, is that this pervasive approach to-
wards antitrust in advanced economies (focusing on prices and price-based 
consumer welfare) could seriously improve access to medicines in the devel-
oping world through antitrust enforcement cooperation, particularly if carry-
ing out regular coordinated inter-state investigations on global anti-compet-
itive licensing practices. 
Interestingly, some authorities from developing countries have taken 
the smart route of antitrust law and policy by threatening with the issuance 
of compulsory license-based consent decrees in order to down-price critical 
therapeutic brand-name drugs in their territories. 
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Reasonably, antitrust authorities from developed countries could cer-
tainly help to enforce down pricing policies through current schemes of anti-
trust enforcement cooperation, by simply following the dictates of consumer 
welfare maximization, and thus taking IP-based anticompetitive behaviour 
seriously (e.g: exorbitant prices).
The sixth chapter deals with the tense issue of what should be done, 
when and where, from the policy angle of inter-agency competence. In this 
regard, it recalls that health and economic agencies share competence, not 
only across the board of IP domestic policymaking but also international pol-
icymaking. 
In principle, IP is related to trade as long as trade and IP are also re-
lated to health. In this sense, increased policy deference between health and 
economic agencies would be highly advisable from a purely rational angle. 
If this were the case, policy coherence could be increased and, by extension, 
higher levels of legitimacy could be reached in this socially sensitive area of 
world policy making.
Thus, the chapter argues that specialized domestic agencies (e.g. health 
and economy ministers), as well as the global institutions in which these sep-
arately participate (e.g. WHO, WIPO, WTO, etc), should embrace upstream 
engagement in global policymaking. In this respect, there is an evident case 
for equal involvement of health ministers in any global negotiation dealing 
with health-related IP protection. 
The seventh chapter generally explores the structural tensions between 
scientific innovation and knowledge appropriation in a world in which the 
profit-maximizing corporate proxies of capital-holders increasingly use the 
so-called ‘IP asssets’ as devices to discipline if not annull markets and com-
petition. 
In order to do that, the chapter approaches the issue of propie-
tary-knowledge under the prism of institutional stake holders such as WIPO 
and WHO high level scientific committes. Finally, it explores the potential 
impact of the extreme IP paradigm on the functioning of the advanced aca-
demic and scientific institutions. 
Following that, chapter eight argues that IP functions a sort of super-as-
set, which is not only highly liquid but fully enforceable worldwide; thus, a 
highly tradable world property in its own rights. In addition, the chapter sug-
gests that many hub-and-spokes global licensing schemes annul market and 
competition-mechanisms and thus operate anticompetitive arrangements. 
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Finally, the wrap-up chapter poses some open reflexions and conclu-
sions, and basically argues for mitigating the current extreme IP paradigm.In 
this regard, the international patent system is probably here to stay for some 
years to come. Transforming the game is not an easy task, as path depend-
ence and vested interests are in place. Thus, while we work for strong policy 
upgrades in the interest of everyone, it would be reasonable not to neglect 
policy-second bests; in the meantime, these could at least secure some degree 
of knowledge ecology in the functioning of patent ecosystems. 
Conceptually, on one hand, the granting of government-sponsored pro-
prietary rights over knowledge diverges not only from the very public-goods 
nature of information but also from the cooperative side of human nature. 
On the other hand, for centuries, government-sponsored monopolies 
have proved to be an extremely well trodden path, providing both a corridor 
and a revolving door for special interests in colluding against the general in-
terest. 
Thus, any exclusive rights regime must be addressed with consummate 
caution. In this regard, whatever the government-sponsored IP optimum 
is said to be now and then (read legal scope, strength, and period of pro-
tection), public decision-making regarding the propertization of knowledge 
should proceed with greater care. 
Access to affordable medicines is one of the most qualified examples 
of the social challenges produced by proprietary knowledge, as patents ul-
timately deal with human life and death. The following pages focus on such 
issues, in order to explore their social implications. In this regard, patent sys-
tems should be socially sustainable.
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CHESS-BOARD POLITICS 
1. Trading on IP 
The transition from government to governance, as Picciotto explains, means 
a lack of a clear hierarchy of norms, a blurring of distinctions between hard 
and soft law, and a fragmentation of public functions entailing a resurgence of 
technocracy.1 In this context, the globalization of intellectual property stand-
ards exacerbates the historical tensions that characterise patent and health 
protection.2 Private interest and public values are in increasing conflict,3 
while developed and developing countries continuously shift fora, battling to 
ratchet IP protection up or down.4 
These regulatory fluxes produced the first critical forum shift to the 
benefit of IP constituencies during the Uruguay Round. This shift is already 
part of modern world history, as it officially inaugurated a relentless and se-
1  For an historical analysis through the prism of law and legal creativity see S. 
Picciotto, Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
as well as ‘International Transformations of the Capitalist State’, 43 Antipode 1 (2011): 
87–107.
2  See G. Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third 
World (Princeton University Press 1983), J. Braithwaite, Corporate crime in the phar-
maceutical industry (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984), M. Ryan, Knowledge Diploma-
cy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property (Brookings Institution 
Press 1998), P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: who owns the knowl-
edge economy (Earthscan 2002), S. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globaliza-
tion of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge University Press 2003), P. Drahos, The 
Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and their clients (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2010).
3  See S. Picciotto, ‘Defending the public interest in TRIPS and the WTO’ Global 
intellectual property rights: Knowledge, access and development (Palgrave Macmillan / 
Oxfam 2002), pp. 224–243.
4  P. Drahos, ‘Four lessons for developing countries from the trade negotiations 
over access to medicines’ 28 Liverpool Law Review (2007): 33.
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rious game of global ‘chessboard politics’ on the protection, limits and excep-
tions to knowledge-based monopoly rights.5
At the beginning of the 1980s, parties to the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, the oldest convention providing protection 
for patented inventions outside domestic laws, applied the rules of non-dis-
crimination and national treatment to patents and patent applications but 
retained country autonomy in substantive criteria such as the patentability or 
non-patentability of pharmaceuticals.6 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, a Diplomatic Conference held under the 
auspices of WIPO attempted to revise the Convention. However, developing 
and developed countries could not agree on critical issues such as compulso-
ry licenses (CL).7 In fact, attempts by developing countries to upgrade its CL 
provisions (article 5A) brought the Conference to an end.8 
The failure of this Conference persuaded IP constituencies to promote a 
forum shift to the next round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). 
By the time of the launch of the Uruguay Round (1986), 49 of the 98 mem-
bers of the Paris Convention excluded patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products.9 In essence, US IP constituencies shifted their strategy from the IP 
to the trade regime and pushed the United Trade Representative (USTR) to 
follow suit as a final effect of the crises facing the WIPO in its dealings with 
the US, when WIPO became a forum for criticism of copyright and patents in 
the 1960s and 70s. 
The move to the multilateral trading system also aimed to benefit 
from the comparative institutional advantages of the new dispute settle-
5  K. Alter & S. Meunier, ‘The International Politics of Regime Complexity’, 7 
Perspectives on Politics (2009): 13–24.
6  See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 
1883, as revised at Stockholm (1967), 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305.
7  See e.g. J.H, Reichman & C, Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented 
Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of 
the Practice in Canada and the USA, UNCTAD/ICTSD-Project on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Issue Paper No. 5 (2003).
8  Compulsory licensing is as old as patent law. For the historical origins of the 
patent system see, in particular, I. Mgbeoji, ‘The Juridical Origins of the International 
Patent System: Towards a Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization’ 5 
Journal of History of International Law (2003): 403–422.
9  See Existence, scope and form of generally internationally accepted and ap-
plied Standards/Norms for the Protection of Intellectual Property-Note prepared by the 
International Bureau of WIPO (15 September 1988). MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/Rev.1.
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ment mechanism that was being negotiated in the Uruguay Round (e.g. 
binding multilateral jurisdiction and authorization of sanctions/suspension 
of concessions).10 
Interestingly, the ministers represented in WIPO reacted with celerity, 
launching negotiations to produce a (WIPO) dispute settlement treaty, but 
the initiative was derailed.11 As a result, trade-related IP rights are now part of 
a ‘WTO covered agreement’ and thus enforceable through its binding dispute 
settlement mechanism.12 
Wanted or not, WIPO had to learn to ‘share’ its original competences 
with WTO, and nowadays provides legal advice and technical assistance on 
TRIPS implementation in accordance with their cooperation agreement of 
1995.13 Therefore, a pure jurisdictional reallocation or ‘forum shifting’ has tak-
en place in the area of global IP protection. 
As a result, new global standards for IP protection were established 
under the TRIPS agreement. Thus, ministers of trade and finance managed 
to inoculate IP protection within the multilateral trading system by using a 
strategic association of ideas: ‘trade-relatedness’. 
Obviously, the ‘trade-relatedness’ invention opens up a world of pos-
sibilities for global policy formation in all areas, and thus also to multiple 
jurisdictional reallocations,14 as almost everything is interrelated, in some way 
or another.
10  For the negotiating history see J. Ross & J. Wasserman, ‘Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights’, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating His-
tory (1986-1992), Volume II (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1993) at 2241–2313 
and D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Sweet and Max-
well 1998).
11  See WIPO Proposed Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes between States in the 
Field of Intellectual Property, WO/GA/XXI/2 (30 April 1997) and Background informa-
tion document, WO/GA/XXI/3 (30 April 1997).
12  For the first studies on the forum-shifting paradigm see J. Braithwaite & P. 
Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2000) at 564–571 
and L. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of Inter-
national Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1 
(2004): 1–83.
13  For a detailed overview see WIPO Annual Reports, available at http://www.
wipo.int.
14  See chapter 6.
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2. TRIPS lens
The TRIPS agreement is a revolution in the history of IP protection.15 Having 
been designed to establish minimum protection standards for trade-related 
IP, this treaty applies a top-down approach towards harmonization.16 Basi-
cally, it is the most far-reaching and comprehensive legal regime ever to be 
concluded in the intellectual property area.17 However, the TRIPS provisions 
do not establish ‘IP-related’ public health protection with similar sensitivity. 
Consequently, this agreement has been in need of strategic re-engineering 
from the very first day that it entered into force in 1996. 
Developing countries ‘agreed’ to negotiate the TRIPS agreement during 
the Uruguay Round in exchange for trade concessions on textiles and agri-
cultural products, and under the pressure of US trade unilateralism.18 The 
agreement was in fact negotiated in the shadow of unilateral trade sanctions 
pursued by the so-called USTR diplomacy.19 
GATT Contracting Parties such as Brazil, India, Argentina, Cuba, 
Egypt, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and the former Yugoslavia were 
among the most active GATT Contracting Parties opposing IP lawmaking in 
the Uruguay Round, arguing that the multilateral trade system was primarily 
concerned with trade in goods and not property rights in intangibles.20
15  C. Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global 
Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries (Oxford University Press 
2008), p. 1.
16  P. Stephan, “Institutions and Elites: Property, Contract, the State, and Rights 
in Information in the Global Economy”, 10 Cardozo Journal of International Law and 
Comparative Law (2002): 305–306.
17  C. Correa & A.Yusuf, Intellectual Property and International Trade: the TRIPS 
Agreement (Kluwer Law International 1998), p. xvii.
18  See K. Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing coun-
tries, Oxford University Press, 2001 and R. Okediji, ‘Public Welfare and the Role of the 
WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS Agreement’, 17 Emory International Law Review 2 
(2003): 819–918.
19  The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988 amended section 301 of 
the US Trade Act of 1974 and required USTR to identify inadequate domestic IP protection 
and unilaterally enforce market access. See, particularly, M. Ryan, ‘The Function-Specif-
ic and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’, 19 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law (1998): 558–559.
20  J. Bradley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in 
the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations’, 23 Stanford Journal of International Law 
(1987): 8.
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However, their initial resistance for a narrower interpretation of the 
mandate for the Uruguay Round negotiations on this issue (Ministerial Dec-
laration of 1986) broke down in 1988, with the second amendment of the 
Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, the so-called Special 301.
Entering into operation in 1989, Special 301 granted USTR the authori-
ty to apply unilateral trade sanctions against countries providing ‘insufficient’ 
protection of intellectual property. Indicatively, 5 of the 10 countries in the 
hard line group which was against incorporating IP protection in the nego-
tiations were listed for bilateral attention in the first USTR announcement 
of Special 301 country targets. Countries such as Argentina or Egypt were 
placed on the Watch List, while both Brazil and India, the leading opponents 
of the US agenda were placed on the Priority Watch List, Special 301 most 
serious country-category (USTR’s annual Special 301 IPR Reports).21
As a result, the original legal framework of WTO law today contains an 
agreement on trade-related IP protection. However, almost a decade since it 
entered into force, there is growing criticism among developing countries as 
they have to live with the ‘burden’ of stringent IP standards, while developed 
countries have not equally honoured their trade commitments (lowering tar-
iffs and subsidies on agriculture and textiles).22 
Last, but not least, the TRIPS agreement is producing some unforeseen 
adverse effects on the policies of the developing world.23 As Drahos explains, both 
developed and developing countries alike were generally in ignorance about its 
likely effects on information markets:24 in addition, most importer nations did 
not have a clear understanding of their interests and, as this Australian recalls, 
were not in the room when the critical technical details were settled.25
21  F. Abbott, ‘Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Prop-
erty Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework’, 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Trans-
national Law (1989): 689 and 708–709.
22  See Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy: Report 
the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (2003), p. 8.
23  On the perverse distributional effects of TRIPS patent protection with regards 
to pharmaceuticals see, in particular, E. Benvenisti & G. Downs, ‘Distributive Politics and 
International Institutions: The Case of Drugs’, 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of In-
ternational Law (2004): 21–52.
24  P. Drahos, “Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-setting”, Study Paper 008 of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(United Kingdom 2001), p. 13.
25  See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit at 190–191 and F. Scherer, 
‘A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting’, 27 World Economy (2004).
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The information revolution has reduced production costs, significantly 
raising the (legal) value of knowledge. In theory, TRIPS rules were precisely 
designed to promote the legal protection of these knowledge-production pro-
cesses; in practice, however, the rules do not facilitate access to medicines in 
the developing world, among others issues.
In any case, finding a proper balance between patents and health is not 
itself an easy task, as interests and values are seriously at odds in this disput-
ed area of global politics.26 
Conventional thinking on patents argues that effective patent protec-
tion is a prerequisite for technological innovation, and thus also a lever for 
economic development generally.27 According to this view, IP friendly envi-
ronments promote foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer 
(e.g. foreign technology licensing, and joint ventures).28 Conversely, critical 
thinking argues that less burdensome public mechanisms could alternatively 
obtain similar outcomes without incurring the social burdens of patent sys-
tems. 
Interestingly, numbers provided by the industry itself tend to bear this 
out. For example, the figure provided by the US pharmaceutical industry it-
self in its 2011 industry profile reached $ 67.4 billion on Global R&D by all 
private companies in 2010.29 For that same year, the estimate on global sales 
by industry-friendly IMS Health Market Prognosis reached $ 856 billion.30 
But leaving aside those figures, there is also a strong point to make that 
the price we pay for patents nowadays is unrelated to the price of discovery 
and development. This is not only a question of price that the consumer can 
afford but also the price paid by under developed societies. Access to afforda-
26  On the two main schools alternatively suggesting a conflict (primacy of human 
rights) or co-existence (need for a balance) of human rights with IP monopoly rights see 
L. Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights; Conflict or Co-existence?’, 5 
Minnesota Intellectual Property Review (2003).
27  For the first global reports on the interaction between IP, technology transfer 
and FDI see Economic Arguments for Protecting Intellectual Property Effectively (OCDE 
1989) and Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Development 1993).
28  See e.g. Creativity, Innovation and Economic Growth in the 21st Century: An 
Affirmative Case of Intellectual Property Rights, Business and Industry Advisory Com-
mittee to the OECD 2004.
29  See 2011 PhRMA industry profile, p. 2.
30  See ‘Total Unaudited and Audited Global Pharmaceutical Market: 2003–2010’, 
IMS Health Market Prognosis (March 2011).
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ble medicines in any given society has a significantly more positive impact on 
development than high standards of pharmaceutical patent protection and 
enforcement.31 
Notwithstanding the dilemmas raised by the patent and health rela-
tionship, a variety of authoritative diagnostics reveal that a more nuanced bal-
ance between public health (rights of citizens/patients) and private property 
(rights of patent holders/corporations) is needed, particularly (but not ex-
clusively) regarding access to affordable medicines in the developing world.32
3. Flexibility 
Small groups tend to be more adept than the general public at organizing 
the ways in which they pursue their interests, as their transaction costs are 
lower.33 As a result of that, developed countries over-protected the interests 
of their industries in TRIPS agreement. 
The drafting of the TRIPS agreement was basically a trade diplomat 
driven-process permeated by the latter.34 Indeed, its very existence (and a 
good deal of its substance) owes much to the global firms that guided the 
USTR strategy during the Uruguay Round negotiations with a generously 
staffed team of business advisors and IP experts.35 
31  See B. Wright, ‘The economics of invention incentives’ and S. Shavell & T. Van 
Ypersele. ‘Rewards versus intellectual property rights’, M. Kremer, ‘Patent buyouts: a 
mechanism for encouraging innovation’ op. cit, J. Love, From TRIPS to RIPS: A Better 
Trade Framework to Support Innovation in Medical Technologies, Paper presented at 
Agence Nationale de Recherches sur le Sida, University of the Mediterranean (Marseille 
2003) and T. Hubbard & J. Love, ‘A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D’ 
Plos Biology 2: 147–150.
32  For scientific and deliberative commissions on the issue see, in particular, Pub-
lic Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, Final Report of the WHO Com-
mission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (WHO 2006) and 
Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy, Report the UK Commis-
sion on Intellectual Property Rights (2003).
33  M. Olson, The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups 
(Harvard University Press 1965), pp. 22–36.
34  See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit (chapters 8 and 9).
35  In the words of Sell: “it was not merely their relative economic power that led to 
their ultimate success, but their command on IP expertise, their ideas, their information, 
and their framing skills (translating complex issues into political discourse”. See S. Sell, 
Private Power op. cit., p. 4.
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In essence, the USTR acted as a proxy for the technology and pharma-
ceutical industry (through the US Advisory Committee on Trade and Policy 
Negotiation) and the EU representatives as well as other developed countries 
followed suit.36 
The TRIPS agreement is a regulatory by-product of global corporate 
capitalism.37 Its drafting was seriously and strongly influenced by a precisely 
circumscribed coalition of private technology exporters, namely, the twelve 
companies that originally founded the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) 
in 1986 in order to mobilise support for the adventure.3839 In the bold words of 
Susan Sell, a dozen corporations managed to make public law for the world.40 
The capacity of developing countries to influence outcomes was limited 
by US unilateralism but also as a result of the scant exposure of some devel-
oping country negotiators to the arcane technicalities of western (read also 
US-style) intellectual property law.41 Thus, a model of IP protection which 
originated in the developed world has been transplanted to the developing 
world through the tools of international law.42
In consequence, flexibility is required. The way the TRIPS agreement 
approached development is based merely on transitional periods and is 
therefore too simplistic. The balancing of patent protection and health pro-
tection was envisioned as an issue to be approached by buying time, instead 
of adapting its implementation to the changing levels of development of WTO 
Members (phase-ins) and linking technology transfer to compliance. 
Generally, WTO members had to implement the TRIPS Agreement at 
the end of the 1995–2000 transition periods. In addition, an extra term was 
granted until 1 January 2005 in the area of pharmaceutical product patents 
for certain developing WTO Members. In consequence, these were allowed to 
36  For an insightful business case study on the participation of Pfizer in the develop-
ment of international trade law see M. Sontoro & L. Paine, ‘Pfizer: Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty in a Global Marketplace’, Harvard Business School, Case study No. 9-392-073 (1992).
37  See S. Picciotto, Regulating global corporate op. cit, P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite. 
Information op. cit and J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global business op. cit.
38  For the whole process of this regulatory ‘private-public partnership’ see in par-
ticular P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit.
39  See G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights and the life science industries: A 
Twentieth Century History, (Ashgate 2003).
40  See S. Sell, Private Power op. cit., p. 96.
41  P. Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual’ op. cit., p. 13 
42  See S. Tully, Corporations and International lawmaking (Martinus Nijhoff 2007).
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delay product patent protection in areas not protected by their legal systems 
at the time that the agreement entered into force (TRIPS Article 65.4). Devel-
oping countries (less than twenty developing countries including India and 
Brazil) were required to accept patent applications from 1995 onwards (the 
so-called patent ‘mailbox’) and began to assess them in 2005. 
Finally, a third transition period covering patent protection of pharma-
ceuticals and exclusive marketing rights was granted to provide Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs) with a longer phase-out to comply with TRIPS obli-
gations. As a result, LDCs enjoyed a temporary waiver originally expiring on 
1 January 2006 that has been further extended to 1 January 2016 through a 
Decision of TRIPS Council in 2002.43 
However, transitional periods are inevitably incapable of regulating the 
complexities of pharmaceutical patent protection in the developing world. 
As mentioned above, transitional periods are unconditional, merely based 
on granting developing countries time (phase-outs) to implement the given 
rules. Consequently, they are not easily adapted to the changing realities of 
developing countries and are thus particularly inefficient in regulatory terms.
 As a direct result, WTO Members are currently involved, and have 
been almost since the entry into force of the agreement, in a regulatory 
learning process to re-engineer the TRIPS disciplines in order to address the 
health realities of developing countries.44 In fact, the problem became a pub-
lic relations disaster for the new WTO in 2000, immediately following its first 
and failed Round of negotiations (the so-called Millennium Round, derailed 
in 1999), and prior to beginning a second attempt (the Doha Development 
Round, initiated in 2001). 
At the beginning of a new decade, century and millennium, health ad-
vocates and public health representatives managed to effectively question the 
state of affairs of pharmaceutical patent protection in the developing world 
and blamed TRIPS rules in part for the difficulties that developing countries 
were facing in gaining access to affordable medicines. 
With the WTO’s legitimacy being questioned prior to a new negotiating 
43  See IP/C/25 Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect 
to Pharmaceutical Products, Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Council 
for TRIPS (1 July 2002).
44  For a proposal for making WTO law more pro-development friendly by linking 
IP compliance to economic factors see T. Cottier, ‘From progressive liberalization to progres-
sive regulation in WTO law’, 9 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2006): 779–821.
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round, finding a solution was considered an institutional priority by the WTO 
Secretariat and most, if not all, WTO Members. The world trading system was 
under pressure to deliver consensus-based solutions on this highly sensitive 
issue, and thus also had a major opportunity to demonstrate its ‘flexible’ legal 
culture in the beginning of the Doha Development Round.45 
Thus, trade ministers concentrated on negotiating some collective 
(re)interpretations to extend the scope within TRIPS agreement for pursu-
ing public health policies in developing countries. In this regard, the TRIPS 
Council had the complex task of developing a consensus-based formula (read 
acceptable for all) for reinterpreting TRIPS obligations on this issue.46 
In practice, WTO Members collectively entered into a complex re-regu-
latory learning process which continues today. This sign of the times is clearly 
captured in their reaction, in April 2001, to the settlement of a famous do-
mestic lawsuit against the South African Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act. Interestingly, the settlement of this lawsuit brought 
by the South African Pharmaceutical Industry Association and several affil-
iated companies, merited an unprecedented welcome from the WTO Direc-
tor-General himself. Even the Press Release takes advantage of the event as 
proof of the flexible nature of WTO law: 
The settlement shows that the WTO agreements, such as TRIPS, contain the necessary 
flexibility to meet the health needs of developing countries and can be used as a basis for 
resolving difficult issues concerning access to essential drugs.47
However, arriving at a new legal balance with regard to health-relat-
ed patent protection was never going to be easy. In this respect, the African 
Group, Brazil and India took the lead inside WTO corridors and meeting 
rooms, while social activists were effectively voicing the issue in the global 
media. 
The pressures of developing countries against any substantial policy 
change with regard to patents and health were critical; but the anthrax cases 
in the United States, and the subsequent intention of the US administration 
45  See R. Gold & J. Morin, ‘Consensus-seeking, distrust and rhetorical entrap-
ment: The WTO Decision on access to medicines’ 16 European Journal of International 
Relations 4 (2010): 563–587 (578).
46 See C. Ehlermann & L. Ehring, ‘Decision-making in the world trade organiza-
tion’, 8 Journal of International Economic Law 1 (2005): 64.
47  See WTO News: Speeches—DG Mike Moore. Moore welcomes news of settle-
ment of South Africa drug lawsuit, Geneva (19 April 2001).
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to issue a compulsory license for Cipro (a Bayer antibiotic), secured some 
policy momentum to upgrade the legal status quo. 
In June 2001, TRIPS Council had its first special meeting on access to 
medicines, requested by the African Group. That was also the same month 
that the US withdrew its WTO complaint against Brazil’s pharmaceutical 
policies, thus conveying a change in attitude and suggesting a willingness to 
adapt TRIPS rules to the health realities of the developing world.48 
The rationalization of TRIPS rules began in a 7-hour session of that 
special meeting, with interventions from over 40 delegations.49 In that ses-
sion, trade representatives developed some (first) common interpretations on 
TRIPS inner ‘flexibility’. 
For the WTO Director-General, TRIPS rules ‘strikes a carefully-nego-
tiated balance’ between providing IP protection and ‘the flexibility to ensure 
that treatment reach the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people’. Pur-
suant to this, the TRIPS Council ‘reinforced’ the security that WTO Members 
‘can use’ the available ‘flexibility’ in the agreement. Furthermore, should any 
improvements be needed, as ‘nothing is perfect’, these improvements could 
be negotiated in the Doha Round.50 
Hence, access to medicines was on board the so-called Doha ‘Develop-
ment Round’ in the Ministerial Conference of Qatar. In fact, the Ministerial 
Declaration opening the Round had already underlined the critical impor-
tance of making a pro-health implementation and interpretation ‘by promot-
ing both access to existing medicines and the creation of new medicines’ (par-
agraph 17). 
The Doha Declaration on public health and access to medicines, adopt-
ed in November 2001, was certainly a milestone in the whole process of 
reengineering the TRIPS agreement. In the words of the current WTO DG, 
at the High-Level Symposium on Global Health Diplomacy, held in 2011 to 
mark the Declaration’s 10th anniversary, ‘this historic instrument has rein-
forced health policy choices worldwide’.51
48  See Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc WT/DS199/3 
(January 9, 2001).
49  See the working paper submitted by the African Group and 17 developing coun-
tries. IP/C/W/296, TRIPS and Public Health (June 29, 2001).
50  See WTO News: Speeches—DG Mike Moore. Moore: Countries must feel se-
cure that they can use TRIP´s flexibility (20 June 2001).
51  See WTO News: 10-year-old WTO Declaration has reinforced health policy 
choices, Lamy tells symposium (23 November 2011).
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The key idea underlying the Declaration is formal recognition that the 
TRIPS agreement provides for ‘flexibilities’ to secure state regulatory auton-
omy in the patents and health policy area. The flexibilities of TRIPS rules 
recognized in the 2001 Declaration are to be found and developed through 
the interpretative prism of the objectives and principles of the agreement: 
– Article 7 (objectives): ‘The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of techno-
logical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations’. 
– Article 8 (Principles): ‘[Members may adopt] measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement’. 
Interestingly, Paragraph 5 of the 2001 Declaration itself expressly re-
calls how flexibility needs to be built upon those provisions: ‘In applying 
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each pro-
vision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and 
purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles’. 
The Declaration determines that the TRIPS agreement ‘does not 
and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect pub-
lic health’.52 In this sense, the agreement ‘can and should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to pro-
tect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all’ 
(paragraph 4). Its provisions also refer to a right to use those rules, ‘for this 
purpose’ and ‘to the full’. 
The legality of compulsory licensing is thus secured under this legal ra-
tionale. The term was not regulated as such in TRIPS agreement but as ‘other 
use without authorization of the right holder’ in the title of article 31.53 In any 
case, the right to grant compulsory licenses was made clearer than under ar-
52  See WT/MIN (01)/Dec/2, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreements and Public Health (20 November 2001), paragraph 4.
53  For a history of article 31 see also R. Gold & D, Lam, ‘Balancing Trade in Pat-
ents: public non-commercial use and compulsory licensing’, 6 Journal of World Intellec-
tual Property (2003): 5–32.
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ticle 5A of the Paris Convention,54 and was thus reworded in broader terms to 
avoid misinterpretations: 
Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licenses are granted.55 
Legal exceptions based on health crises were, in addition, formally rec-
ognized: ‘each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics, can represent national emergency or other cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency’ (paragraph 5.c). 
To sum up, the 2001 Doha Declaration facilitates pro-health imple-
mentation, providing for extra (TRIPS compatible) policy space based on 
re-regulation and flexible interpretations. Certainly, the reach of ‘TRIPS flex-
ibility’ depends on the political will of those who can authoritatively interpret 
and waive TRIPS rules through WTO decision making-processes. As even 
well-known IP critics recognize, in any case, the Declaration has critically 
increased and reinforced the legality of TRIPS flexibilities on health-related 
areas.56 
4. Reregulation 
The Declaration confirms that WTO Members have the ‘right to grant com-
pulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such 
licenses are granted’. In addition, it also mandated the TRIPS Council to 
make additional efforts in some areas, and particularly with regard to the 
so-called ‘Paragraph 6 issue’ of the 2001 Doha Declaration57: TRIPS Article 
54  The right of governments to grant CL on virtually any ground (including public 
interest, abuse or anticompetitive conduct, or for noncommercial government use, among 
others) was incorporated in TRIPS agreement thanks to the fortitude and analytical skills 
of the Indian delegation. See J. Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceu-
tical Inventions: Evaluating the Options’, Journal of Law Medicine (2009): 248.
55  See paragraph 5.b.
56  See J. Love, ‘What the 2001 Doha Declaration Changed?, Knowledge Ecology 
International (16 September 2011).
57  See WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declara-
tion (20 November 2001) paragraph 17.
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31 recognizes the legality of granting CL to order generics but also determines 
that ‘any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use’. 
As a result, the provision not only prevented developing countries with 
no manufacturing capacity (which was most of them) to import generics from 
countries in which the patented drug was produced. It also limited produc-
tion to an unspecified volume, by using the expression ‘predominantly’. 
The wording of the paragraph 6 issue was precisely framed under the 
policy pressure of the new pro-development Doha Round: ‘to find an expedi-
tious solution to this problem before the end of 2002. 
The ‘solution’ was reached with the so-called ‘Motta text’ (named af-
ter Perez Motta, the former Chairman of the TRIPS Council) in December 
2002,58 and was finally adopted on 30 August 2003 through a WTO Gen-
eral Council Decision –interestingly, not a TRIPS Council Decision– on the 
implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.59 In the words of 
Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General of the WTO at that time, the ‘final 
piece of the jigsaw” had fallen into place with this Decision; proving ‘once and 
for all’ that WTO ‘can handle humanitarian as well as trade concerns’.60 
In essence, the Decision waives article 31(f) requiring production under 
CL to be ‘predominantly’ for the domestic market. The object of this waiver is 
reasonable, as it is simply an unachievable requirement for developing WTO 
members that lack manufacturing capacity.61 As mentioned above, these in-
evitably have to be supplied by global generics markets. In order to provide 
this, the waiver creates a member-driven mechanism allowing the import 
and export of generics on a case-by-case, drug-by-drug, country-by-coun-
try basis. The regulatory structure of this member-driven (paradoxically not 
58  See in particular F. Abbott, ‘The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceu-
tical Trade and the Protection of Public Health’, 99 American Journal of International 
Law 2 (2005): 317–358 and see D. Matthews, ‘WTO Decision on Implementation of Par-
agraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to 
the Access to essential medicines problem?’, 7 Journal of International Economic Law 1 
(2004): 73–107.
59  See WT/L/540, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and public health, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 
2003 (1 September 2003).
60  See WTO News: 2003 Press Releases, Press/350/Rev.1, Decision removes fi-
nal patent obstacle to cheap drug imports (30 August 2003).
61  In fact, former WTO Director, Supachai Panitchpakdi, described the Decision 
as ‘an historic agreement.’ See WTO News: 2003 Press Releases (9 September 2003).
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market-driven) mechanism is based on a notification procedure for both im-
porting and exporting countries planning to trade in generics.62 
The Decision, pre-negotiated by the United States, India, Brazil, South 
Africa and Kenya, basically helped WTO Members to keep the ongoing Doha 
negotiating process on track at the Cancun Ministerial Conference (Septem-
ber 2003). The negotiated instrument aims with questionable success to 
strike a balance between potential importers of generics (mainly in Africa, 
Asia and America), potential exporters (such as India and Brazil), and tech-
nology-exporting countries.63 
The 2003 Decision also establishes that WTO Members may notify 
their intention not to use the system as importers, or to use it only in a limit-
ed way. Practically all OECD countries have issued such notifications, under 
pressure from their patent-holding industries. Thus, the instrument includes 
a list of developed countries who will formally refrain from importing generic 
medicines, as well as a list of countries that will commit to importing generic 
drugs only in cases of extreme urgency or national emergency.
The Decision is accompanied by a separate statement of the General 
Council chairperson ensuring that it would not provide a backdoor for com-
mercial use of those generics, by re-entering non-exempted markets. The 
statement expresses several ‘shared understandings’ regarding the Decision 
and the way it has to be interpreted and implemented: 
(1) the system has to be used ‘in good faith’, undertaking not to pursue ‘industrial or com-
mercial objectives’; 
(2) all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent market diversion (re-exports);
(3) issues arising from the Decision have to be solved expeditiously and amicably and 
finally;
(4) notifications should include information from the Member on the ways and means it 
has employed to conclude that there is insufficient manufacturing capacity in the sector. 
The chairperson also attaches to his separate statement a short list of guide-
lines (selected ‘best practices’ from producers) to reduce and minimize product 
diversion (anti-diversion measures) and thus to ensure market segmentation.64
62  See <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/public_health_notif_
export_e.htm>.
63  For a comment see generally F. Abbott, ‘The WTO Medicines Decision’ op. cit 
317–358 and D. Matthews, ‘WTO Decision on Implementation’ op. cit., pp. 73–107.
64  These schemes built on the previous experience of anti-diversion business 
practices by companies like Novartis, Merck, Pfizer and others, differentiating regular 
PABLO ZAPATERO
42
Interestingly, the 2003 Decision is an interim waiver to be applied un-
til the TRIPS agreement is amended.65 As a result, the General Council adopt-
ed a Protocol of Amendment in 2005.66 Open to acceptance by WTO Mem-
bers before 1 December 2007, this protocol contains an extremely elaborate 
(: bad) article 31bis to be incorporated as an Annex to the TRIPS agreement if 
accepted by two thirds of WTO Members.67 
By the time this book was completed, less than 50 WTO Members68 had 
accepted the Amendment including the United States (17 December 2005) 
and the European Communities (20 November 2007).69 
Interestingly, a new Decision of WTO Members in 21 December 2007 
finally established an unlimited extension to the waiver, probably taking into 
due consideration the obvious difficulty of ratification by WTO Members: 
‘The period […] shall be extended until 31 December 2009 or such later date 
as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference’.70 In short, the self-evident 
political difficulties to ratify the Protocol suggest that it is unlikely to enter 
into force, at least in the near future.71 
Its wording is, in any case, overly burdensome.72 In fact, African coun-
tries, Brazil and India strongly opposed the provisions contained in the 
amendment itself without much success. Basically, the amendment trans-
products from products supplied through discounted pricing or donor policies. See WT/
GC/M/82, General Council Chairperson´s Statement (13 November 2003).
65  See Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health - Decision of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540 (29, august 
2003).
66  For a detailed legal study on available policy options see F. Abbott, ‘Compul-
sory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at the WTO after the Doha 
Declaration on public health’, 9 QUNO Paper n.9 (2002).
67  See WT/L/641, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement (8 December 2005).
68  See <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e//TRIPS_e/amendment_e.htm>.
69  See SGS7/166652, Instrument of Acceptance, Council of the European 
Union (Brussels, 19/11/2007).
70  See WT/L/711, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement-Extension of the Period 
for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement (21 De-
cember 2007).
71  See European Parliament Resolution on the TRIPS Agreement and access 
to medicines, B6-0288/2007 (9 July 2007), paragraph K.7, the study commissioned 
by its Committee on International Trade as well as European Parliament Debates 
CRE 11/07/2007–18 (7 July 2007) and PV 11/07/2007–18 (7 July 2007).
72  See V. Bradford & K. Lee, ‘TRIPS, the Doha declaration and paragraph 6 de-
cision: what are the remaining steps for protecting access to medicines?’ 3 Globalization 
and Health (2007): 3.
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forms into treaty law the (non-functioning) member-driven mechanism cre-
ated by the 2003 Decision. In this regard, it is reasonable to suggest that it is 
not cost-efficient to allocate significant public resources to that ratification. 
Developing countries without pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity 
have legal and legitimate expectations of accessing generics through global 
markets. In this regard, market mechanisms tend to function better when 
strong vested interests are involved. A member-driven mechanism such as 
the paragraph 6 mechanism (requiring a double compulsory licence from 
both the importing and exporting country to trade in generics) is inefficient 
vis-à-vis market mechanisms. 
In this regard, this member-driven mechanism is not only dependent 
on the unnecessary bureaucratic processes of public decision-making in both 
the potentially exporting and importing countries, but it is also highly ex-
posed to the pharmaceutical brand-name industry pressures against the CL 
which are required to make it function. 
Hence, it not difficult to conclude why the mechanism has only been 
used once since its 2003 inception,73 involving a generics transaction be-
tween Rwanda and Canada (260000 packs) of an HIV/AIDS combination 
therapy (TRIAvir) manufactured by Canadian Apotex Inc.74 In consequence, 
it is easy to understand why developing countries are pressing to renegotiate. 
73  See IP/N/9/RWA/1, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights - Notification under paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003–Rwan-
da (19 July 2007) and IP/N/10/CAN/1, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights–Notification under Paragraph 2(c) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 
– Canada (5 October 2007), respectively.
74  On this transaction see in particular C. Cotter, ‘The Implications of Rwanda’s 
Paragraph 6 Agreement with Canada for Other Developing Countries’, 5 Loyola Universi-
ty of Chicago International Law Review (2008): 177 y 185-86, J. Cohen-Kohler, L. Esmail 
& A. Perez Cosio, ‘Canada’s implementation of the Paragraph 6 Decision: is it sustain-
able public policy?’, 3 Globalization and Health (2007):12 and H. Hestermeyer, “Cana-
dian-made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Application of the WTO Waiver on Patents and 
Medicines’, 11 ASIL Insight 28 (December 10, 2007).
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3
EXPANDING PROPERTIES
1. States as proxies 
Many developing countries have scant manufacturing capacity or none at all, 
and are thus supplied with generics by global markets. For this reason, pat-
ents within middle-income developing countries with manufacturing capaci-
ty are of the most critical concern. In essence, sustainable generic production 
in the latter is a prerequisite for exporting those medicines to the former.
In recent decades, an efficient generic drug industry has burgeoned 
in developing countries such as South Africa, Thailand, India, and Brazil 
has also become a key source of global generic production and distribution. 
Manufacturers such as Cipla (India) or Cristalia (Brazil), for example, have 
long-standing experience in producing quality drugs for export to developing 
countries where there is no patent, or where the patent has expired or, less 
frequently, the patent is under compulsory license (CL), or government use. 
As a result, a wide variety of cheap generic medicines are competing today in 
generics markets. 
However, patents are becoming more widespread as a result of the 
TRIPS agreement, as well as other TRIPS+ initiatives and this has restricted 
generic competition for newer patented drugs.1 Brazil, for example, passed 
Decree nº 1355 reintroducing patents, after a 30-year vacuum, as early as 30 
December 1994, and India amended its Patent Act in March 2005 on similar 
lines.2 
1  B. Waning, M. Kyle and E. Diedrichsen, L. Soucy & J. Hochstadt et al, ‘Interven-
ing in global markets to improve access to HIV/AIDS treatment: an analysis of interna-
tional policies and the dynamics of global antiretroviral medicines markets’, 6 Globaliza-
tion and Health (2010): 13.
2  Before this, interestingly, both a WTO panel and Appellate Body decision had 
ruled against India for not taking the required steps to prepare its compliance with TRIPS 
agreements in 2005 (transitional obligations). See WT/DS79/R India-Patent Protection 
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (August 24, 1998) and WT/
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Patent protection of new drugs in these countries adversely affects ac-
cess to second and third treatments in developing countries. The cost struc-
ture for drugs in developing countries is bound to be severely affected if the 
generic manufacturers in these countries operate under increasingly strong 
patent regimes and smaller scale operations. For this reason, it is critical to 
ensure that generic industries compete in the global markets and thus, up-
scale their operations. 
Obviously, the pharmaceutical industry is not particularly supportive 
of the export-oriented production of generics in the developing world. Lob-
bies such as IIIA (International Intellectual Property Alliance) or US PhRMA 
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America) are in fact target-
ing the sources of generic production and distribution. 
As a result, developing countries with export-oriented generic produc-
tion are under pressure from aggressive IPs+ domestic lobbying and litiga-
tion. These strategies deployed by the industry are complemented by technol-
ogy exporting countries acting as proxies to negotiate (bilateral and regional) 
TRIPS+ treaties.3 
In short, some developing countries are bargaining away the existing 
health-related TRIPS flexibilities in exchange for more expedient market ac-
cess, in order to obtain (or not to lose) concessions elsewhere (foreign aid 
withdrawal, refusal to transfer technology, etc), or to avoid becoming a target 
for unilateral action.4 In addition, no country is interested nowadays in suf-
fering the inconvenience of being subject to a corporate campaign depicting 
it as a piracy-lenient country. 
As a result, TRIPS flexibilities remain untested in many developing 
countries. Public policies in developing countries are subject to carrots and 
sticks from developed countries.5 Thus, ministries other than health minis-
ters tend to be reluctant to support critical health policies such as pharma-
ceutical compulsory licensing (CL). It is noteworthy, for example, that the 
first CL granted by India to a generic producer was issued as late as 2012. The 
DS50/AB/R India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products (December 19, 1997), respectively.
3  See V. Bradford & K. Lee, ‘TRIPS, the Doha declaration’ op. cit., p. 3.
4  See, in particular, P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit., pp. 187–197 
(chapter 12).
5  E. Hoen, ‘Public Health and International Law. TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, 
and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha’, 27 Chicago Journal 
of International Law (2002): 32–33.
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decision authorizes Natco until 2020 to manufacture a patented anti-cancer 
drug from Bayer for the domestic market.
The USTR (United States Trade Representative) and the EU DG Trade 
are critical players in this brave game of ratcheting up IP standards, in which 
some bilateral diplomatic signals are sent each time an initiative to issue a 
compulsory license is underway in a developing country.6 
The USTR’s Special 301 epitomizes the race for stringent global patent 
standards, sharply contrasting with the leniency shown towards IP generally 
in the United States during the period of its trade power formation. As Picci-
otto recalls, the United States is appointing itself as the main global police-
man of IP rights but paradoxically it refused copyright protection for foreign 
works until 1891, and did not even join the Berne Convention until 1987, just 
when it finally placed IP on the regulatory agenda of the Uruguay Round; 
certainly, ‘the late converts may be the most fervent apostles’.7
In fact, the functioning of Special 301 targets accelerated TRIPS im-
plementation singling out the rules and policies of other countries that the 
United States deems objectionable, irrespective of whether or not they are 
TRIPS compatible. Thus, the mechanism often pushes countries to go beyond 
their TRIPS obligations:
In the US, TNCs continue to monitor these agreements through the US Trade Represent-
ative advisory committee called IFAC-3 (Industry Functional Advisory Committee-3), 
made up of 20 members drawn from Industry Sector Advisory Committes and 20 from 
private-sector” working across all US IP-related trade initiatives.8 
In the words of Charlene Barshefsky, former USTR, the instrument is 
much more than an in-depth review of public policies of other countries: it 
provides ‘a direct route to press countries to improve their IP [rights] prac-
tices’.9 
Unfortunately, the EU has followed suit in respect of this strategy by 
replicating some of its critical elements in its own IP enforcement strategy, 
6  See generally F. Abbott, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health and the Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agree-
ments’. Occasional Paper N. 14, Quaker United Nations Office, 2004.
7  See S. Picciotto. ‘Defending the public interest in TRIPS and the WTO’ op. cit., 
p. 226.
8  See P. Drahos, ‘“IP World”-Made by TNC Inc’ op. cit., p. 208.
9  See ‘USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Annual Review’, Press Release 97-
37 (April 30 1997).
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adopted in 2005. The EU strategy on IP enforcement outside European bor-
ders, currently under revision, functions with a similar rationale: conducting 
broad surveys on IP rights enforcement, which are used to update the list of 
‘priority countries’ and acting accordingly.10
2. Upward ratcheting
In addition, an extra tool for promoting stronger global IP protection is the 
negotiation of clone treaties based on TRIPS+ schemes.11 These instruments 
inhibit the implementation of health-related TRIPS flexibilities in develop-
ing countries, and are thus basically producing international re-regulation 
through the back door. 
Recent US FTAs, for example, prevent or undermine the ability to im-
plement TRIPS flexibilities by requiring the adoption of measures such as 
patent term extensions, data exclusivity, linkage of patents with registration, 
restrictions on compulsory licensing, restrictions on or elimination of paral-
lel imports and border enforcement requirements, among others.12 The EU 
also follows the US lead on these practices by promoting its own bilateral 
TRIPS+ treaties. A recent example is the controversial EU-India FTA origi-
nally planned for signature by the end of 2012 but which is still under con-
sideration. 
The higher standards of protection in TRIPS+ schemes delay or re-
strict, by their very nature, trade in generics and thus generic competition.13 
In essence, through these bilateral and regional treaties, developing countries 
‘are being made to agree’ to a ratcheting up of IP standards.14 By strengthen-
10  See Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third coun-
tries, Official Journal of the European Union, C129, Volume 48 (26 May 2005) at 3.
11  US bilateral treaty-making on IP did not begun but intensified after TRIPS. In 
this regard, see P. Drahos, ‘BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property’, 4 The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property (2001): 807–808.
12  See generally K. Gopakumar & S. Smith, ‘IPR provisions in FTAs: Implications 
for access to medicines’, Intellectual property and access to medicines: papers and 
perspectives (World Health Organization 2010) and also Access to Generic medicines 
and ‘TRIPS plus’ provisions, European Generics Association, Position Paper (November 
2007).
13  See C. Correa, ‘Implications of bilateral free trade agreements on access to 
medicines’, 84 Bulletin of the World Health Organization (2006): 402.
14  See P. Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and’ op. cit., p. 21.
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ing, broadening and lengthening monopolies on medicines generally, their 
provisions are bound to create a chilling effect on generic market entry and 
thus they erode the consolidation of a global market for generics. 
It is important to underline that these treaties are not health+, or hu-
man rights+, but IP+ schemes. The contents of some of the new obligations 
are illustrative in this regard: (a) extending patent terms beyond the 20 years 
required by TRIPS agreement, (b) requiring new export and burdensome 
procedures for generics, (c) restricting conditions for compulsory licenses 
to be issued, (d) delaying approval and registration of generics by providing 
original manufacturers with exclusive rights on pharmaceutical test data, (e) 
requiring regulatory authorities to pursue a policing role on patent enforce-
ment, among others.15
Inevitably, the restricted rationality of these TRIPS+ treaties under-
mines the flexibilities provided by TRIPS rules and the 2001 Doha Declara-
tion on TRIPS agreement and Public Health.16 In theory, WTO law and poli-
cies formally recognized some major TRIPS flexibilities with regard to access 
to medicines. In practice, however, pharmaceutical lobbying is taking those 
rights away by using states as proxies to promote stringent global standards 
in other fora.
A significant example of the present state of affairs is the new IP en-
forcement trends treating generics as counterfeit (‘counterfeit drugs’). In this 
regard, TRIPS article 61 mandates Member States to establish severe crimi-
nal penalties in order to deter counterfeiting; as some counterfeit drugs may 
pose a threat to public health, this provision is often used to combat counter-
feit medicines. 
However, the zeal of some patent-holders goes beyond what is reason-
able. In this regard, these IP+ enforcement trends have already allowed the 
seizure of generic medicines transiting through European ports to Africa and 
Latin America on the basis of the EU Customs Regulation 1383/2003. The 
first cases include several million doses of generics detained in transit at Rot-
15  See S. Sell, ‘TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines’, 28 
Liverpool Law Review (2007): 56–57 and F. Abbott, ‘A new dominant Trade Species 
emerges: is bilateralism a threat?’, 10 Journal of International Economic Law (2007): 
571–583.
16  The United Nations Development Report of 1999 already referred openly to the 
‘relentless march of intellectual property rights” and underline that this process “needs to 
be stopped and questioned’. See UNDP Human Development Report 1999 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1999), p. 73.
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terdam in December 2008 (Losartan, an anti-hypertension drug), Frankfurt 
in May 2009 (Amoxicillin) and in Paris in October 2009 (Clopidogrel, a blood 
thinner). 
As a result, Brazil and India filed a WTO complaint against the EU in 
May 2010, recently settled,17 on the legal grounds of GATT article V (freedom 
of transit) and the 2001 Doha Declaration.18 
In addition, TRIPS+ treaties such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) also contain measures confusing generics with counter-
feit medicines.19 Despite its name, this (‘trade-related’) IP enforcement treaty 
targets border and internal enforcement of IP infringements. ACTA provi-
sions formally exclude patents from border measures and, in fact, contain 
safeguards on access to health. 
However, ACTA also include civil trademark infringement with strong 
penalties, to name just one qualified regulatory feature. As a result, customs 
officials could initiate a seizure and even destruction of an allegedly infring-
ing product under its provisions, in order to protect the interests of the rights 
holder of a commercial trademark. 
Generally, these IP enforcement trends are in themselves strong dis-
incentives for those companies eager to trade in generics at global scale, and 
thus for the consolidation and development of a global market for generics to 
the benefit of patients in developing countries. 
The drive towards stronger IP enforcement is thus of particular con-
cern. Something is going wrong in global IP politics when IP advocates, such 
as the former President of the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, 
Timothy Trainer, with no hesitation whatsoever, makes this formal state-
ment: ‘ACTA is an initiative that allows governments to voluntarily commit 
themselves to whatever TRIPS+ standards are agreed’.20 
17  See B. Mercurio, ‘Seizing’ pharmaceuticals in transit: analysing the WTO dis-
pute that wasn´t’, 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2012): 389-426 and 
B. Baker, ‘Settlement of India/EU WTO Dispute re Seizures of In-Transit Medicines: Why 
the Proposed EU Border Regulation Isn’t Good Enough’, Northeastern University School 
of Law Research Paper No. 81-2012 (January 1, 2012).
18  See WTO/DS408, European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic 
Drugs in Transit - Requests for consultations, India (11 May 2010) and see WTO/DS409, 
European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit - Requests for 
consultations, Brazil (12 May 2010).
19  See K. Outterson & R. Smith. ‘Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly’, 15 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology (2006): 525.
20  See T. Trainer, ‘Intellectual Property Enforcement: A Reality Gap (Insufficient 
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The statement certainly suggests that, for some actors, global IP pro-
tection is nowadays a sort of Wild West in terms of international legislation. 
Interestingly, the European Parliament has recently rejected ACTA 
under its Lisbon Treaty power to reject international agreements: for the 
first time after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU MPs have 
exercised here this power: 478 votes against, 39 in favor, and 165 absten-
tions.21
The current state of affairs has to be seriously considered from a purely 
legal perspective. Pro-health TRIPS flexibilities cannot reasonably be inter-
preted as a floor but rather as a ceiling of pharmaceutical patent protection. 
In this sense, it is reasonable to argue that any TRIPS+ regime with regard 
to pharmaceutical patent protection is WTO-illegal. Not only does the TRIPS 
agreement contain major flexibilities with regard to public health but WTO 
Members have agreed to adopt the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS agree-
ment and public health. 
In any basic notion of global equity or justice, it is not legally reason-
able to put forward the argument that what WTO Members have agreed on 
multilaterally, with regard to public health, can be undone in other fora by 
ratcheting up mere monopoly rights. 
Pro-health flexibilities operate as legal benefits granted to all WTO 
Members. These flexibilities contained in WTO primary rules (TRIPS agree-
ment) have in fact been confirmed in WTO secondary rules through multilat-
eral decision-making (2001 Doha Declaration). 
As Correa recalls, implementation of the 2001 Doha Declaration should 
not be regarded as a matter of political choice if article 26 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of the Treaties is taken into due consideration: the Dec-
laration creates international obligations which should be complied with in 
good faith by all WTO Members.22 
In this sense, good faith is a key principle of international law and thus 
Assistance, Ineffective Implementation?’, 8 John Marshall Law School Review of Intellec-
tual Property Law (2008): 74.
21  See European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 July 2012 on the draft 
Council Decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (4 July 
2012).
22  C. Correa, Implementation of the WTO General Council Decision on para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (World 
Health Organization 2004), p. 8.
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of treaties:23 ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith’ (article 26). 
In addition, article 31 of VCLT clearly determines that treaties ‘shall be 
interpreted in good faith’. Thus, applying TRIPS rules and the health-related 
2001 Doha Declaration in accordance with the VCLT reasonably imposes cer-
tain limitations on WTO members. A contrary application may constitute an 
abuse or rights.24 
TRIPS+ schemes with regard to pharmaceuticals technically infringe 
WTO law by producing an annulment or denial of WTO benefits. These 
TRIPS+ schemes are to be read by their own nature as TRIPS-Minus with 
regard to the balance of benefits and concessions resulting from WTO law: a 
body of law historically made up of a series of complex trade-offs (e.g. more 
market access in exchange for patent standards). 
In consequence, TRIPS+ schemes invalidate the flexibilities provided 
by the TRIPS agreement and, as such, could be challenged as WTO non-com-
patible under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).25 In fact, any WTO 
Member may request a panel if any measures from other Members (including 
treaties) is denying or annulling those benefits.26 As a result, the negotiation 
or implementation of TRIPS+ schemes by WTO Members (treaties external 
to WTO) could nullify or impair benefits deriving from WTO law. 
The compatibility of these schemes could be challenged not only by IP 
violation complaints but also by the so-called non-violation complaints, pro-
vided the present moratorium on the latter is finally lifted.27 However, devel-
oping countries are probably those who would benefit most from the lifting 
23  See generally J. Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Dartmouth Pub-
lishing 1991).
24  For abuse of rights as a ceiling to patent protection see in particular M. Tem-
merman, ‘The Legal Notion of Abuse of Patent Rights’ NCCR Trade Regulation Working 
Paper No 2011/23 (May 2011), pp. 5–10.
25  F. Abbott, ‘The WTO Medicines Decision’ op. cit., p. 357.
26  In fact, the DSU standing is very open, and in practice close to an actio popu-
laris. See P. Kuijper, ‘The Law of GATT as Special Field of International Law. Ignorance, 
further refinement or self-contained system of international law?’, 25 Netherland Year-
book of International Law (1994): 239–241.
27  The moratorium is being extended from one ministerial conference to the oth-
er, the latest being the extension from the 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference (3-6 December 
2013) to the ministerial meeting to hold in 2015. For the extension see WT/L/842, TRIPS 
non-violation and situation complaints, Decision of 17 December 2011 (19 December 
2011).
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of the moratorium, as they have more technical resources to invest in specu-
lative legal claims.28 
In any case, the substantive rules are already in place (TRIPS flexibili-
ties) to be properly adjudicated as violation complaints. This generous stand-
ing has been part of the legal acquis of the multilateral trading system almost 
since GATT was originally conceived.29
Arguably, some health ministers would see a legal case here, irrespec-
tive of whether or not they represent a developing country. However, they are 
not on board the WTO ship. In practice, ministers of trade are those respon-
sible for the final decision on whether or not to file WTO complaints. Those 
who govern WTO are trade ministers, not health ministers. 
The balance between rights and obligations resulting from the trade-
offs negotiated in the Uruguay Round should be honoured. Promoting strin-
gent patent standards for pharmaceuticals outside WTO, once these rules are 
in place, is playing against the traditional rules and inner functioning of the 
world trading system. In fact, it is also playing above those rules (playing a 
meta-game) against the interest of WTO itself as a global institution respon-
sible for progressive trade liberalization.
In this regard, there is a strong case for a legal ceiling on health-relat-
ed patent protection in the benefit of the developing world. In fact, it could 
probably be critical to the success of the ongoing Doha Development Round... 
The WTO constituency should recall that the 2001 Declaration on Pub-
lic Health (read Doha) helped to keep on track the first post-GATT Round of 
negotiations (read WTO), after the (globally broadcasted) 1999 Millennium 
Round derailment (read Seattle). 
In this sense, the existence (or non-existence) of international legal 
ceilings for the global ratcheting up of patent protection is a structurally criti-
cal trade issue deserving serious legal consideration by the WTO regime.
28  Non-violation complaints allow WTO Members to challenge a measure in 
WTO dispute settlement procedures that is not infringing WTO law, but nullifying or im-
pairing the trade benefits that its members could have reasonably expected to obtain. See 
F. Abbott, ‘Non-violation nullification or Impairment Actions under the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Fifth Ministerial Conference: A Warning and Reminder’, 11 QUNO Occasional 
Paper (2003).
29  For its critical evolution compare J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of 
GATT. A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (The Boobs-Mer-
rills Company Inc 1969) at 163–189 and J. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (New 
York Council on Foreign Relations Press 1990) at 65 and, in particular, J. Jackson, ‘The 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Ob-
ligation’, 91 American Journal of International Law (1997): 60.
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In short, the TRIPS rules, together with the 2001 Declaration on Public 
Health, should reasonably be interpreted as a legal ceiling against stronger IP 
protection in health-related areas, but also as a legal floor to promote the con-
solidation of a global brand-name and non-brand-name market to the benefit 
of developing countries.30 
3. Uneasy captures 
However, vested interests are involved. Nowadays, modern patent systems 
have created high returns on revenues, assets and shareholders’ equity over 
decades, making the pharmaceutical industry annually ranked as among the 
most profitable industries in the world. These revenues are highly concentrat-
ed in the markets of developed countries. 
Thus, the CEOs’ and shareholders’ expectations on high future returns 
from investments in this area (R&D and marketing) have been fuelled by 
their private-public partnerships with trade representatives negotiating new 
global IP standards. 
In practice, this phenomenon has produced a ‘global money illusion’ 
on exponential increases of corporate profits. As a result, brand-name com-
panies are involved in aggressive strategies to secure worldwide monopoly 
rents,31 and are not open to other profitable but alternative wealth-enhancing 
strategies. 
In this regard, brand-name companies could easily obtain profits at 
least comparable to those of generic producers (profiting from off-patent 
medicines in developing countries) by selling their brand-name products to 
larger numbers of poor people at very low prices:32 price-based competition 
is the word. 
That was in fact the rationale of the government of Thailand, when it 
officially suggested a shift of pricing strategies based on ‘low-volume, high 
margin returns’ to ‘high-volume, low margin returns’.33
30  See chapters 4 and 5.
31  See particularly, S. Picciotto, ‘Private rights vs public interests in the TRIPS 
agreement: the access to medicines dispute’, Proceedings of the annual conference of the 
American society of international law (2003), p. 167.
32  J. Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions’ 
op. cit., pp. 247–263.
33  See Facts and Evidence on the 10 Burning Issues Related to the Government 
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However, brand-name companies are less focused on price-based 
competition and more on derailing generic companies from global markets 
through the ratcheting up of global IP standards. 
In consequence, international legislation is perceived as a second level 
playing field for policy formation, as it is often more effective than merely 
lobbying domestic legislators. For corporations operating in multiple state 
jurisdictions, it is more efficient to lobby collectively for international legis-
lation (which is binding in at least two or more state jurisdictions) than for 
domestic legislation (binding in one state jurisdiction). 
Last but not least, as Correa bluntly recalls with regard to US bilat-
eralism, by creating protection standards higher than those applied domes-
tically, the pharmaceutical industry may be able to force an amendment of 
US domestic laws ‘in ways simpler and less costly than through lobbying in 
Congress’.34 
The point applies to most developed countries. These modern rent-seek-
ing strategies are amplifying socially wasteful public law on a multi-state 
scale. Nowadays, as a result, some international rules are almost by-products 
of corporate regulatory captures. 
The enhanced and increasing leverage of special interest groups on 
global decision making has critical consequences. These processes, which are 
currently shaping global politics cannot be understood or explained through a 
simple and traditional state-centric approach to international rule-making.35 
Therefore, traditional approaches need to be revisited, to combat or avoid the 
capture of public international law by special interest. 
In this regard, it is also reasonable to argue that the pharmaceutical 
business model itself requires a structural transformation. In fact, the WHO 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Health (CIPIH) 
has already made some clear recommendations on this issue: 
Companies should adopt patent and enforcement policies that facilitate greater access 
to medicines needed in developing countries. In low income developing countries, they 
should avoid filing patents, or enforcing them in ways that might inhibit access. Compa-
Use of Patents on Three Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand, Ministry of Public Health 
and National Health Security Office, Thailand (February 2007).
34  C. Correa, ‘Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for 
Access to Medicines’ 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2004): 93.
35  See K. Alter & S. Meunier, ‘The International Politics of Regime Complexity’ 
op. cit., pp. 13–24.
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nies are also encouraged to grant voluntary licenses in developing countries, where this 
will facilitate greater access to medicines, and to accompany this with technology transfer 
activities. 
In addition, the CIPIH has also clearly stated that ‘companies should 
not lobby government for more stringent standards than those contained in 
TRIPS agreement’.36 
These are critical ideas. However, the socially wasteful rent-seeking 
strategies of the industry in developing countries cannot be inhibited through 
mere (voluntary) initiatives of corporate social responsibility (CSR), but by 
reforming legal institutions. 
The reason is simple: these companies are run by publicly inefficient 
incentives structures, and not by unethical persons who could be convinced 
to act (read manage) differently. In essence, these companies do what they do 
because their CEOs are tied too tightly to the mast of profit maximization, as 
a direct result of the incentives structure in modern corporate law (the corpo-
rate form itself) and financial markets. 
4. The window openers 
Nowadays, global policymaking occurs through nodes of closely connected 
actors in a diversity of networks.37 In the world of “nodal governance”, both 
public interest and private interest coalitions battle in multiple fora, without 
equal footing, to regulate public issues such as access to medicines.38 
Fortunately, transnational advocacy networks have an essential role to 
play here,39 as direct result of the growing research and legally-oriented func-
tion of NGOs in global politics.40 As Shaffer suggests, developing countries 
36  See Public Health, Innovation op. cit., p. 181 (paragraph 4.16).
37  P. Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: a Nodal Gover-
nance Approach’, 77 Temple Law Review (2004): 401–424.
38  See S. Burris, P. Drahos & C. Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’, 30 Australian 
Journal of Legal Philosophy (2005): 30–58.
39  On the use of law for empowering and legitimating transnational advocacy net-
works see K. Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Social Construction of 
Legal Rules’ Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a 
New Legal Orthodoxy (The University of Michigan Press 2002), pp. 37–64.
40  See generally M. Keck & K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Net-
works in International Politics, (Cornell University Press 1998).
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could critically enhance their prospects of success with regard to access to 
medicines if they worked together with US and European constituencies such 
as NGOs.41 
In fact, global campaigns had a major impact on the WTO decision-mak-
ing processes leading to the 2001 Doha Declaration.42 The policy momentum 
would certainly not have been reached without global campaigns such as the 
so-called PMA case in South Africa.43 
These and other events provided the window of opportunity for devel-
oping countries and civil society to obtain the first special session of the TRIPS 
Council to discuss health-related TRIPS issues in April 2001. The rest, includ-
ing the 2001 Doha Declaration, is already part of contemporary world history.44 
The 2001 Doha Declaration on public health is, as Drahos refers to it, ‘a 
case of a weak coalition making a gain that an observer would not have pre-
dicted given the power resources of the US-led coalition’.45 
In the brave new world of TRIPS+ schemes, however, developing coun-
tries/NGOs coalitions are forced to take action in multiple battlefields almost 
daily: the ongoing cycle of action and reaction with regard to global IP stand-
ard setting takes place in a wide variety of fora.46 
Since the early 1980s, advocates seeking to ratchet up IP protection 
have shifted fora both vertically and horizontally to achieve their goals. They 
have shifted vertically, from multilateral to regional to bilateral levels, and 
they have shifted horizontally across diverse international organizations.47 
41  G. Shaffer, ‘Recognizing public goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who partic-
ipates? Who Decides? The case of TRIPS and pharmaceutical patent protection’, 7 Journal 
of International Economic Law (2004): 479–80.
42  See, for example, R. Mayne, ‘The Global Campaign on Patents and Access to 
Medicines: An Oxfam Perspective’, Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Ac-
cess and Development (Palgrave Macmillan (2002) at 244–259.
43  See The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa and Oth-
ers v. The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Case no. 4183/98, High 
Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division).
44  On the impact of events such as the PMA case see S. Sell, ‘TRIPS and the Access 
to Medicines Campaign’, 20 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2001–2002): 511.
45  P. Drahos, ‘Four lessons for’ op. cit., pp. 11–39.
46  See F. Abbott, ‘The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in 
Intellectual Property and Health’, Negotiating Health: Intellectual Property and Access 
to Medicines (Routledge 2006), p. 31.
47  See S. Sell, ‘Cat and Mouse: Forum shifting in the battle over intellectual prop-
erty rules and enforcement’, Paper presented the International Studies Association Mon-
treal (March 16-19th, 2011).
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As Sell suggests, international politics are far messier than is generally 
assumed.48 In fact, the game is never over, as all actors involved continuously 
cycle through fora to find one at a moment in time where their power will be 
optimized.49 
In the words of Chorev, institutions have interactive effects in any giv-
en policy space:50 as a result, the repositioning of one piece in one of those 
institutions (e.g. adoption of a rule) may result in the repositioning of pieces 
in other institutions. This phenomenon has been also defined as ‘chessboard 
politics’.51 
Securing pro-health global law and policy is directly dependent on the 
relative efficiency of the strategies deployed by developing countries/NGOs 
coalitions. 
Sell employs an illustrative ‘cat and mouse’ metaphor to explain the 
arena in which public interest coalitions struggle for success today: in the 
1980s, IP advocates (the ‘cat’) made the first move moving ‘trade-related’ 
intellectual property from WIPO into the GATT regime. However, once the 
developing countries/NGOs coalition (the ‘mouse’) mobilized in the WTO, IP 
advocates (the ‘cat’) moved again to TRIPS+ bilateral and regional treaties, 
the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) or a Substantive Patent 
Law Treaty (SPLT). 
The ‘mouse’ is nowadays definitely trying to chase the ‘cat’ out of the 
WTO.52 The ongoing global battles over generic medicines are currently tak-
ing place on multiple fronts, both in and outside the WTO. Given this scenar-
io, public interest coalitions need to adopt a longitudinal, broad perspective 
of multiple moving parts on global IP negotiations.53 Otherwise, as Drahos 
suggests, these coalitions risk winning battles (2001 Doha Declaration) yet 
finally losing the war.54 
48  S. Sell, ‘Cat and Mouse’ op. cit., p. 31.
49  P. Drahos, ‘Four lessons’ op. cit., p. 33.
50  N. Chorev, ‘Political and Institutional Maneuvers in International Trade Nego-
tiations: The United States and the Doha Development Round’, Strategic Arena Switch-
ing in International Trade Negotiations (Ashgate 2007), pp. 33–34.
51 K. Alter & S. Meunier, ‘The International Politics of Regime Complexity’ op. cit.
52  S. Sell, ‘Cat and Mouse’ op. cit., p. 30.
53  P. Drahos, ‘Four lessons’ op. cit., at 35–37.
54  P. Drahos, ‘Winning Battles, Losing the War: Lessons for the Weak from the 
Negotiations over the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health’, paper presented 
at Trade Negotiation and Developing Countries: The Doha Round, International Work-
shop, Griffith University (August 12-13, 2005).
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In this sense, as resources are limited on their side, it would be reason-
able to argue that public interest coalitions should consider forming a coali-
tion to veto the continuous ratcheting up of IP standards.55 A veto coalition 
on TRIPS+ schemes should certainly fight the major battle in the corridors of 
the William Rappard building in Geneva, speaking the language of WTO law 
and TRIPS flexibilities. 
Interestingly, in May 2006, ten South American Ministers of Health 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uru-
guay and Venezuela) adopted the Declaration of Ministers of South America 
over Intellectual Property, Access to Medicines, and Public Health to estab-
lish a united position against TRIPS+ schemes.
In this regard, an efficient and reasonable strategy for the developing 
countries/NGOs coalition –in order to avoid battling continuously on every 
front– would be to obtain a formal WTO Declaration confirming that TRIPS 
flexibilities constitute a legal ceiling with regard to pharmaceutical protection 
in the developing world.
Promoting a new Declaration on TRIPS as a legal ceiling for pharma-
ceutical patent protection would be a major move, complementing the his-
toric 2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health. In addition, such a critical in-
itiative could provide some extra leverage towards a necessary Development 
Round. 
55  See P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit at 204–205 and 208–209. 
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NON-MARKET ECONOMICS
1. Red taping 
The 2003 Decision was created to constitute an ‘expeditious solution’ for 
‘WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the phar-
maceutical sector’ who faced difficulties in ‘making effective use of compulso-
ry licensing under the TRIPS Agreement’. However, it is fair to say that it is a 
complete failure. 
There is only one successful compulsory licence under the 2003 Deci-
sion to date, involving a generics transaction between Rwanda (Notification 
of intent to import on 17 July 2007)1 and Canada (Notification of intent to 
export on 4 October 2007)2 of 260000 packs of TRIAvir (an HIV/AIDS com-
bination therapy), manufactured by Apotex Inc. 
In addition, transaction between India and Nepal was withdrawn in 
the very first stages of the paragraph 6 mechanism. In September 2007, an 
Indian generic manufacturer applied in India for a compulsory license for 
three medicines to be exported to Nepal but decided to withdraw the request 
in India as the Nepal authorities had not granted the compulsory licence to 
import the medicines, nor had the TRIPS Council been notified of its inten-
tion to import under the paragraph 6 mechanism.
Leaving aside the reasons why this single (and thus unique) transaction 
took four years to proceed, it is easy to understand why developing countries 
have increased their pressure against the present statu quo with regard to 
trade in generics. 
1  IP/N/9/RWA/1, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights–Notification under paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 – Rwanda 
(19 July 2007).
2  IP/N/10/CAN/1, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights – Notification under Paragraph 2(c) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 – Can-
ada (5 October 2007). The information on the shipment (quantities and distinguishing 
features) is posted on the licensee’s website pursuant to paragraph 2(c) and 2(b) (iii) of 
the Decision of 30 August 2003. See also <www.apotex.com/apotriavir/abouttriavir.asp>.
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Developed countries are not eager to admit that the mechanism does 
not function properly, as this would reasonably open the door for reform ini-
tiatives with a more pro-trade rationale. 
However, developing countries strongly demand a proper fact determi-
nation in this regard,3 and call for real-life experiences to be seriously ana-
lysed in the Annual Reviews of the mechanism by the TRIPS Council.4 
Developed countries act like the emperor in his new clothes, and buy 
time in the meantime to also promote TRIP+ schemes in other fora. It is hard 
to see how this will not lead to major tensions in the mid-term. It is notewor-
thy that Annual Reviews of paragraph 6 mechanism contain an agenda item 
with the illustrative title ‘Any alternatives to the use of Paragraph 6 System’. 
There are some explanations for the failure to use the 2003 Decision. 
The very fact that it is member-driven is a critical factor in its failure to func-
tion: generic companies are directly excluded from the possibility of using the 
mechanism to trade in generics, since any global transaction requires a dual 
authorisation (from both importing and exporting countries) for it to operate. 
In short, having been designed in WTO, the mechanism certainly suf-
fers a paradoxical anti-market and anti-trade approach. In essence, the pro-
cedure compartmentalizes transactions on a case-by-case, drug-by-drug and 
country-by-country basis through a dual compulsory licensing scheme.5 
As a result, notifications under this scheme require issues to be deter-
mined in advance, such as to whom will the license be extended, what vol-
ume, at what royalty rate, and on what grounds. 
In addition, advance notifications to the TRIPS Council of the intention 
to use the procedure leave those developing countries willing to import gener-
ics under CL open to pre-emptive political pressures. Thus, a strong political 
barrier is effectively raised against weak developing countries at the outset. 
The devil is certainly in the details: notifications must specify the names 
and expected quantities of the product needed over a specific period of time, 
3  For the Annual Review of 2012 see IP/C/63 Annual Review of the Decision on 
the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health— Report to the General Council (26 November 2012).
4  See e.g. IP/C/61 Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Re-
port to the General Council (18 November 2011), paragraph 56 (Indian Delegation in-
tervention).
5  F. Abbott & J. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies 
for the production and diffusion of patented medicines under the amended TRIPS provi-
sions’, 10 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2007): 921–987.
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the royalty rate that will be paid, and outline the evidence for the lack of or 
insufficient manufacturing capacity. 
Consequently, there is no automaticity in it but stronger procedural 
market segmentation to what already existed before the 2003 Decision. Thus, 
the attainment of the economies of scale required to stimulate global generic 
production and competition are inhibited and by extension, so are the inner 
virtues of international trade. 
Market-driven mechanisms are part of the solution, not the problem. 
In this regard, generics manufacturers are dependent on sufficiently large 
production to achieve economies of scale: high-volume, low margin returns. 
In order to apply for an export-oriented compulsory licence (CL) under 
the current procedure, generics companies have to perceive that making use 
of it will not only be economically viable but also profitable. In this sense, it 
is highly unlikely that the paragraph 6 mechanism will ever provide sufficient 
economic incentives for generic companies, since authorizations are granted 
drug order by drug order and only upon request by the public authorities of 
another country. 
There are also critical obstacles in place such as, to name one key exam-
ple, the condition to produce only the amounts needed to satisfy the require-
ments of licensees as notified to the TRIPS Council. As Abbott and Reichman 
explain, the procedure is saddled with unnecessary administrative hurdles 
that make the export of generic versions of patented drugs neither simple nor 
expeditious.6 
It is also important to underline that TRIPS article 31(h) requires ad-
equate remuneration be paid to the patent holder. However, the 2003 Deci-
sion states that it is the exporting country that is required to remunerate or 
compensate the patent holder.7 In practice, requiring the exporting country 
to compensate the patent holder adds yet another hindrance. 
Obviously, the governments of developed countries have no incentive 
to promote the export of generic products by their industries when they bear 
the burden of paying the fee. Certainly, alternative solutions could easily have 
been designed.8 
6  F. Abbott & J. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy’, op. cit., p. 
932.
7  For an analysis on remuneration and its problems see in particular D. Cahoy, 
‘Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha’, 42 Georgia Law Review (2007): 
150.
8  D. Cahoy, ‘Confronting Myths’ op. cit., pp. 148–53.
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For many, the procedure is designed to make it difficult for countries to 
issue compulsory licences and to hinder the functioning of domestic proce-
dures. In the words of Stiglitz, ‘if [trade advocates] wanted developing coun-
tries to have access to essential drugs, they should have allowed automatic 
licences for all drugs except those that are not essential’9. Certainly, the black 
letter law produces difficulties that could easily have been avoided. 
Last but not least, the ‘implementation game’ is also a difficult one.10 
Potential exporting countries such as Canada, India, Norway, China and the 
European Union itself have already adopted legislation to implement the De-
cision in order to enable the production and export of generic medicines un-
der compulsory licences.11 
However, some of these domestic regulations have added more admin-
istrative requirements and thus could further hamper use of the Decision. 
Interestingly, while Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) passed 
in 2004 contains 200 articles, India’s implementing legislation consists of a 
scant 3 paragraphs.12 
CAMR was the first enabling legislation for the production and export of 
generic medicines under compulsory licences to developing countries lacking 
manufacturing capacity.13 For many, this domestic legislation is considered to be 
fraught with deficiencies and epitomises the flaws of the implementation game.14 
However, it is also true that the first and only successful compulsory licence un-
der the 2003 Decision to date involved a generics transaction from Canada. 
Developing and developed countries radically differ in their explana-
tions for why the mechanism is not being used. 
9  J. Stiglitz, ‘Trade agreements and health in developing countries’, 373 The Lan-
cet (January 31 2009): 365.
10  See C. Deere, The Implementation Game, op. cit.
11  E. Hoen, The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: Drug pat-
ents, access, innovation and the application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health (AMB Publishers 2009), pp. 36–37.
12  See E. Ng & J. Kohler, ‘Finding flaws: the limitations of compulsory licensing 
for improving access to medicines: an international comparison’ 16 Health Law Journal 
(2008): 166.
13  R. Elliot, ‘Pledges and pitfalls: Canada’s legislation on compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceutical for export’, 1 International Journal of Intellectual Property Management 
1 (2006): 94–112.
14  See, in particular, C. Cotter, ‘The Implications of Rwanda’s’ op. cit at 177 and 
185-86; J. Cohen-Kohler, L. Smail & A. Perez Cosio, ‘Canada’s implementation of the Para-
graph 6 Decision: is it sustainable public policy?’, 3 Globalization and Health (2007):12 
and H. Hestermeyer, ‘Canadian-made Drugs for Rwanda’ op. cit.
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On 27 October 2010, for example, Canada delivered three interven-
tions related to the review of the mechanism in the WTO TRIPS Council. 
For Canada, CAMR worked efficiently, effectively and in a timely fashion: 
the length of time needed to export to Rwanda was not caused by the para-
graph 6 mechanism, but instead by other factors. Canadian representatives 
explained that the mechanism is a member-driven process; as such, it only 
applies to instances where countries seek a generic version of the patented 
drug. 
In this sense, once the eligible importing country (Rwanda) had no-
tified the WTO of its intention to import under the mechanism, the CAMR 
process (starting with a request for voluntary licences and ending with a CL 
granted) was completed in just over two months. For Canada, in short, the 
delays incurred in Apotex’s export of medicines to Rwanda were ‘separate’ 
from CAMR. 
In this regard, Canada recalled that it took 3.5 years for Apotex to de-
velop the drug, identify a recipient country, secure a supply contract, manu-
facture the drug and export it. Thus, under this rationale, Canada underlines 
that it is not a company (Apotex) but rather a country (Rwanda) which is 
required to use the mechanism in order for it to become operational. 
Indeed, this is certainly the case. The major structural flaw of the 
mechanism is that its functioning depends on the political will of Member 
States. 
Alternatively, the 2003 Decision would have been more efficiently de-
signed if the inner economic rationale of free trade had been taken into se-
rious consideration, instead of creating extra market segmentation and bar-
riers to trade; that is to say, maximizing access to medicines through world 
market formation.
2. Drug pipelines
In any case, the 2001 Doha Declaration (not the 2003 Decision) has critically 
transformed the original status quo in which developing countries and phar-
maceutical companies now negotiate their deals.
In this sense, the 2001 Declaration has critically promoted the negoti-
ation of voluntary licences between patent holding companies and their ge-
neric manufacturing counterparts under the threat (by generic companies) of 
PABLO ZAPATERO
66
a request for a compulsory licence, or the threat (by public authorities) of the 
issuance of a compulsory license.15 
In addition, the 2001 Declaration as well as the WTO general discourse 
on TRIPS flexibilities is also used by health authorities in developing coun-
tries as leverage in their price negotiations vis-à-vis patent holders. In prac-
tice, the Declaration functions as a bargaining chip for governments to alter-
natively negotiate brand-name price reductions subject to issue of a compul-
sory license.
Currently, the use of compulsory licensing is limited. In fact, as Attaran 
recalls, no generic medicines, or practically none, have been manufactured 
this way in the 90s.16 However, things are gradually changing. Beneath the 
surface, in the words of Reichman, health Ministries quietly began to use the 
threat of compulsory licences to rein in the prices of selected medicines, par-
ticularly AIDS drugs. As these negotiated deals are often kept secret, the sur-
face calm appears more assured than it really is.17
Interestingly, an authoritative case study on the use of TRIPS flexibili-
ties, for the treatment of AIDS between 2004 and 2008, documented 65 for-
mal statements by developing countries authorizing the procurement, import 
and use of generic medicines.18 In addition, as Hoen et alia recall in a later 
study, 26 out of 32 LDCs authorized generics imports with express reference 
to paragraph 7 of the 2001 Declaration (delaying the granting and enforcing 
of patents on medicines until 2016).19 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the 2001 Declaration, as 
well as the institutional discourse on flexibilities, has been of great use for 
the reinforcement of both the legality and legitimacy of public health policies 
based on measures such as CL on pharmaceuticals. The health ministry from 
Brazil, for example, has been among the most successful in using compulsory 
licensing threats to obtain major concessions from brand-name companies. 
15  See J. Reichman & C. Hasenzahl, ‘Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented Inven-
tions’, 5 ICTSD/UNCTAD Issue Papers (2003).
16  See A. Attaran, ‘Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater Flexibility and a 
Non-Justiciability Solution’, 2 Emory International Law Review 17 (2003): 743–780.
17  J. Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions’ 
op. cit., pp. 249–250.
18  E. Hoen, The Global Politics op. cit., pp. 59–60.
19  E. Hoen, J. Berger, A. Calmy & S. Moon, ‘Driving a decade of change: HIV/
AIDs, patents and access to medicines for all’, 14 Journal of International Aids society 15 
(2011): 1–12.
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In short, governments make companies negotiate price reductions un-
der the threat of issuing a CL but also generic companies directly negotiate 
voluntary licences with patent-holding companies under the threat of re-
questing a CL. Interestingly, these negotiations are pursued without the need 
to use the paragraph 6 mechanism. 
However, it is important to underline that not all developing countries 
could obtain similar success by pursuing these strategies. Inevitably, as the 
procedure of 2003 Decision to import generics under CL is not functioning, 
CL threats by developing countries are only credible when they are backed by 
a burgeoning local generics industry (read India, China and Brazil). 
In consequence, as Benvenisti and Downs suggest, price breaks under 
CL threats should be considered more as isolated victories, materially impor-
tant in the short term but ‘institutionally irrelevant in the long term’.20 In this 
sense, the only real victory is the availability of cheap quality drugs in devel-
oping countries as a result of a thriving global market pushing prices down 
globally. That is, global price-based competition.
The procedure contained in the 2003 Decision does not provide the 
required result. Fortunately, the 2003 Decision is not the only legal vehicle 
to facilitating access to medicines in the developing world. The TRIPS agree-
ment permits major flexibilities to balance public health and legal monopoly 
rights (patents) other than importing generics under CL by developing coun-
tries lacking production capacity. 
In this regard, WTO Members are allowed to adopt complementary 
measures that may facilitate access to medicines, as set out in articles 7 and 8 
of the TRIPS agreement, and explicitly recognized by the 2001 Declaration.21 
However, the existence of enabling legislation, as mentioned above, is critical 
in this respect. Suitable legal provisions should be enacted beforehand in or-
der to use these and other TRIPS flexibilities in domestic law and policies. As 
WTO rules and acts are not self-executing, it is essential that adequate provi-
sions be enacted in domestic laws in order to enable developing countries to 
make use of flexibilities. 
As Musungu recalls, the major problems here are a ‘widespread lack 
of clarity about the options available, coupled with the lack of local legal and 
20  See E. Benvenisti & G. Downs, ‘Distributive Politics’ op. cit.
21  See generally C. Correa, ‘Intellectual property rights and public health: the gen-
eral context and main TRIPS compliant flexibilities’, Intellectual property and access to 
medicines: papers and perspectives (World Health Organization 2010).
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technical expertise for incorporating and implementing TRIPS flexibilities in 
national law and policy’.22
With regard to CL in particular, it is crucial to establish straightfor-
ward, simple and clear decision-making processes as well as domestic pro-
visions which will avoid its suspension as a result of an appeal by the patent 
holder.23 
In addition, domestic royalty rates are also an issue of concern as there 
are no general binding rules on the matter. Voluntary licence rates generally 
set royalty rates from 4 to 5 percent.24 In turn, the WHO-UNDP Remunera-
tion Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of Patents on Medical Technologies 
suggest royalties from 0 to 6 percent of the price charged by the generic com-
petitor.25 
In practice, the lack of clear-cut guidelines results in developing coun-
tries authorising CL with rather different royalty rates these days. Precise 
legal criteria on this issue would be of major importance. Predictability in 
setting the remuneration or compensation required by Article 31(h) is an im-
perative for improved functioning of generic markets. 
To summarise, developing countries have to adopt adequate legisla-
tion for making the most of TRIPS flexibilities. This is particularly relevant 
for export-oriented generics producers. In this regard, it is useful to recall 
that, before 1996, developing countries with exporting generics manufac-
turers such as India, Brazil, South Africa, Singapore and China engaged in a 
robust trade in generics. Thus, many ‘pre-TRIPS’ drugs entered the market 
in generics-manufacturing countries, and are still produced and exported as 
generics.26 
As a direct result, many developing countries are nowadays importing 
generic medicines from these export-oriented producers. However, new de-
veloped drugs are likely to be patented in multiple jurisdictions today and to 
22  S. Musungu & C. Oh, The use of flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: 
Can they promote access to medicines? (WHO 2006), pp. 119–120.
23  In addition, when compensation is appealed, it would also be useful to place 
the onus on patent holders to disclose the economic data to justify claims of inadequate 
royalty rate in order to discourage unjustified claims from patent holders. See S. Musungu 
& C. Oh, The use of flexibilities op. cit., p. 67.
24  P. Mayharduk & S. Rimmington, ‘Compulsory Licenses: A tool to improve global 
access to the HPV vaccine’, 35 American Journal of Law & Medicine (2009): 323–350.
25  Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on Medical 
Technologies, WHO-UNDP, 2005.
26  E. Hoen, The Global Politics op. cit., p. 36–37.
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be subject to at least 7300 days (20 years) of patent protection in all WTO 
Members, but LDCs (until 2016). 
Obviously, the rationale of patent protection requires granting patent 
holders exclusive rights to produce and sell their products and thus, inevita-
bly, restrict access to newly discovered medicines.27 In consequence, as tran-
sitional periods end, the sources of new generics from these export-oriented 
producers are in danger of drying up, and thus blocking the global pipelines 
of generic drugs for developing countries.28 
Developed countries and brand-name pharmaceutical industries tend 
to concentrate their pressure on patent protection and enforcement in emerg-
ing economies and middle-income developing countries. In this regard, not 
only their potential shares of the pharmaceutical market, but also their ca-
pacity to export generics, make these countries targets for the private-public 
partnerships backing a extreme IP paradigm (TRIPS+ treaties, etc).29 
Therefore, strong patent protection and enforcement for new phar-
maceuticals in these countries risks blocking the sources of export-oriented 
generic production. In essence, if these sources are impaired, not only will 
emerging economies and middle-income developing countries have less ge-
nerics suppliers for both old and new medicines, but so will LDCs in general.30 
3. Unworking solutions
Nowadays, alternative legal grounds are beginning to be considered by devel-
oping countries in order to avoid taking the path of the paragraph 6 mech-
anism and the related provision in TRIPS article 31.31 For many experts and 
27  See generally, F. Scherer & J. Watal, ‘Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Pat-
ented Medicines in Developing Countries’ Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 
Working Paper n.WG4:1, Geneva (WHO 2001) and M. Mrazek, ‘Pharmaceutical Pricing in 
the Developing World: Issues of Access to Medicines’, 2 Expert Rev Pharmacoeconomics 
Outcomes Research 1 (2002): 43–50.
28  C. Correa, Implementation of the WTO op. cit.
29  Although these economies only represent today approx 5% of the global phar-
maceutical market, the opportunity to increase pharmaceutical sales in emerging econ-
omies is rising fast as the size of their markets is growing. The GDP of E7 economies is 
expected to triple by 2020, compared to only a 40% increase in the G7 countries (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers 2007).
30  E. Hoen, The Global Politics op. cit., p. 62.
31  The use of the exceptions clause of article 30 is not foreclosed by the 2003 
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informed observers, article 30 (exceptions to rights conferred) still remains 
an alternative option with regard to compulsory licensing generally.32 
This is certainly a more effective policy approach. In fact, the issue is 
already under consideration in the implementation measures of the WIPO 
Development Agenda. The WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents 
(SCP) considers ‘Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights’ as an agenda 
item since 2008. 
In June of that year, the SCP asked the WIPO Secretariat to establish 
preliminary studies on ‘exceptions from patentable subject matter and limi-
tations to the rights, inter alia research exemption and compulsory licenses’. 
Interestingly, in 2010, Brazil proposed setting up a working programme in 
order to hold a wide-ranging and sustained debate on this issue with a view to 
drawing up a WIPO manual of exceptions and limitations.33 
However, tensions run high. For example, delegates at the 18th session 
of the WIPO Standing Committee of the Law of Patents (SCP) between 21 and 
25 of May 2012 were unable to reach agreement on the committee’s future 
work programme, as a result of the strongly diverse opinions regarding work 
on agenda items such as patents and health, exceptions and limitations to 
patent rights, quality of patents and technology transfer. 
Positions between Group B (industrialised countries) –particularly 
United States and EU– and developing countries were irreconcilable when a 
joint proposal on this future programme was tabled by the African Group and 
the Development Agenda Group. 
The balance between exclusivity (monopoly rights) and public interest 
is generally considered to be provided through the subtle interplay of articles 
30 and 31. Thus, it is through this interplay that TRIPS-consistent policy op-
tions are conventionally defined nowadays, as article 30 details substantive 
criteria for exceptions to exclusivity, and article 31 contains a list of procedur-
al requirements to limit that exclusivity. 
However, article 44 also potentially provides further flexibility with re-
Decision. See C. Garrison, Exceptions to Patent Rights in Developing Countries, UNCT-
AD-ICTSD Issue Paper 17 (2006).
32  The (restrictive) interpretation of Article 30 by the panel in the Canada-Ge-
nerics case is not legally relevant as adopted prior to 2001 Doha Declaration, which placed 
Article 30 in a new interpretative framework. See Canada — Patent Protection of Pharma-
ceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (17 March 2000).
33  See SCP/14/7, Proposal from Brazil, Standing Committee on the Law of Pat-
ents, Fourteenth Session, Geneva, (January 20, 2010).
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gard to permanent injunctions. In this regard, compulsory licences granted 
under Part III of the TRIPS (enforcement), and therefore those based on ar-
ticle 44 (injunctions), are subject to a different regime from that of the com-
pulsory licences granted under the procedures of Part II (standards), as the 
former are not subject to the restrictions existing for article 30 and 31. 
Interestingly, US judicial practices regarding CL permanent injunctions 
are already considered by developing countries as potential new alternatives 
for extending policy space with regard to export-oriented pharmaceutical CL. 
As a result, in the chessboard politics of global IP standards, the Afri-
can Group/DAG made a strategic move in 2011 by requesting that the Inter-
national Bureau of WIPO ‘organise a technical workshop on state practice 
involving the compulsory licensing of medical technologies, including the ap-
plication of TRIPS Articles 30, 31 and 44’34 
In fact, several US cases regarding CL injunctions with export-oriented 
elements are tracked by developing countries as a result of a landmark US 
Supreme Court judgment on CL in 2006: eBay Inc. v. MercExchange.35 In 
this high-profile case, in which MercExchange requested that the Court grant 
a permanent injunction, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had to sat-
isfy a 4-factor Test based on equity before a court could issue a permanent 
injunction in respect of compulsory licences. 
For the court, this 4-factor test for permanent injunctions is necessary 
on the grounds of principles of equity, namely criteria such as (1) having suf-
fered an irreparable injury, (2) inadequate legal remedies (e.g. compensation) 
being unable to compensate the injury, (3) balancing the ‘hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant’, and (4) not disserving the public interest. 
Following this judgment on the issuance of compulsory licences, there 
have been several such cases in the United States.36 Thus, for example, in the 
case of Edwards Lifesciences v. CoreValve in 2011, a compulsory licence was 
granted in the US for manufacturing an export-oriented medical device to 
treat aortic valve stenosis, without being affected by the restrictions of TRIPS 
34  See SCP/16/7, Proposal submitted by the Delegation of South Africa on behalf 
of the African Group and the Development Agenda Group (May 18, 2011).
35  See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
36  See A. Mace, ‘TRIPS, EBay, and denials of Injunctive Relief: is article 31 com-
pliance everything?’, 10 Columbia Science and Technology Law Review (2009): 233-266 
and Ch. Cotropia, ‘Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ Decision in eBay v. MercExchange’, Comparative Patent Law: A Hand-
book of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2008), pp. 557–583.
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article 31 on exports under a compulsory licence and the paragraph 6 mech-
anism.37
The African Group/DAG, and particularly India, are already bench-
marking those judicial experiences in order to obtain further policy space 
for their export-oriented generic industries outside the paragraph 6 mech-
anism.38
This policy approach is more useful for health policy formation than 
focusing on article 31(f) and the unpromising paragraph 6 mechanism. It is 
reasonable to argue that, since TRIPS agreement entered into force, enough 
time and efforts have been dedicated to article 31(f) by developing country 
health and trade officials, NGOs, and A2K advocates. Any cost-effect analysis 
would suggest finding a more simple and automatic procedure to avoid the 
ongoing and exhausting allocation of resources to the multiple (global and 
domestic) battles related to this issue. 
The high transaction cost involved in the paragraph 6 mechanism is 
clearly described by Sell: ‘even when single battles are won with regard to a 
specific medicine needed by any given country, the whole process must then 
be wound up and started over again for the next drug in the next country, 
with all the legal, economic, and political costs to be repeated’. The resulting 
‘patchwork quilt of territorial measures and countermeasures’, as she recalls, 
increases the transaction costs of all the stakeholders while not appreciably 
stabilising access to essential medicines for citizens in poor countries as a 
whole.39 
Political science literature offers insights on why the ‘solution’ con-
tained in the 2003 Decision was made. For Gold and Morin, for example, 
NGOs and developing countries became trapped in consensus-seeking rheto-
ric, making it preferable for all parties involved to agree on adopting a flawed 
mechanism, and thus save face in a particular momentum. Thus, the process 
of rhetorical action led to adopting an unworking agreement in the sense of 
an arrangement made of ‘sham standards’, permitting a claim to the de jure 
37  See Edwards Lifesciences v. CoreValve, Inc. and Medtronic CoreValve, LLC, 
No. 2011-1215, -1257, Fed. Cir. (2011).
38  See Doc IP/C/M/67, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights - Minutes of meeting, 24 - 25 October and 17 November 2011 (15 February 2012), 
paragraphs 221–223.
39  S. Sell, ‘From Forum-Shifters to Shape-Shifters: Rulemaking and Enforcement 
in Intellectual Property’, International Studies Association Meeting, New York City (Feb-
ruary 15-19 2009), p. 87.
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existence of a mechanism and relieving pressures for the continuation of the 
debate as previously framed.40 
Certainly, by rendering the 2003 Decision unworkable, developed 
countries and IP industries obtained a public relations (PR) success without 
the need to incur the foreseeable reputational losses associated with insisting 
on restricting, for example, its coverage to a limited number of products and/
or diseases. In this regard, the Decision certainly provided for a ‘media-vis-
ible solution’ to a highly ‘sensitive issue’; the ‘theatre policy dimension’, as 
Robert Hudec would have said.41 
For Hoen, according to this line of reasoning, the Decision is a textbook 
example of a compromise with little practical use: ‘at the end of the day, the 
objective was to reach an agreement –any agreement– without regard to the 
effectiveness of the compromise’.42
The WHO Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Pub-
lic Health (CIPIH) had already predicted these problems and in fact recom-
mended that the effectiveness of the Decision needed to be kept under review 
‘and appropriate changes considered to achieve a workable solution, if nec-
essary’.43 
Interestingly, generic producers kept a very low profile during the 2003 
Decision negotiations. Shadlen sheds light on this issue, as her interviewees 
working with the generics industry explained their preference for dedicating 
efforts to other policy issues, as they considered the whole procedure to be a 
predictable failure.44
For some authors, the 2003 Decision closed the door on further conten-
tion over the legitimacy of the TRIPS agreement. In the words of Pugatch, IP 
owners had learned the lesson of PR mistakes with regard to access to medicines 
in the past,45 and thus adopted a proactive, rather than defen sive, strategy.
40  See E. Gold & J. Morin, ‘Consensus-seeking, distrust’ op. cit.
41  See R. Hudec, ‘International Economic Law: the political theater dimension’, 17 
Journal of International Economic Law (1996): 9–15.
42  E. Hoen, The Global Politics op. cit., pp. 36–37 and p. 38.
43  See CIPIH Recommendation 4.15: 120.
44  K. Shadlen, ‘The political economy of AIDs treatment: Intellectual property 
and the trans formation of generic supply’, 51 International Studies Quarterly 3 (2007): 
576–577.
45  Particularly, the legal challenge (February 1998) in the running up to the Doha 
WTO Ministerial Conference by 39 drug companies against the government of South Af-
rica, alleging that the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 
violated TRIPS and the South African Constitution.
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For the industry, it was politically necessary to conclude negotiations 
in a manner that would be perceived as beneficial to developing countries. 
On the other hand, by signing the 2003 Decision, developing countries were 
essentially declaring that TRIPS rules “no longer obstruct efforts to promote 
public health’.46 
4. The way out
Thus, the 2003 Decision does not facilitate access to generic medicines in 
developing countries lacking manufacturing capacity. The underlying mas-
ter-value of the Decision is clear, in that it is compatible with WTO to import 
and export generics to developing countries without sufficient pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturing capacity under certain conditions. However, its regulatory 
structure compartmentalizes transactions on a case-by-case, drug-by-drug 
and country-by-country basis through a (member-driven) double compulso-
ry licensing scheme.47 
As mentioned, the Annual Reviews of the mechanism by the TRIPS 
Council already contain an agenda item under the illustrative title ‘Any al-
ternatives to the use of Paragraph 6 System to achieve the objective of ac-
cess to medicines’.48 In this regard, there are several policy options linked 
to trade that could seriously contribute to reducing prices of essential med-
icines in the developing world. This is the case of pooled procurement, 
among others. 
Pooled procurement reduces the transaction costs among participating 
countries, creates greater buying power, and offer suppliers incentives to in-
vest in generics production. In addition, it also offers incentives to the orig-
inating firms to become ‘low bidders’, as developing countries pooling their 
procurement can produce economies of scale which will facilitate exporters’ 
46  M. Pugatch, ‘Political economy of intellectual property policy-making — an 
observation from a realistic (and slightly cynical) perspective’ 7 The Journal of World In-
vestment & Trade 2 (2006): 270–271.
47  F. Abbott & J. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies 
for the production and diffusion of patented medicines under the amended TRIPS provi-
sions’, 10 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2007): 921–987.
48  See e.g. the intervention of the Indian delegation in IP/C/61 Annual Review 
of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Report to the General Council (18 November 2011), 
paragraph 56.
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long-term planning under supply contracts offered by a centralized procure-
ment authority. 
The two decades of experience of the Pharmaceutical Procurement Ser-
vice of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS/PPS) are among 
the best practices of inter-state pooled procurement. In fact, the OECS/PPS 
has successfully used pooled procurement to steadily and significantly reduce 
the price of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies for its nine Ministries of 
Health since its establishment in 1986.
As Jerome Reichman suggests, pooling procurement (by coordinating 
the potential use of compulsory licences) can generate economies of scale and 
scope to entice even the pharmaceutical companies that originated the prod-
uct to ‘play ball’ with them. 
The carrot dangled in this scenario is the possibility for the originator 
company to exercise its exclusive rights (including trademarks) over a suita-
bly large area that would make it worthwhile, even at discount prices;49again, 
high-volumes, low-margins. 
In addition, these measures could eliminate the high transaction costs 
of uncoordinated legal action by developing countries: as Abbott and Reich-
man recall, action by single states on a case-by-case approach will remain vul-
nerable to strong legal and economic pressures by right holders, in the form 
of ‘defensive actions to choke off critical sources of supply’.50 
Reichman has also put forward an interesting new idea by suggesting 
the creation of loose trade agreements between developing countries (as long 
as they involve at least an LDC) to establish a regional pharmaceutical supply 
centre in one LDC member country (exempted from patent protections until 
2016) and to re-export generics drugs imported under double compulsory 
licenses throughout the entire group of Members. 
Such schemes could probably give producers sufficient scale to justify 
the investment in producing generics for export to these countries, and even 
setting up production in one of these countries. In this sense, such an initia-
tive could also be an opportunity to help developing countries build region-
al manufacturing. In this regard, health ministers could offer incentives to 
patent holders to set up a regional factory, supervise production quality, and 
supply the member states from that facility. 
49  J. Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions’ 
op. cit., p. 258.
50  F. Abott & J. Reichman, ‘The Doha Round‘s Public Health Legacy’ op. cit., p. 973.
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The scheme would also amplify the bargaining power vis-à-vis the in-
dustry, as it would allow health ministers, acting jointly, to hold their bun-
dle of compulsory licenses and go to the original patent holder and offer the 
possibility of supplying the entire regional market, if the required drugs were 
offered at affordable prices. 
Taking this road instead of issuing individual CL also cancels out the 
risks of playing alone against the global pharmaceutical industry. In this re-
spect, under pooled schemes, it would be more difficult to threaten a develop-
ing country successfully with domestic lawsuits. 
Interestingly, the German Development Agency was among the first to 
recall that the LDCs transition period (until 2016) was a major window of 
opportunity for focusing on technology transfer to establish export-oriented 
generic pharmaceutical production bases in key LDCs and trade in generics 
with other LDCs. In fact, the German agency is actually very active in sup-
porting local production of pharmaceuticals in countries such as Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania.51 
However, this window of opportunity as well as that referred to by Re-
ichman is due to be phased-out if WTO members fail to agree on adopting 
new extensions to this transitional period.52 
In any case, even counting on the possibility of an extra transitional 
period, it would be reasonable not to leave access to medicines at affordable 
prices in the developing world to member-driven mechanisms but to trade 
and traders. In this regard, a critical element for the solution to access to 
affordable medicines in the developing world is more global trade: the same 
global trade that has silently managed to make electronic devices, food, cars, 
clothing, etc, affordable in our societies since the inception of GATT in 1947 
and the following eight Rounds of trade negotiations. 
Creating and developing a thriving global market for generics is cer-
tainly a more efficient policy option than adding extra market segmentation 
to the traditional market segmentation for patents. In this regard, the 2003 
Decision’s double-CL scheme was unreasonable. In this line of reasoning, it is 
also critical to underline that all the trade involved in world economic growth 
51  See Investment in Pharmaceutical Production in the Least Developed Coun-
tries: A Guide for Policy Makers and Investment Promotion Agencies (United Nations 
2011), p. 13.
52  See WTO/L/845 Decision on the Transition Period for Least-developed coun-
tries under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement adopted by the Eighth Ministerial Con-
ference on 17 December 2011 (19 December).
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during last half century was neutral towards domestic IP protection until 
TRIPS agreement entered into force (1996). 
The historic Doha Declaration on access to medicines can open the 
doors for a pro-trade WTO policy decision aiming to facilitate access to med-
icines in developing countries. In this regard, WTO has a historical opportu-
nity to confront its critics and handle humanitarian concerns by going for the 
core of its activity (world trade and market formation) and not for what has 
been made “related to” IP through the TRIPS agreement.
More than a decade since the inception of the 2001 Declaration, it is rea-
sonable to suggest that humanitarian concerns in this area could be more effi-
ciently managed by embracing trade, not through extra market segmentation 
and a member-driven mechanism at odds with the historical inner economic 
logic and rationale of the world trade system. In this regard, it is obvious that 
the member-driven mechanism adopted so far in the 2003 Decision does not 
prove effective for improving access to medicines in the developing world. 
Member-driven solutions are at odds with world trade, and mar-
ket-driven solutions should thus be explored. In this respect, WTO Members 
could make a better contribution to the provision of access to generic medi-
cines in developing countries by leaving aside bureaucratic controls and mar-
ket segmentation to concentrate on what the world trade system does best, 
namely promoting market formation on a global scale.
For any market to function properly, prices must be affordable for po-
tential buyers. However, the purchasing capacity of brand-name medicines 
by most patients in developing countries is extremely low at best, and their 
public authorities do not still have capacity to deliver. In consequence, global 
trade in generics may be the only option to have a major impact on prices and 
thus on affordable medicines in these countries. 
By fostering price-based competition through increasing potential ge-
neric suppliers both from developed and developing countries, the price of 
both generic and patented medicines can be significantly brought down in de-
veloping countries. In this regard, it is not market failure but market success 
what strongly suggests strengthening global trade in generics both in and for 
the developing world. 
Beginning at the launch of the Doha Development Round (2001), WTO 
Members have been involved in an open re-regulatory process to facilitate 
pro-health pharmaceutical policies in the developing world. However, the 
measures taken so far have not proved sufficiently effective. 
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Alternatively, (TRIPS compatible) market-driven solutions have to be 
explored. Promoting public health in developing countries through trade re-
quires not only ensuring zero tariffs on health products (medicines, active in-
gredients and medical products) but facilitating world trade flows of generics 
under automatic mandatory licensing. Nowadays, the former is improving 
but the latter is not.
With regard to the former, there is a trend within the WTO regime to-
ward tariff reduction on medicines, active ingredients and medical products. 
Notwithstanding these improvements, some LDCs, developing countries and 
transition economies still maintain high tariff rates on health products.53 In 
consequence, pro-health endeavors are required to further reduce tariffs in 
those countries. 
With regard to the latter, world trade flows in health products under 
compulsory license towards developing countries are almost non-existent. 
Although developing countries such as India and Brazil have increased their 
participation in world trade in health products in recent decades, the key 
players are still a small group of developed countries strongly opposing the 
adoption of any rule and policy facilitating world trade in pharmaceutical 
products under compulsory licensing.54 
Fortunately, competition authorities in developing countries can play 
a major role here by issuing compulsory licenses not only to produce but also 
to import generics in order to tackle critical antitrust issues such as, particu-
larly, exorbitant or excessive pricing.
In addition, the potential for increasing flexibility (read adaptability) 
of WTO law through Declarations and waivers is underestimated. In fact, all 
studies of WTO practices on waivers tend to stress their potential.55 In this 
53  The study updates data and extends the universe of health products, going 
beyond the three health products taken as a sample by Olcay and Laing in their study for 
the WHO CIPRIH (2005). See respectively M. Helble, More Trade for Better Health, In-
ternational Trade and Tariffs on Health Products, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2012-17, 
WTO Economic Research and Statistical Division (18 October 2012) and M. Olcay & R. 
Laing, Pharmaceutical Tariffs: What is their effect on prices, protection of local industry 
and revenue generation?”, Study prepared for the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health (World Health Organization 2005).
54  For empirical data see, in particular, M. Helbler, More Trade for Better Health, 
op. cit., pp. 11–13.
55  In this regard, the typology offered by Feichtner (individual exceptions, gen-
eral exceptions and rule-making instruments) and her reflections on this issue are par-
ticularly clear. See I. Feichtner, The Law and Politics of WTO Waivers: Stability and 
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regard, WTO structures offer significant regulatory capacity to reconsider 
(re-regulate) TRIPS disciplines in this and other areas; provided there is suf-
ficient social pressure, and thus political will among its Members.
Flexibility in Public International Law (Cambridge International Trade and Economic 
Law 2011).
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PRICE-BASED COMPETITION
1. Maximizing generics
Intellectual property rights are legal instruments designed to grant private 
control over inventions, information and ideas.1 Prior to the entry into force 
of WTO law and its Annex 1C TRIPS Agreement, international intellectual 
property had a limited influence on the capacity of developing countries to 
regulate public health. However, for more than a decade, WTO members have 
been involved in a regulatory learning process to rebalance patent and health 
protection in the TRIPS Agreement.2 
Obviously, the core right conferred with a patent is the ‘right’ to exclude 
others from profiting from an invention: patents are legal monopolies created 
to secure a (temporary) exclusion of competitors with regard to a given inven-
tion. In this regard, the competition provisions in TRIPS agreement may play 
a critical role towards the inclusion of competitors and thus the promotion of 
global generics competition and market formation generally. 
And here, the WTO formal recognition that TRIPS rules are flexible 
offers major policy space. In this sense, trade ministers could collectively 
make a considerable contribution to access to medicines by promoting global 
generic competition and, particularly, pro-generics domestic regulation and 
policies in the developing world. 
There is a case for stronger competition law and policy in the brave new 
world of knowledge monopolies, and particularly in the life-science indus-
tries . Global competition issues have a major impact on prices, and pricing is 
certainly a key factor in access to affordable medicines. 
For any market to function properly, prices must be affordable for po-
1  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit.
2  See generally S. Picciotto, ‘Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and the WTO’, 
Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development (Palgrave and 
Oxfam 2002).
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tential buyers. However, as recalled above, the purchasing capacity of brand 
name medicines by most patients and/or public procurement authorities in 
developing countries tends to be very low at best. 
Certainly, cost is not the sole factor impacting access to medicines in 
the developing world, but it must be resolved first. Thus, generic drugs are 
critical to ensuring a steady stream of affordable medicines by bringing pric-
es down to the marginal production cost, plus a sustainable royalty: a truly 
efficient drug market might offer, not the lowest prices per se, but the lowest 
prices possible while at the same time ensuring innovation.3 
Sustainable prices for medicines in the developing world can be more 
easily constructed if more volumes are involved, and this can only be done 
through global trade in generics. By fostering (price) competition through the 
existence of a multiplicity of potential generic suppliers, both from developed 
and developing countries, the price of generic and patented medicines can 
be brought down. Thus, in order to effectively lower prices, a thriving glob-
al generics market requires promoting market formation, and pro-generics 
competition law and policies. 
Policy measures taken in this direction could certainly help in advanc-
ing (or unblocking) the agenda of the Doha Round. In this regard, it is not 
market failure but market success what strongly suggests strengthening ge-
neric competition both in and for the developing world. 
2. Pro-health antitrust 
Nowadays, a variety of private and public practices are using IP protection in 
order to inhibit global market formation, and therefore global competition. 
However, competition and intellectual property are inevitably required to 
converge in the medium term.4
3  B. Waning, M. Kyle & E. Diedrichsen et al, ‘Intervening in global markets’ op. 
cit., p. 17.
4  See generally, G. Ghidini, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The 
Innovation Nexus (Edward Elgar 2006) at 99–118 (chapter 5), E. Fox, ‘Can Antitrust Pol-
icy Protect the Global Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?’, International Public Goods 
and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) and, particularly, N. Gallini & M. Trebilcock, ‘Competition policy 
and intellectual property rights’ Competition policy and intellectual property rights in the 
knowledge-based economy (University of Calgary Press 1998), pp. 17–61.
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Any unrestrained freedom to exploit knowledge monopolies, and sub-
sequent monopoly pricing, produces deadweight losses (losses occurring 
when potential consumers cannot afford to buy a product), and it thus re-
quires more antitrust policymaking and enforcement. In this regard, access 
to affordable medicines in developing countries is a major example requiring 
incorporating pro-competitive TRIPS flexibility into their antitrust enforce-
ment policies.5 
Domestic competition laws and policies are strongly instrumental in 
any pro-development reading of TRIPS agreement.6 In fact, according to arti-
cle 40 of TRIPS (Section 8: control of anti-competitive practices in contrac-
tual licenses), countries have full regulatory autonomy to define what may be 
deemed anti-competitive conduct. 
Thus, not only practices such as applying excessively broad patents to 
block research, ‘sham litigation’, ‘patent clusters’, ‘evergreening’ and others 
can be scrutinised by competition authorities in developing countries. Also 
excessive pricing itself, or the refusals to negotiate voluntary licences block-
ing the access of generic competitors to essential facilities, among others, are 
anti-competitive practices which require the competition authorities to take 
decisions (such as the issuance of compulsory licences), in order to secure 
affordable prices for essential drugs.
In the past two decades, developing countries have begun to gener-
ally adopt competition law and policies as a structural element of their de-
velopment strategies. These laws and policies are increasingly perceived as 
instrumental in promoting and protecting welfare creation in areas such as 
intellectual property.7 As a result, some developing countries have begun to 
explore pro-competition readings of pharmaceutical protection in order to 
gain access to medicines at affordable prices. 
There is no doubt that enforcing competition law and policy could be 
5  For a pre-TRIPS history of the impact of pharmaceutical corporate practices on 
the health care systems of developing countries see G. Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Indus-
try and Dependency op. cit.
6  T. Avafia, J. Berger & T. Hartzenberg, ‘The ability of select sub-Saharan African 
countries to utilize TRIPS Flexibilities and Competition Law to ensure a sustainable supply 
of essential medicines: A study of producing and importing countries’, Trade Law Center for 
Southern South Africa (TRALAC) Working Paper No. 12 Stellenbosch (2006), p. 52.
7  J. Drexl, ‘The Critical Role of Competition Law in Preserving Public Goods in 
Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights’, International Public Goods and Transfer of 
Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University 
Press 2005), pp. 709–725.
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particularly helpful in this regard. It is true that addressing pharmaceutical 
anticompetitive practices requires complex economic analysis, skilled regula-
tors, as well as sophisticated administrative and judicial processes.8 
However, the benefits clearly outweigh the costs. In terms of compara-
tive law and policy, competition authorities enjoy a more pro-active role and 
more independent investigative powers than patent authorities for pursuing 
cases which are in the public interest. 
In fact, cases can be pursued on the simple basis of third party com-
plaints. Conversely, patent law normally tends to rely on directly interested 
parties who are often reluctant to dedicate time and resources to costly and 
complicated litigation against large patent-holding corporations. 
Patent licensing procedures and competition law procedures differ 
from each other in key issues. In particular, the inquiry by the competition 
authorities is public and focuses on the legality or illegality of a given practice. 
Last, but not least, competition laws are punitive! 
In consequence, it is self-evident that competition commissions may 
play a critical role in access to affordable medicines in developing countries 
through pro-competitive compulsory licensing (CL). 
These actions are WTO compatible, as TRIPS article 31(k) provides for 
efficient policy space to grant pro-competitive CL, by waiving the need for a 
previous negotiation with patent holders and leaving the possibility of grant-
ing royalty free licences. In this sense, a finding of anti-competitive conduct 
under article 31(k) would exempt WTO Members from negotiations with the 
patent holder, and even from the TRIPS requirement to limit CL predomi-
nantly for the supply of the domestic market. In addition, remuneration may 
also become marginal in such cases, given the punitive elements of remedy-
ing anticompetitive practices.9
Hence, some competition authorities from the developing world are 
beginning to tackle excessive pricing of pharmaceuticals and showing an ex-
ample to others. 
In this regard, the South African Competition Commission was among 
the first competition authorities in the developing world to use the stated pur-
poses of its competition rules with a pro-generics rationale in mind: Section 
8  J. Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions’ 
op. cit at 253 and E. Fox, ‘Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from the 
Excesses of IPRs?’, International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Glo-
balised Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University Press 2005), pp. 758–769.
9  J. Reichman, ‘Compulsory Licensing of Patented’ op. cit., p. 253.
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2 of the Competition Act states that its purpose is to promote and maintain 
competition in order ‘to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development 
of the economy’, ‘to provide consumers with competitive prices and product 
choices’ and ‘to advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans’. 
Section 8 in turn determines that it is prohibited for a dominant firm 
‘to charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers [and to] refuse to 
give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasi-
ble to do so’.
To date, one of the most successful uses of competition law regard-
ing generics was a complaint brought before this competition commission 
against GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim in 2002, and an agree-
ment obtained from Bristol-Myers Squibb by an NGO, under the threat of an 
antitrust complaint to the commission in 2005. 
Both cases are based on abuse of dominance, and focus extensively on 
excessive pricing with regard to pharmaceutical products for the treatment of 
HIV infection and AIDS-related diseases. In both cases, interesting insights 
are provided with regard to the use of competition law and policy in the phar-
maceutical area.10
In Hazel Tau and Others v GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingel-
heim, the complainants bluntly alleged that the prices that GSK and BI were 
charging for their products were responsible for the premature, predictable 
and avoidable loss of human lives. 
The Commission determined that GSK and BI engaged in restrictive 
practices that violated the Competition Act of 1998’s prohibitions against 
excessive pricing (section 8(a)), denying a competitor access to essential fa-
cilities (section 8(b)) and exclusionary acts with an anticompetitive effect 
outweighing technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains (section 
8(c).
The Competition Commission referred their refusal to license gener-
ic manufacturers to the competition tribunal for a ruling, and requested the 
tribunal ‘to make an order authorising any person to exploit the patents to 
market generic versions of the respondents patented medicines or fixed dose 
combinations that require these patents, in return for the payment of a rea-
sonable royalty’. 
10  J. Berger, Advancing public health by other means: using competition policy 
to increase access to essential medicines. Bellagio Series on Development and Intellectu-
al Property Policy: Policy Options for Assuring Affordable Access to Essential Medicines 
(ICTSD 2004).
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In addition, a penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of the respondents’ 
ARVs was recommended for each year that they were found to have violated 
the Competition Act. In the following months, the companies agreed to ne-
gotiate voluntary licences with generic companies to avoid not only a legal 
precedent, but a PR disaster.11 The agreement allowed generic products still 
under patent to be available for the first time in South Africa.
In the latter case, TAC (Treatment Action Campaign) advocates also 
threatened BMS to file a complaint in the shadow of the previous case, aim-
ing to open access to key first line AIDS medicine patents. For TAC, BMS was 
charging excessive prices for an off-patent product under a de facto monopo-
ly which was already being marketed at substantially lower prices in countries 
such as Brazil, among others. Before any formal decision by the Commission, 
BMS agreed to settle the issue by offering a price cut of approximately 80%. 
In short, some first pro-generics experiences are already available in 
the competition enforcement policies of the developing world. 
It should also be recalled that countries such as the United States al-
ready make strategic use of compulsory licensing to remedy anti-competitive 
practices. The US administration is in fact exemplary in this regard, as it has 
long been particularly active in granting compulsory licences to correct an-
ti-competitive practices. 
Paradoxically, this administration has used compulsory licensing de-
crees in antitrust law and policies as a remedy in more than 100 case set-
tlements including pharmaceutical cases involving meprobamate, synthetic 
steroids, the antibiotics tetracycline and griseofulvin, and basic biotechnolo-
gy patents, as Frederic Scherer explains.12 
In fact, the US administration has not been alone in making use of 
pro-competition CL in the field of pharmaceutical protection. The Italian 
Competition Authority, for example, has already granted several compulso-
ry licences under article 31(k) between 2005 and 2007. On 21 June 2005, 
this regulatory agency granted a compulsory license against Merck for its re-
fusal to license an antibiotic (Imipenem Cilastatin) and on 8 February 2006 
against GSK for its refusal to negotiate with Fabbrica Italiana Sintetici SpA a 
voluntary license for the manufacture of an active ingredient (Sumatriptan 
Succinate) to produce a migraine drug. 
11  T. Avafia, J. Berger & T. Hartzenberg, ‘The ability of ’ op. cit., p. 27–32.
12  See F. Scherer, Competition policy, domestic and international (Elgar Publish-
ing 2000), p. 352.
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Also, on 21 March 2007, the Italian Competition Authority authorized 
3 CLs for the active ingredient (Finasteride) of a product used to treat prostat-
ic hypertrophy, prostate cancer and baldness. The three of these compulsory 
licences involved exports to other European countries.13
The UE Commission is also taking more responsibility on IP-related 
competition policy in the field of generic drugs. In January 2008, DG Com-
petition launched a sector inquiry (under Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003) on 
the pharmaceutical sector to examine the reasons why fewer new medicines 
are brought to market and why generic entry seems to be delayed in many 
cases. 
Reacting to the findings of the final report (8 July 2009)14, the Com-
mission has intensified its scrutiny of the pharmaceutical sector, including 
monitoring of settlements between originator and generic drug companies. 
Several investigations into pharmaceutical company practices have been con-
ducted and are in progress as a result of this inquiry. Additionally, between 
2010 and 2011, the Commission launched two Reports on the monitoring of 
problematic pharma patent settlements.15 
As a result, it is reasonable to suggest that competition authorities in 
developing countries should seriously benchmark these pro-generics devel-
opments in the competition policies of developed countries in order to obtain 
negotiating leverage regarding their own policies. This is particularly the case 
with regard to the major export-oriented generic producers from the devel-
oping world. 
Also, the empowering legal language of competition should not be un-
derestimated in its promotion of pro-health policies in the developing world. 
In this sense, competition rules and policies allow not only competition au-
thorities but health ministers to take a more vigilant and proactive role with 
regard to lawmaking and policymaking in patents and public health areas. 
With this objective in mind, it is important for developing countries not 
only to strengthen their institutional capacity with regard to competition law 
13  See IP/C/61 Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Report to 
the General Council (18 November 2011), paragraphs 51–54.
14  See European Commission Communication and Technical Annex- Commis-
sion Staff Working Document (8 July 2009).
15  See DG Competition-1st Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (July 
2010) and DG Competition-2nd Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (July 
2011).
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and policy but global institutions such as the WHO, WIPO and UNDP also 
need to incorporate competition issues in their agendas.
Nowadays, developing common ground for pro-development competi-
tion law and policy in the IP area is a major global policy issue. Fortunately, 
WIPO has already granted itself a promising mandate on Intellectual Prop-
erty and Competition Policy. At the 2007 General Assembly, WIPO Member 
States adopted 45 recommendations for immediate implementation under 
the Development Agenda. 
As a result, Recommendation 7 (Cluster A: Technical Assistance and 
Capacity Building) urges promoting measures that will help countries deal 
with intellectual property-related anti-competitive practices, by providing 
technical cooperation to developing countries, especially LDCs, at their re-
quest, in order to better understand the interface between IPRs and compe-
tition policies. 
Added to this, Recommendation 23 (Cluster B: Norm-setting, flexibili-
ties, public policy and public domain) underlines the importance of pro-com-
petitive licensing practices: to consider how to better promote pro-compet-
itive intellectual property licensing practices, particularly with a view to 
fostering creativity, innovation and the transfer and dissemination of tech-
nology to interested countries, in particular developing countries and LDCs. 
Finally, Recommendation 32 (Cluster C: Technology Transfer, Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Access to Knowledge) 
refers to systemic exchanges with regard to policy formation in this area: to 
have within WIPO opportunity for exchange of national and regional expe-
riences and information on the links between IPRs and competition policies.
Interestingly, the former WTO Director General Pascal Lamy was also 
clearly aware of the need to develop common ground in this area. For this 
pragmatic practitioner of globalization, the prospects for success of domestic 
competition policies and the WTO are ‘profoundly inter-linked’. 
According to Lamy, the relationship is “a delicate and subtle one”, beg-
ging critical questions that cannot be answered by any organization acting 
in isolation but through joint reflection and deliberation by organizations 
such as WIPO, the OECD, UNCTAD, the International Competition Network 
(ICN) and the WTO, in addition to national competition agencies with expe-
rience in this field.16 
16  See P. Lamy, ‘Strong competition policies key to a dynamic and healthy market 
economy’, WTO| Speeches and statements (16 February 2012).
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Hence, it is be reasonable to assume that pro-competitive TRIPS flex-
ibilities should be developed in collaboration with other international insti-
tutions.
3. Generics competition 
Competition is perhaps ‘the most powerful policy instrument for bringing down 
drug prices for off-patent drugs’, in the WHO’s own words. The final report of 
the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public 
Health (CIPIH) was already stressing in 2006 how generic competition played 
a significant role in pushing down the prices of off-patent products. 
For CIPIH, developing countries should adopt pro-competitive meas-
ures for preventing or remedying anti-competitive practices related to the use 
of pharmaceutical patents.17 Thus, the commission recommends that devel-
oping countries should ‘generally promote policies that support greater com-
petition between generics, whether branded or not’.18 
Their proposal is precisely framed: ‘competition is in the last instance 
the key tool to drive prices down and improve access to medicines’.19 For CIP-
IH, in consequence, ‘governments and concerned international organiza-
tions should promote new purchasing mechanisms to stimulate the supply 
of affordable new products and to enhance the number of suppliers in order 
to provide a more competitive environment’. Under this rationale, the Com-
mission reaffirms ‘avoiding or dismantling unjustified barriers to the entry 
of generics’ as ‘a major responsibility of governments’.20
In fact, in reaction to its authoritative diagnosis, a Global Strategy and 
Plan of Action on public health, innovation and IP was adopted in May 2008 
by the World Health Assembly. Element 6 of the Global strategy, under the 
title Improving delivery and access, signals TRIPS-consistent generic com-
petition as a critical instrument to improve availability and affordability of 
health products, ‘through the development of national legislation and/or pol-
icies that encourage generic production and entry’.21
17  See ‘Recommendation 4.23’ and ‘Recommendation 4.25’ in Public Health, In-
novation and Intellectual Property Rights, CIPIH Final Report (WHO 2006).
18  See ‘Recommendation 4.24’.
19  See CIPIH Final Report, op. cit., p. 112.
20  See CIPIH Final Report, op. cit., p. 128 and p. 181.
21  See Global Strategy and Plan of action on public health, innovation and in-
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For many, global welfare could be improved if developing countries 
were generally allowed to free ride on pharmaceutical innovation under cer-
tain conditions.22 Notwithstanding that the current international patent sys-
tem produces difficulties for going down this route, they are not insurmount-
able. TRIPS rules still provide for very significant flexibility for combating 
world anti-competitive conduct in the pharmaceutical patent area, both on a 
domestic and global scale.23
At the present time, several provisions in the TRIPS framework allow 
for developing flexible pro-competition policies in one way or another (e.g. 
articles 6, 7, 8, 30, 31, 40 and 44). In addition, as Berger underlines, ‘there is 
sufficient disagreement between and within developed countries on the rela-
tionship between competition policy and intellectual property to provide sig-
nificant space within which to manoeuvre’.24 This lack of consensus certainly 
allows an important window of opportunity to develop (TRIPS compatible) 
pro-generics policies.
The TRIPS agreement offers powerful policy space for promoting glob-
al pro-generics competition. The principles of the agreement itself, contained 
in article 8.2, expressly establish that appropriate measures may be needed 
‘to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade’. 
Added to this, article 40.2 recognizes pro-competition limitations of IP 
rights generally: ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from 
specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in 
particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market’. 
In short, TRIPS principles contained in article 8.2 (measures to prevent 
unreasonable trade restrictions) and pro-competition provisions contained 
in article 40.2 (measures to prevent the abuse of IP rights having an adverse 
effect on competition) open a window of opportunity for promoting domestic 
and global public policies towards greater generic competition. 
In fact, antitrust remedies are obviously not covered by the 2003 De-
cision and thus are exempted from the paragraph 6 mechanism. Therefore, 
tellectual property, Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Agenda item 11.6 (24 May 
2008).
22  F. Scherer, ‘A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting’, 27 World 
Economy (2004) 7: 1141.
23  See chapter 8.
24  J. Berger, Advancing public health by other means op. cit., p. 4.
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developing countries enjoy enough leeway to determine what pharmaceutical 
patent-related conduct constitutes anti-competitive behaviour in the TRIPS 
agreement and how to correct it. Indeed, these articles offer them ample ‘wig-
gle room’ to implement policies favouring the public interest in free compe-
tition.25 
TRIPS article 31(k) allows CL to correct anti-competitive practices of a 
patent holder. As a result, compulsory licensing is a promising TRIPS-com-
patible policy option to combat anti-competitive behaviour in the global 
pharmaceutical sector. In this sense, the general rules on CL contained in 
article 31(f) do not apply to those CL granted to remedy or correct anti-com-
petitive behaviour. Thus, public authorities are exempted prior to negotiation 
with the patent-holder and can even refuse to provide for compensation to 
the patent-holder. 
In addition, there are also some additional pro-competition policy tools 
that could seriously contribute to price-based competition and thus lead to 
significant price reductions for essential medicines in the developing world. 
These are not only the pooled procurement above mentioned but, in particu-
lar, the cases of automatic mandatory licensing and patent pooling. 
In automatic mandatory licensing, any company can use the patent-
ed invention, provided it complies with the legal requirements (drug quality 
standards, required royalties, etc). In order to achieve this, governments have 
to leave patents open to all qualified applicants.26 
As a result, this type of licence allows multiple firms to enter the mar-
ket, and thus expand competition. In addition, governments are prevented 
from selecting one provider only as there will be more than one available. 
Breach of contract and failure to deliver can also be easily remedied, with no 
need to issue a new licence. 
Patent pooling is also a promising initiative. A patent pool is created 
when patent rights, held by different owners are brought together (pooled) 
and made available on a non-exclusive basis to pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers through voluntary licences by paying royalties to the pool.
Firms that are contemplating producing and marketing generics can 
access these ‘one stop shop” facilities and make use of the covered patents.27 
25  J. Reichman, ‘From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under 
the TRIPS Agreement’, 29 New York University Journal of International Law and Poli-
tics (1996): 28.
26  See chapter 9.4.
27  E. Hoen, The Global Politics of op. cit., pp. 90–91.
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The idea was first launched by James Love from Knowledge Ecology Inter-
national, after studying the US airplane patent pool established in 1917 by 
the US Government to overcome patent barriers to the mass production of 
airplanes for the military.28 
UNITAID, a mechanism originally designed for the purchase of medi-
cines (and financed by a tax on airline tickets), evolved to operate along these 
lines and established a Medicines Patent Pool for HIV drugs that became op-
erational in 2010.29 
These licences, available for producing low-cost generics, are designed 
to cover as many developing countries as possible, in order to both maximize 
public health protection and to ensure economies of scale in generic drug 
production.
Interestingly, patent pooling is not frowned upon by developing coun-
tries. In the post-Doha scenario, developing countries and large pharma-
ceutical industries prefer to promote any sort of public and/or private ini-
tiatives based on voluntary licensing rather than lowering their guard and 
accepting a generalized issuance of pro-health CL. The US administration, 
for example, is already publicly supporting patent pooling as an alternative 
voluntary model.
These private-public initiatives should not be underestimated, as the 
experiences of generic producing countries illustrate that making effective 
use of CLs issued by governments is not always easy, as patent offices often 
grant patents not sufficiently disclosed. Given the lack of sufficient disclosure, 
the poor quality of many patents may mean an unreasonably long time for 
developing countries to develop and produce a given invention, if there is no 
voluntary collaboration by the patent-holder. 
In a submission to the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Pat-
ents (SCP) in 2010, Brazil illustrated this problem with its own experience 
with the CL granted for an antiretroviral drug (Efaviretz) in May 2007: it took 
the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation almost two years to develop and produce the 
drug.30
Technology transfer programs should obviously be given more weight 
28  See D. Serafino, ‘Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and 
Management Structures’, KEI Research Notes (6, 4 June 2007), pp. 15–16.
29  See J. Bermudez & E. Hohen, ‘The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative: Bringing 
Patents Together for the Common Good’, 4 Open AIDS Journal (2010): 37–40.
30  See SCP/14/17, Exceptions and Limitations to Patents Rights, Brazil Propos-
al, paragraph 15–16 (15 January 2010).
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in trade negotiations, as developing countries without pharmaceutical manu-
facturing capacity should not be dependent on foreign supply forever. 
Transfer of technology programs (investing in plant and equipment, 
and upgrading systems for compliance with OECD GMP quality standards) 
are of critical importance for securing local pharmaceutical production in de-
veloping countries. Ironically, however, they have been reclaiming the devel-
opment of effective global disciplines to facilitate technology transfer for half 
a century now.
The TRIPS article 7 itself reads as follows: ‘The protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance 
of rights and obligations’. 
Article 66.2 also has relevant provisions on this issue: ‘Developed coun-
try Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology trans-
fer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base’. 
How should these provisions be read from the legal perspective of 
TRIPS flexibility? Certainly, promoting world-class pharmaceutical produc-
tion in developing countries would facilitate major global generic compe-
tition. The existence of more export-oriented pharmaceutical industries in 
(and for) developing countries would reduce pharmaceutical prices in the 
developing world. 
However, developed countries and their industries are generally some-
what reluctant to pave the way for this to happen. In fact, Special and Differ-
ential treatment for developing countries under TRIPS rules is not based on 
any particular commitment with regard to technology transfer but merely on 
transitional periods. 
Following a Decision at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, the 
WTO established a mechanism for ensuring the monitoring and full imple-
mentation of the above mentioned obligations. This mechanism was set up 
by a Council Decision in 2003, detailing the information to be supplied by 
developed countries on how their domestic technology transfer incentives are 
functioning in practice.31 
31  See IP/C/28 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
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Under this mechanism, developed countries have to provide detailed 
reports every third year and in the intervening years provide updates. How-
ever, the scope and depth of the technology transfer is purely voluntary.32 In 
this regard, technology transfer for domestic and global exports between LDC 
and developed countries should be renegotiated and enforced. 
4. Sealing legal ceilings 
The domestic markets of many developing countries are not considered by 
the patent-holding pharmaceutical industry to be sufficiently profitable to file 
patent applications in their jurisdictions. However, these markets still need 
to be supplied with imported generics, as they have scant domestic manufac-
turing capacity or none at all. 
For this reason, patents in middle-income developing countries with 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity are of critical concern. Sustainable 
generic production in these countries is a prerequisite in order to export 
those medicines to other developing countries.
In recent decades, as above mentioned, an efficient generic drug indus-
try has burgeoned in developing countries such as South Africa, Thailand, 
India, and Brazil has become a key source of global generic production and 
distribution. Manufacturers such as Cipla (India) or Cristalia (Brazil), for ex-
ample, have long standing experience in producing quality drugs for export 
to developing countries where there is no patent, or where the patent has ex-
pired or where, less frequently, it is under compulsory licence or government 
use. As a result, a wide variety of cheap generic medicines are competing to-
day in the global generics markets. 
However, patents are becoming more widespread and this is restricting 
generic competition for newer patented drugs.33 As already mentioned, Brazil 
passed Decree no. 1355 reintroducing patents after a 30-year vacuum in De-
cember 1994, and India amended its Patent Act in March 2005 on similar lines.
Just before this, interestingly, both a WTO panel and Appellate Body 
decision had ruled against India for not taking the required steps to prepare 
- Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement - Decision of the Council for 
TRIPS (19 February 2003).
32  For the reports see WTO Docs IP/C/W/*.
33  B. Waning, M. Kyle, E. Diedrichsen, L. Soucy & J. Hochstadt et al, ‘Intervening 
in global markets’ op. cit., p. 13.
VIRGIN LANDS OF INVENTION
95
its compliance with TRIPS agreements in 2005 (transitional obligations). 
The case, filed by the United States in 1997 claimed, among other issues, In-
dia’s non-compliance with TRIPS article 70.8 (providing for means to file 
patent applications, etc) and article 70.9 (granting exclusive marketing rights 
to products subject to patent application in other WTO Members).34
Patent protection of new drugs in these countries adversely affects ac-
cess to second and third treatments in developing countries that lack man-
ufacturing capacity. If the generic manufacturers in these countries have 
stronger patent regimes and smaller scale operations, there will be an adverse 
impact on the cost structure for drugs in developing countries. 
In this regard, international antitrust enforcement between developing 
countries –perhaps together with antitrust agencies of some developed coun-
tries– can be instrumental in ensuring that generic industries successfully 
upscale global price-based competition. 
Obviously, the pharmaceutical industry is not supportive of export-ori-
ented generics production in the developing world, and thus of global ge-
nerics competition. As above mentioned, lobbies such as IIIA (Internation-
al Intellectual Property Alliance) or US PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America) are, in fact, targeting the sources of generic 
production. Not surprisingly, developing countries that produce and/or im-
port generics are under pressure from aggressive TRIPS+ lobbying and litiga-
tion. These strategies are complemented by developed countries negotiating 
TRIPS+ treaties as well as GSP benefits in exchange of stringent IP obliga-
tions.35 
Thus, some developing countries are bargaining away their TRIPS flex-
ibilities in favour of trade concessions elsewhere, or in exchange for more ex-
pedient market access. Any developing country reliant on trade with powerful 
trading partners is inevitably reluctant to use TRIPS flexibilities, as there is 
a rational concern of being targeted by (direct and indirect) sanctions in oth-
er policy areas. In addition, as above mentioned, no country is interested in 
suffering the inconvenience of being subjected to a campaign depicting it as 
a piracy-lenient country. As a result, TRIPS flexibilities remain untested in 
many developing countries.
34  See WT/DS79/R India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultur-
al Chemical Products (August 24, 1998) and WT/DS50/AB/R India-Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (December 19, 1997), respectively.
35  See V. Bradford & K. Lee, ‘TRIPS, the Doha Declaration’ op. cit.
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The restricted rationality of the TRIPS+ initiatives under negotiation 
undermines the 2001 Doha Declaration as well as the TRIPS flexibilities with 
regard to health protection. To avoid such an impact, for example, the WHO 
Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean has surprisingly managed to 
publish a Policy Guide on Public health related TRIPS-plus provisions in bi-
lateral trade agreements.36 
The trend of key global institutions questioning the status quo is, in any 
case, steady since the United Nations Development Programme begun refer-
ring openly in its Report of 1999 to the ‘relentless march of intellectual prop-
erty rights’, stating that this process ‘needs to be stopped and questioned’37
In essence, WTO law and policies have formally recognized the right 
of developing countries to import/export generics under certain conditions 
while, in practice, pharmaceutical lobbying is taking those rights away by us-
ing proxy states to advance stronger global standards to those contained in 
TRIPS itself.
Therefore, the existence of legal ceilings with regard to IP protection 
is certainly a critical issue deserving global consideration. Arguably, TRIPS+ 
treaties that invalidate TRIPS flexibilities are TRIPS-Minus with regard to 
trade concessions and benefits in WTO law, and thus should be legally inter-
preted as WTO non-compatible. 
In conclusion, the TRIPS rules, together with the 2001 Doha Declara-
tion should reasonably be taken as a world legal ceiling for stronger IP pro-
tection as well as an international legal foundation for antitrust authorities 
promoting world market formation and thus global generics competition.
In this last regard, TRIPS articles 40 and 31(k) together with the 2001 
Declaration are critical legal instruments for consolidating a thriving global 
generics market to benefit patients from developing countries.
36  See Public health related TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral trade agree-
ments: A Policy Guide for negotiators and implementers in the WHO Eastern Mediterra-
nean Region (WHO and ICTSD 2010).
37  See UNDP Human Development Report 1999 (Oxford University Press 1999), 
p. 73.
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6
WORLD POLICY COHERENCE
1. Relatedness
Finding a proper balance between patents and health through inter-agency 
cooperation is not an easy task. Certainly, in this structurally disputed area of 
international law and global politics, values and (public and private) interests 
seriously conflict.1 In any case, it is reasonable to contend that more nuanced 
balances between public health (rights of citizens-patients) and private prop-
erty (rights of patent holders-corporations) should be considered. 
The prime example of the imbalances resulting from multilateral 
trade-related IP protection is the difficulties experienced by developing coun-
tries in importing generics under TRIPS rules. 
Ironically, in order to solve the problem, the 2003 Decision has 
erected a extremely burdensome procedure. In essence, the Decision com-
partmentalises transactions on a case-by-case, drug-by-drug and coun-
try-by-country basis through a dual compulsory licensing scheme. Thus, the 
rules of the game are based on a procedure reinforcing world-scale ‘market’ 
segmentation. 
As a result, the inner virtues of world trade are thus inhibited, as well 
as the attainment of the economies of scale required to stimulate generic pro-
duction and competition. Thus, the functioning of this mechanism depends 
on political will; and large corporations can always derail political will at both 
the supply and demand side in any given generics transaction. 
Having been designed in the rooms and corridors of the world trading 
regime (i.e. the WTO), the solution suffers from a paradoxical anti-market 
and anti-trade approach. Reasonably, a different solution would have been 
reached if trade ministers had allowed health ministers and other agencies sit 
at negotiating table. 
1  See in particular L. Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights, op. 
cit., p. 47.
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Trade ministers tend to have more leverage vis-à-vis health ministers 
(as well as other domestic agencies). As a direct result, there are multiple 
health-related IP treaties administered by the latter... but no trade-related 
IP treaties administered by the former.
The TRIPS agreement itself formalizes this state of affairs in which 
trade ministers have expanded their power to negotiate treaties by using a 
strategic association of ideas; not for nothing does TRIP stands for Agree-
ment on Intellectual Property Rights related to Trade. 
Obviously, the invention of ‘trade-relatedness’ opens up a world of pos-
sibilities for global policy formation in all areas. In that case, is not almost 
everything related to everything else? The health and trade area is no excep-
tion. 
Is the trade in generics a trade policy or a health policy? Or more pre-
cisely, is the trade in generics a policy dependent on ministers of trade and 
finance, and their global institutions such as the WTO? Or is it a policy de-
pendent on ministers of health and, consequently, global institutions such as 
the WHO? 
Patent protection is both a trade-related and a health-related policy is-
sue. Therefore, there is clear case for increasing inter-agency coordination in 
these critical areas of public policymaking. 
This controversial state of affairs could have been avoided if trade ne-
gotiators had been more open to other public policy expertise. At the pres-
ent time, the issue of trade in generics epitomizes the current global tensions 
where human rights and monopoly rights intersect.2 
Reasonably, more balanced solutions could have been developed if 
technical guidance and assistance from the United Nations agencies special-
izing in health protection (WHO) and human rights (UN Human Rights re-
gime) had been requested by trade negotiators.3 
This is a global policy area in which not only WTO but the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
and the United Nations Human Rights Regime have concurrent authorities 
and mandates. However, these other global institutions were not consulted 
2  See L. Helfer & G. Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping 
the Global Interface (Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 90.
3  On health and international health law as global public goods see, in particular, 
L. Chen, T. Evans & R. Cass, ‘Health as a Global Public Good’, Global Public Goods: In-
ternational Cooperation in the 21st Century (United Nations Development Programme 
1999), pp. 284–305.
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when the TRIPS agreement was being drafted, nor were they invited to par-
ticipate in the design of a solution to the paragraph 6 issue.4 
2. Chairs at the table 
Developing consensus-based public policies in this and other health-related 
global policy areas would certainly benefit from a more inclusive approach in this 
regard. In any case, it is not only a question of pragmatism and legitimacy, but 
of pure international legality, as each of these concurring international regimes 
share complementary responsibilities and overlapping authority in this area. 
For its part, WIPO is responsible for administering a group of IP trea-
ties under its institutional umbrella. However, the emergence of WTO has 
de facto limited its competence. When the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) gave 
rise to the WTO, incorporating ‘Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights’ 
under its jurisdiction, part of the global IP agenda was moved beyond the 
WIPO structure. Irrespective of its own wishes, WIPO has learnt to ‘share’ 
its original competence with WTO and nowadays provides legal advice and 
technical assistance on TRIPS implementation in accordance with their co-
operation agreement of 1995.5 
On the health side, the WHO is the mandated global institution primarily 
responsible for world health strategy. Its constitution envisages a regulatory re-
gime designed to promote the attainment of ‘the highest possible level of health’ 
(Preamble). In consequence, it grants the WHO powers to adopt conventions 
(article 19), binding regulations (article 21), and recommendations (article 23) 
as well as to monitor national health legislation (article 63). As such, and par-
aphrasing Taylor, it is the only international regime that brings together the 
institutional mandate, legal authority, and public health expertise for the codi-
fication of treaties that principally address global public health concerns.6
4  See generally H. Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Pat-
ents and Access to Medicines (Oxford University Press 2007) and L. Helfer & G. Austin, 
Human Rights op. cit.
5  For detailed overviews see WIPO Annual Reports, available at http://www.wipo.
int. With regard to TRIPS flexibilities see, in particular, Patent Related Flexibilities in the 
Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the National and 
Regional Levels, WIPO Secretariat, Part I (2010) and Part II (2011).
6  A. Taylor, ‘Governing the Globalization of Public Health’, Journal of law, med-
icine and ethics (2004): 507.
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In addition, the UN human rights regime has the primary responsibili-
ty for promoting and protecting the right to health on a global scale, as deter-
mined in article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In 
addition, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) establishes the human right to ‘the highest attainable standard of 
health’ (article 12.1) and thus its various bodies also have competence and 
authority over these complex issues. 
Reasonably, in consequence, these multilateral institutions should also 
participate in both global policymaking and rulemaking with regard to access 
to medicines. 
In fact, their authoritative interpretations in this area deserve some 
legal deference. Examples of this are the WHO Global Strategy and plan of 
action on public health, innovation and intellectual property adopted in May 
2008 which should provide a major reference for WTO in its search for TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
Prior to that, on 24 May 1999 the World Health Assembly had unani-
mously adopted a resolution on Revised Drug Strategy, requesting the WHO 
to intensify its activities in six areas: national drug policies, pharmaceuticals 
and trade agreements, drug information and drug promotion, drug quality, 
drug donations and partnerships.7
However, the statu quo tips the scale in favour of the WTO regime be-
cause the WIPO, the WHO and the UN Human Rights regimes lack a com-
pliance structure (or ‘teeth’) as efficient as WTO’s (e.g. binding dispute set-
tlement and subsequent authorization to suspend trade concessions) when 
it comes to obtaining compliance with their respective legal interpretations 
on these issues.8 In essence, their comparative legal leverage is dependent on 
institutional design.9 
Given this imbalanced state of affairs, some pre-emptive initiatives are 
required in order to at least mitigate potential legal friction or conflicts be-
tween these regimes. In this regard, global policy coherence in this area can 
only reasonably be obtained through deeper upstream inter-institutional co-
7  See World Health Assembly Resolution EB103/1999/R1, Revised Drug Strategy 
(24 May 1999).
8  M. Montaña y Mora, ‘A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Res-
olution of International Trade Disputes’, 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1 
(1993): 103–180.
9  See P. Zapatero, ‘Modern international law and the advent of Special Legal Sys-
tems’, 23 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (2005): 55–75.
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ordination.10 Thus, deeper coordination is a critical policy option to find a bet-
ter balance between the diverse rules and policies of these global institutions. 
Hence, policy design and implementation regarding access to essential 
medicines in developing countries should reasonably be coordinated among 
the WHO, WTO as well as UN human rights regime and WIPO.11 
Interestingly, the former Director-General of WTO himself suggested 
this approach while in charge of the EU DG Trade in relation to health and 
trade issues: ‘when there’s too much mistrust in the game then you have to 
call a third party, and the WHO is a trusted party’.12 
The pragmatic Lamy has certainly been not only a practitioner but also 
an advocate of major global inter-institutional coherence.13 In fact, he has 
seriously toyed with the idea of coherence as a potential general principle of 
international law: ‘this is, in my view, the place and role of the WTO and its 
legal order in the international legal order: a catalyst for international mutual 
respect towards international coherence and even for increased global gov-
ernance’.14 
For the former WTO DG, ‘the effectivity and legitimacy of the WTO de-
pends on how it relates to norms of other legal systems and on the nature and 
quality of its relationships with other international organizations’.15 
In fact, he acted in consequence, as WTO Director-General, by promot-
ing practical cooperation to ensure policy coherence, in collaboration with 
WHO DG Margaret Chan and WIPO DG Francis Gurry. 
The idea of closer work between WTO, WHO and WIPO was first pur-
sued by the three Director Generals following the 2001 Doha Declaration, 
particularly focusing on capacity building and technical assistance to help de-
veloping countries using IP flexibilities in the pharmaceutical area through a 
series of annual, Geneva-based workshops.
10  See P. Zapatero, ‘Searching for coherence in global economic policymaking’, 24 
Pennsylvania State International Law Review (2006): 595–627.
11  For a World Bank-sponsored Guide on the paragraph 6 mechanism, see F. Ab-
bott & P. van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health: A Guide and Model 
Documents for Implementation of the Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision (World 
Bank 2005).
12  See ‘European Voice: Lamy access-to-medicine plan under fire’, Press Clips-Mé-
decins sans Frontières (17 January, 2003).
13  P. Lamy, Towards World Democracy (Policy Network 2004).
14  P. Lamy, ‘The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal Order’, 
17 European Journal of International Law 5 (2007): 982 and 984, respectively.
15  P. Lamy, ‘The Place of the WTO’, op. cit., p. 977.
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Interestingly, on 14 July of 2009, in a panel with the theme ‘Strength-
ening Multilateral Cooperation on Intellectual Property and Public Health’ in 
a WIPO conference, Pascal Lamy and Margaret Chan were making the point 
that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’, and thus reinforced the 
need for major partnership, dialogue and policy coherence: “within our dis-
tinct mandates, we can each bring our own areas of expertise and work to-
wards stronger, more broadly based and effective outcomes’. 16
The first joint symposium on pricing and procurement policies, held in 
2010, is an example of pragmatic initiatives with this vision in mind.17 This 
particular event was designed to bring together their concurrent areas of ex-
pertise and collective data resources and know-how, as a basis for policymak-
ing. 
Concentrating on gathering sources of technical information and pool-
ing practical experiences, this technical symposium was driven to move tech-
nical cooperation beyond the boundaries of formal overviews of treaty stand-
ards to real information exchanges on policy choices and practical experience 
in their implementation.18 
In the words of the (then) WTO DG, ‘the idea was not to engage in poli-
cy discussions or legal debate, but rather, it was a chance for us to look at how 
we could collaborate more closely and more effectively to provide a stronger, 
more coherent and more accessible information base for policy debate’.19 
Also interestingly, the former Chairperson of the WHO Commission on 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH),20 Ruth Dreifuss, 
closed the last panel discussion under the title Taking Stock and Defining 
Future Needs… 
This trilateral cooperative program is a promising ongoing tool for up-
grading coherence. 
All three Director-Generals publicly refer to the ‘cooperative program 
16  P. Lamy. ‘Urging multilateral cooperation to advance public health “in the real 
world”’, WTO | Speeches and statements (14 July 2009).
17  See ‘WHO, WIPO, WTO join forces to put access-to-medicines under the mi-
croscope’, WTO | 2010 News items (16 July 2010).
18  See Creating Synergies between Intellectual Property Rights and Public 
Health, Joint technical Symposium by WHO, WIPO and WTO (16 July 2010).
19  See ‘TRIPS Symposium tackles how to know whether a medicine is patented’, 
WTO | 2011 News items (18 February 2011).
20  See Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Final Report 
of the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
(WHO 2006).
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of the three Secretariats’ as well as expressly underlining the importance of 
exchanges on practical experience and ideas for future cooperation and plan-
ning.21
In short, the three secretariats decided to foster a better understanding 
of the link between public health and intellectual property policies, and to 
enhance a mutually supportive implementation of their policies, by strength-
ening their cooperation with regard to the critical interface that is intellectual 
property and public health.
As a result, the three institutions began to work together more closely, 
in order to mutually assist each to fulfil its own mandate more effectively, 
to provide cross-support initiatives, to avoid duplication of their efforts and, 
ultimately, to use their limited resources more efficiently (e.g. technical as-
sistance). 
Thus, their trilateral program concentrated on coordinating technical 
cooperation and capacity building, promoting mutual participation in their 
respective activities, and pooling and sharing data resources to inform such 
technical cooperation. 
An interesting output of this policy approach is a joint study by the 
WHO, WIPO and WTO Secretariats on access to medicines and innovation 
released in 2013.22 This trilateral study is among the first of its kind,23 and 
illustrates how such a simple thing as collective research initiatives can be a 
building block for the convergence of policy visions in critical areas. 
Interestingly, the increasing tensions in this area are so enormous that 
even common inter-institutional documents such as this may help in con-
tributing to framing the world policy issues in the best balanced light. In fact, 
at the famously derailed 18th session of the WIPO SCP (21-25 May 2012) 
mentioned above, the US Delegate warned other delegates against duplicat-
ing work, holding that the imminent publication of this joint study should 
reasonably predate any further work at the SCP (!) 
Hence, the WHO, WIPO and WTO Secretariats can make a contribution 
to world policy coherence regarding access to medicines by enhancing and in-
crementally upgrading their trilateral program on technical cooperation. 
21  See Creating Synergies, op. cit.
22  See Promoting Access and Medical Innovation: Intersection Between Public 
Health, Intellectual Property and Trade (WHO-WTO-WIPO 2013).
23  Before this trilateral initiative, a 171 pages bilateral joint study was produced 
in 2002 by the WHO and the WTO Secretariats. See WTO Agreements & Public Health: a 
Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat (WHO-WTO 2002).
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In this regard, the 2001 WTO Doha Declaration, the 2007 WIPO De-
velopment Agenda24 and the 2008 WHO Global Strategy and Plan of Action25 
constitute in their own terms the concept framework for their joint initiatives. 
Arguably, the intertwining of these three instruments could provide promis-
ing building bricks for developing more policy synergies regarding access to 
medicines in the long term. 
3. A key legal issue 
There is an increasingly complex scheme of shared and complementary com-
petences, functions and jurisdictions across the board of global institutional 
architecture. The intertwining of patent and health is a perfect example of the 
need to build new interfaces between international regimes.26 
It would be reasonable to assume that administration of the increas-
ing number of multi-jurisdictional issues dealt with through international re-
gimes needs to shift the paradigm. Improving coherence requires upstream 
inter-institutional coordination (consultation, dialogue and diplomacy); par-
ticularly, in the absence of jurisdictional fora to solve possible conflicts and 
frictions among international regimes and their sets of rules and policies (e.g. 
WHO and WTO).
Inevitably, international regimes with shared competence will be re-
quired to converge in one way or another. As we live in a world of interde-
pendent global jurisdictions, coherence requires inclusive inter-institutional 
approaches: international regimes have common interests, overlapping man-
dates, and complementary functions. 
The interdependence of mandates, competence, and functions between 
these international regimes encourages inter-institutional coordination on a 
more profound level. At the present time, this can lead to several conflicts:
24  See World Intellectual Property Organization Development Agenda, Assem-
blies of the Member States of WIPO (General Assembly), Forty-Third Series of Meetings, 
Res A/43/16 (2007).
25  See Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and In-
tellectual Property, World Health Assembly 61st, Res WHA61.21 (2008).
26  For the first wave of UN human rights reports in this regard see, in particu-
lar, Report of the High Commissioner on the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on human 
rights UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (27 June 2001) and The right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health Report, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, E/CN.4/2003/58 (13 February 2003).
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(1) Horizontal conflicts between the rules of their constitutive treaties (A—B);
(2) Horizontal conflicts between acts adopted by these regimes (a—b); and
(3) Conflicts between a constitutive treaty and an act adopted by other regime 
(A—b or a—B).27 
In this regard, inclusive horizontal coordination among international 
regimes is the most feasible tool for increasing legal coherence (absence of 
antinomies) in current rule-based global governance. Needless to say, world 
policy coherence regarding access to medicines in the developing world would 
benefit from such an approach.
However, ministries and agencies with competence in economic areas 
have increased their policy leverage vis-à-vis other non-economic branches 
of government through the strategic use of the international regimes they 
manage and develop. As a direct result, non-economic agencies have been 
removed from developing “consensus”. 
Economic globalization is not a deregulatory but a reregulatory pro-
cess in which certain social values are given preference over others. The 
international patent system analysed in these pages is a simple but critical 
example.
Hence, the modern architecture of global governance comprises a set of 
coexisting regimes. Thus, increased coordination and upstream engagement 
between these ‘constituencies’ can certainly help to promote coherence in the 
long term. Pascal Lamy explains with great clarity the challenge ahead in re-
lation to the health and IP area:
IP has moved to the centre of cross-cutting debates that defy traditional boundaries be-
tween separate policy domains, and between distinct areas of technical expertise. Coher-
ence, cooperation and practical dialogue within the international system is indispensable, 
if we are to address these fundamental policy questions in a sustainable manner. 28 
As the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property and Health (CIPIH) 
also recommends, governments should ensure that health ministries are prop-
27  For an interesting case discussing the interaction between adjustment pro-
grams and WTO law see Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports 
of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/AB/R (27 March 1998). Com-
menting on this case see also D. Siegel, ‘Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO Relationship: The 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements’, Current Developments in Mon-
etary and Financial Law, Volume 3 (International Monetary Fund 2005), pp. 572–576.
28  See P. Lamy. ‘Urging multilateral cooperation’ op. cit.
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erly represented in trade negotiations.29 A more inclusive approach in interna-
tional economic policymaking is required; and access to medicines is a critical 
example in this regard: as mentioned, a more balanced outcome with regard to 
IP protection would have certainly been delivered during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations if these had also involved some external trade-offs with health 
agencies, instead of mere internal trade-offs between trade agencies.
But there are also other critical issues to reconsider. In fact, paragraph 
19 of the Doha Declaration instructs the TRIPS Council to pursue a work pro-
gram which will cover new issues such as (1) the review of paragraph b of 
article 27.3, (2) the review of the implementation of the TRIPS agreement 
under article 71.1 and the work pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Declaration, 
as well as (3) the study of the relationship between the TRIPS agreement and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
In addition, complex issues of public international law are raised. For 
example, legal frictions between norms and/or acts from different interna-
tional regimes tend to be solved or avoided applying the customary rules of 
treaty interpretation. However, these customary rules expressed in the Vien-
na Convention of the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) do not provide for neutral 
solutions. In practice, in the use of interpretation criteria as a method for in-
tegrating external norms in the functioning of specialized dispute settlement 
mechanisms (e.g. WTO dispute settlement system) these norms (e.g. WHO 
norms) take a ‘backseat’ in that interpretation. 
Under section c of VCLT article 31.3, the operation of interpretation re-
quires taking into account ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties’. Therefore, interpretation is focused on 
a given norm and only takes “into account” those other norms, ‘together with 
the context’ of the latter. Thus, the two norms in tension (or direct conflict) 
are not interpreted together, nor are they given similar weight in the opera-
tion of interpretation: in practice, one is subordinate to the other. Obviously, 
this has clear implications for the outcome of the interpretation. 
Alternatively, when interpretation cannot provide a solution, as a re-
sult of a contradiction between A and B (antinomy/conflict of rules), general 
rules on conflict of treaties apply (lex posterior, lex specialis and clauses of 
conflict). However, these rules cannot solve conflicts in every case; not only 
because they occasionally come up against cases of conflicts with no solution 
(e.g. later general treaty provisions vs. prior special treaty provisions with 
29  See ‘Recommendation 4.21’, CIPIH Final Report, op. cit.p. 126.
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both contradicting clauses of conflict or no clauses of conflict) but also be-
cause modern international regimes tend to operate in relative cultural isola-
tion, as self-contained legal systems. 
The TRIPS agreement is under the self-contained jurisdiction of the 
WTO. In essence, the applicable rules of the WTO dispute settlement mech-
anism are the covered WTO agreements (read WTO law). In consequence, 
this mechanism adjudicates (compulsory jurisdiction) and enforces TRIPS 
obligations (authorization to suspend concessions) but, for example, not hu-
man rights provisions. In this sense, the TRIPS agreement only incorporates 
by reference provisions from pre-existing treaties in the field of intellectu-
al property (the Rome, Paris and Berne Conventions), but not international 
health law or human rights law.
Being unable to apply international human rights law and health law 
on an equal footing to WTO law, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
faces some challenges in order to properly balance competing public goods 
in this area. 
Therefore, WIPO, WHO or the UN Human Rights regime could always 
develop legal interpretations conflicting with those of WTO. In practice, noth-
ing precludes these regimes from developing their own ‘unilateral’ legal posi-
tion on any issue (e.g access to medicines in developing contries). 
This situation poses a considerable challenge to the international com-
munity, as world policy interdependence is pervasive. Clearly, low inter-in-
stitutional cooperation in areas of shared competences among these interna-
tional regimes (ie. access to medicines in the developing countries) could pro-
duce global policy tensions. Recommendation 14 of the WIPO Development 
Agenda is illustrative in this regard: 
Within the framework of the agreement between WIPO and the WTO, WIPO shall make 
available advice to developing countries and LDCs, on the implementation and operation 
of the rights and obligations and the understanding and use of flexibilities contained in the 
TRIPS Agreement.
Obviously, the legal issues arising from this type of inter-institutional 
coordination cannot be managed with traditional legal tools. New methods 
have to be explored as there is no such a thing as a neutral world forum for 
adjudicating conflicts or frictions between these bodies of international law. 
Thus, it would be reasonable for diverse specialized agencies (whether 
trade, health or other related areas of government) to work closely together 
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to develop concerted legal policies at a global scale in sensitive areas. In this 
regard, more formal contacts and regulatory dialogue are required in order to 
foster inter-institutional coordination between these regimes.
Reasonably, article 31.f of TRIPS as well as the so-called paragraph 6 
mechanism designed to solve its problems, are already a textbook case study 
of how not to manage global policymaking. Having access to the trade-re-
lated expertise of other ministers (health ministers) as well as of the global 
institutions in which they operate (WHO) could have avoided WTO Members 
getting trapped both in the biased drafting of article 31.f of TRIPS as well as 
the subsequent controversial (e.g. malfunctioning) paragraph 6 ‘solution’. 
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) could also be another case study 
of how not to manage global policymaking. As is widely acknowledged among 
world health experts, non-communicable diseases (chronic diseases or Type I 
diseases) are rapidly increasing in developing countries.30 
As a result, some developing countries are beginning to issue compul-
sory licenses (CL) for these diseases (e.g. Thailand´s CL orders for treatments 
for cardiovascular disease and cancers).31 
However, many trade representatives from developed countries are not 
eager to interpret the term ‘essential medicine’ contained in the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and health Policy as covering generic versions for 
non-communicable diseases able to export. 
Reasonably, these and other sensitive issues could be better tackled by 
deepening upstream engagement with other specialized regimes which have 
concurrent competence in the field, such as the WHO. 
In short, there is a wide variety of cases in which such collaboration and 
coordination would be highly advisable from both a legal and policymaking 
perspective. 
Currently, the WHO is the global specialized agency bringing together 
the mandate, legal authority, and public expertise on issues of global pub-
lic health.32 Thus, the WHO could improve the solutions devised within the 
world trade regime on health-related issues. 
The WHO is the legally mandated global institution responsible for 
30  See e.g. G. Alberti, ‘Non communicable diseases: Tomorrow´s pandemics’, 79 
Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 10 (2001): 907.
31  E. Hoen, The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly op. cit., p. xvi.
32  See A. Taylor, ‘Governing the Globalization of Public Health’, 32 Journal of 
law, medicine and ethics 2 (2004): 507.
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world health strategies.33 Improving coherence in global policymaking requires 
its expertise to fertilize the WTO regime. Hence, regarding access to medicines 
in developing countries, the world trading system should grant legal deference 
to WHO determinations on critical issues such as the following, among others:
(1) What constitutes a ‘public health crisis’ or a ‘health emergency’, 
(2) Which are ‘essential medicines’, etc.
Thus, it is reasonable to argue in favour of paying due legal deference to 
WHO health-related fact determination inside WTO procedures. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) already contains 
several provisions referring to fact determination. Ironically, however, the 
only global institution which is expressly granted relevance with regard to 
fact determination pursuant to the DSU is the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), in the field of balance of payments.34 
Paying due legal deference to the WHO inside the world trade regime 
could make a positive contribution to the functioning of the WTO regime and, 
by extension, to the coherence of global policy making. 
The WHO constituency is well aware of it and, in fact, already claims 
more deference from the WTO. In fact, the WHO Resolution on the Revised 
Drug Strategy in 1996 already request that the WHO ‘report on the impact 
of the work of the World Trade Organization (WTO) with respect to national 
drug policies and essential drugs and make recommendations for collabora-
tion between WTO and WHO’. Interestingly, the Resolution also mandated 
the compilation of a ‘WHO Guide’ containing Recommendations concerning 
TRIPS implementation.35 
In a globalizing world, treaty interpretation of highly sensitive areas 
requires some form of multi-institutional collaboration. In this regard, the 
33  Surprisingly, it has not been very active on international law-making in the 
past. Taylor attributes to WHO’s organizational culture its traditional conservatism on the 
use of legal institutions for promoting health. See A. Taylor, ‘Making the World Health Or-
ganization Work: A Legal Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health’, 
18 American Journal of Law and Medicine 4 (1992): 301–346.
34  See F. Roessler, ‘The relationship between the World Trade Order and the 
International Monetary Fund’, The Legal Structure, Functions and Limits of the World 
Trade Order: A Collection of Essays (Cameron May 2000), pp. 157–159.
35  See, respectively, Revised Drug Strategy Resolution: WHO Assembly Resolu-
tion, WHA 49.14, (1996) and G. Velasquez & P. Boulet. Globalization and Access to Drugs: 
Perspectives on the WTO/TRIPS Agreement (WHO 1999).
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interpretation of TRIPS provisions cannot be an isolated and exclusive com-
petence of WTO bodies in those cases in which competence and authority is 
shared with other international regimes. From a purely technical standpoint, 
these regimes have concurring jurisdiction over the same subject-matters.36 
Thus, only collectively negotiated interpretations in those highly sensitive is-
sues could reasonably secure the coherence of both global governance and 
international law. 
For example, it would be reasonable to argue that the WHO could 
help in developing a flexible interpretation of the TRIPS rules with regard 
to NCDs, as these diseases are becoming increasingly prominent in global 
health governance.
In fact, a first WHO global ministerial conference on healthy lifestyles 
and non-communicable disease control was held in Moscow on 28-29 April 
2011 and a UN High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on NCDs on 19-
20 September of that same year have already set the ball rolling.
As mentioned, the WHO institutional bodies always have the possibil-
ity of providing their own policy guidance over WTO rules. Interestingly, for 
example, the WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean published 
a Policy Guide on Public health related TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral 
trade agreements on his own in 2010;37 and the WHO published a Policy 
Brief in 2011 on how countries can use TRIPS flexibilities to improve access 
to HIV/AIDS treatment together with UNDP and UNAIDS.38
The ministers of health are already suggesting that the scant deference 
paid to the rulemaking processes led by trade ministers in health-related are-
as is not reasonable, and not even legitimate. 
This is particularly the case in the area of TRIPS+ schemes. As already 
mentioned, 10 South American Ministers of Health adopted the Declaration 
of Ministers of South America over Intellectual Property, Access to Medi-
cines, and Public Health in May 2006 to establish a united position against 
TRIPS+ schemes negotiated by their cabinet colleagues. 
36  See P. Zapatero, ‘Modern international law’ op. cit.
37  See Public health related TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral trade agree-
ments: A Policy Guide for negotiators and implementers in the WHO Eastern Mediterra-
nean Region (WHO & ICTSD 2010).
38  See Using TRIPS flexibilities to improve access to HIV treatment, UNAIDS, 
WHO and UNDP Policy Brief (13 September 2011).
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4. Individual rights 
Certainly, a similar diagnosis also applies to the UN human rights regime. 
In this regard, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
developed some authoritative interpretations on the right to health contained 
in the ICESCR (article 12.1) over the years. As a result, the main authoritative 
interpretation of the human right to health is contained in its General Com-
ment no.14 (adopted by ECOSOC on May 2000, Session 22th):39 this highly 
structured instrument builds upon the experience gained by the committee 
in examining reports from state parties and is expressly designed to assist the 
states on the implementation of the Covenant. 
General Comment no.14 contains a well-organized regulatory struc-
ture: (a) normative content (part I), (b) obligations of state parties (part II), 
(c) violations (part III), (d) national implementation (part IV) and (e) obliga-
tions of non-state actors (part v). This authoritative instrument is made up of 
“interrelated and essential elements” that depend on diverse conditions: (a) 
availability; (b) accessibility (non-discrimination, physical accessibility, and 
affordability and information accessibility); (c) acceptability and (d) quality 
(paragraph 12). In accordance to its provisions, international right to health 
imposes three types of obligations on states parties: Obligations to respect 
(non-state interference); Obligations to protect (prevention of interference 
by third parties) and Obligations to fulfil (facilitation, provision and promo-
tion).40
These obligations also correlate with three forms of infringement codi-
fied in the Covenant: (a) violations of the obligation to respect, (b) violations 
of the obligation to protect and (c) violations of the obligation to fulfil (Part 
III). 
Finally, state compliance is dependent on 6 ‘core obligations’ and 5 ‘ob-
ligations of comparative priority’. The ‘core obligations’ require ensuring the 
satisfaction of, at least, ‘minimum essential levels of the rights’ specified in 
both the Covenant and the General Comment no.14. These obligations are 
complemented by 5 additional obligations of comparable priority (para-
graph 43-45). 
39  See ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of health’, General Comment 
No.14, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (4 July 2000).
40  See General Comments No.12 & No.13 (‘to facilitate’ and ‘to provide’) and Gen-
eral Comment no.14 (‘to promote’).
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In consequence, it is reasonable to argue that core obligations on the 
right to health (paragraph 43) should have some legal relevance in WTO law 
and procedures. In this regard, some of the general core obligations are “to 
ensure the right of access to health […] goods and services on a non discrim-
inatory basis, especially for vulnerable groups” (subparagraph a) and “to en-
sure the equitable distribution of all health […] goods and services” (subpar-
agraph e). 
In addition, the specific core obligations insist on the need ‘to provide 
essential drugs’, as defined under the WHO Action program on essential 
drugs (subparagraph d); reasonably, such provision should be legally rele-
vant for TRIPS implementation purposes. 
In a similar vein, some obligations of comparable priority (paragraph 
44) are arguably also required to have some legal relevance inside WTO law 
and procedures: ‘to provide immunization against the major infectious diseas-
es occurring in the community’ (subparagraph b) and ‘to make measures to 
prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases’ (subparagraph c).
Interestingly, General Comment no.14 already takes the interdepend-
ence of treaties into consideration with regard to article 12.1 of the covenant. 
Thus, this instrument determines that states parties should ensure that the 
right to health is given ‘due attention in international agreements’ and, to 
that end, should consider ‘the development of further legal instruments’ (par-
agraph 39). 
Accordingly, states parties should take steps to ensure that other in-
ternational agreements ‘do not adversely impact upon the right to health’: 
states have an obligation ‘to ensure that their actions as members of interna-
tional organizations take due account of the right to health’ (paragraph 39). 
On the other hand, the General Comment also adds that international 
organizations, UN specialized agencies, subsidiary organs and programmes 
‘should cooperate effectively’ with states parties to implement the right to 
health at the national level, ‘with due respect to their individual mandates’ 
(paragraph 64). 
Last but not least, article 22 of the covenant states that ECOSOC may 
‘bring to the attention’ of other UN organisations and bodies ‘any matters’ 
arising out of the reports referred to in the covenant which may assist such 
bodies in ‘deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability of 
international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive im-
plementation of the [covenant]’.
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Therefore, there is a simple but critical question to answer: how are 
these rules rebalancing the TRIPS agreement in relation to effective access to 
affordable medicines in developing countries? Unfortunately, the answer is 
self-evident. 
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7
SHOULDERS OF GIANTS INC
1. Pathologies
A decade ago, not a single developed country was spending more than 10% 
of its health budget on medicines. However, nowadays, national expenditure 
estimates on pharmaceuticals are increasing faster than GDP in all developed 
countries. 
Our health authorities are devoting an increasingly high percentage of 
their health spending to drugs. Currently, the percentage of GDP devoted to 
this budget line is around 12% in USA, 15% in Germany, 22% in Spain, 16% 
in France and 17% in Canada, for example. As a result, needless to say, fewer 
resources are available for other valuable public purposes. 
Added to this, individuals without universal health coverage also pay 
more for their drugs in pharmacies, or through private insurers as the latter 
are raising contributions and/or reducing coverage benefits. 
Unfortunately, these issues are not easy to tackle for strong reasons. As 
mentioned above, for decades, modern patents systems have created exorbi-
tant returns on revenues, assets and shareholders’ equity, thus the pharma-
ceutical industries are annually ranked as among the most profitable indus-
tries of the world. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these revenues are highly concentrated 
in the markets of developed countries, the international patent system has 
severely fuelled shareholders’ expectations on high (and increasing) returns 
from investments on pharmaceutical innovation and marketing. 
In essence, the international patent system has produced a ‘global 
money illusion’ of exponential increases of corporate profits, as corporations 
are legal proxies of capital-holders that raise the bar to obtain those expected 
profits. 
As a result, patent-holding companies in the pharmaceutical area (and 
other IP-based industries) invest part of their earnings on securing and ex-
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panding the worldwide monopoly rent exacted from the international patent 
system.1 
For the WHO CIPIH, ‘companies should adopt patent and enforcement 
policies that facilitate greater access to medicines needed in developing coun-
tries. In low income developing countries, they should avoid filing patents or 
enforcing them in ways that might inhibit access’. Interestingly, the commis-
sion also made a recommendation concerning and concerned with regulatory 
capture: 
Companies should not lobby governments for more stringent standards than those con-
tained in TRIPS agreement. 
Last but not least, the CIPIH encouraged companies ‘to grant voluntary 
licences in developing countries, where this will facilitate greater access to 
medicines, and to accompany this with technology transfer activities’.2 
However, these socially wasteful income-seeking strategies of IP com-
panies cannot easily be inhibited through initiatives of corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR). Patent-holding companies are not run by unethical per-
sons but by socially non-efficient structures of incentives. 
In short, pharmaceutical companies are tied too tight to the mast of 
profit maximization by (1) modern corporate law, (2) the corporate form itself 
and, last but not least, (3) the mantra of shareholder value, which lies at the 
core of financial markets. 
Beneath the surface of branded wonder drugs of east and west, accu-
mulation of capital by those who have it (capital-holders) is the structure of 
incentives that make pharmaceuticals perform in that way. These companies 
are simply an efficient proxy of such phenomenon.
Therefore, there is no room for naivety regarding global rulemaking 
politics in our brave new world of expert regulatory networks. Nowadays, 
considering treaties as ‘public goods’ per se equates to pop internationalism, 
as these are sometimes negotiated under corporate advice, and thus pursuing 
policies with restricted rationalities. 
The long term impact of some of these instruments should not be un-
derestimated, as the reform of their provisions leads to high transactional 
1  See, particularly, S. Picciotto, ‘Private rights vs public interests in the TRIPS 
agreement: the access to medicines dispute’, Proceedings of the annual conference of the 
American society of international law (2003) at 167.
2  See CIPIH Final Report op. cit at 181 (paragraph 4.16).
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costs once these are in force. In sum, once a given IP treaty enters into force, 
its rules are here to stay, in principle, for decades to come. 
Treaties involve high transaction costs. They are rather like old seago-
ing galleons, requiring too much effort and resources to build and sail them. 
However, once launched, there is no easy route to reconstructing them or 
simply getting them out of the water. 
Hence, if IP treaties end up serving the public interest badly, a lock-in 
phenomenon raises the costs for suspending, reforming or getting rid of these 
rigid regulatory structures.
Achieving more balanced treaty outcomes in the IP area requires 
transparency in negotiations, open consultations with all stakeholders, and 
non-economic domestic agencies and branches of government (e.g. culture, 
science, health, etc) coming to the negotiating table. Last but not least, it is 
also advisable to pursue a more committed parliamentary participation in 
these processes. 
Nowadays, the IP foreign policy of developed countries in all treaty-
making fora and venues basically perpetuates the legal competitive advan-
tage of large patent-holding companies, by protecting and promoting their 
knowledge monopolies multi-jurisdictionally. 
These corporate-driven policies not only block the functioning of mar-
kets and competition but also economic development of technology-import-
ing countries.3 As a result, strong policy tensions are pervasive in all IP and 
IP-related global fora.4 
The Standing Committee of the Law of Patents (SCP) of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a particularly illustrative ex-
ample. Resulting from the new structure of incentives erected by the TRIPS 
agreement, differences between the so-called Development Agenda Group 
and Group B (industrialized countries) are increasingly difficult to bridge on 
such critical agenda items as ‘quality of patents’, ‘patent and health’, ‘excep-
tions and limitations to patent rights’, or ‘technology transfer’, among others. 
On the other hand, some traditional pathologies of patent systems with 
regard to R&D have been exacerbated. In principle, patent systems provide 
incentives for getting involved in innovation, by granting government-spon-
sored legal monopolies over inventions for specific periods. 
3  See chapter 8.
4  See Joint Proposal by the African Group and the Development Agenda Group 
SCP Work Program on Patents and Health, SCP/16/7 (16-20 May 2011).
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However, the international patent system raises some puzzling ten-
sions in the process of turning scientific ideas into proprietary inventions in 
life-sciences. These are some adverse effects of modern patent ecosystems in 
life-sciences: 
(1) increasing distortions of the research agenda (research bias),
(2) disincentives to pursuing scientific research on non-patentable processes,
(3) incentives to researching patentable products and services with little or no gain,5
(4) wasted research into duplicate products and services (copycat or “me-too” products 
and services),6
(5) disclosing information required to obtain patent approval and increasing secrecy in 
scientific research,
(6) secrecy and concealment of negative research findings and unwelcome results,
(7) misleading public opinion for economic gain by using questionable research outcomes 
or biased findings and
(8) hard core spending on marketing. 
Arguably, patent-based research is inconsistent with the disinterested 
scientific pursuit of truth, but also with full disclosure and open access to sci-
entific outcomes.7 For many, in this regard, IP-based profit-oriented research 
blurs the very foundations of science which, on its own terms, is open and co-
operative. Last but not least, it inhibits or limits the spread of critical academ-
ic research on issues that are structurally important for big patent-holders.
Under current patent systems, ‘competitors’ have also strong incen-
tives to create new, different and better inventions, either by making im-
provements or, alternatively, by creating an entirely new equivalent product, 
and thus ‘inventing around’ patents. 
As a result, ‘patent races’ among competing firms are common; the first 
prize is patenting a ‘breakthrough drug’; but there are some other gains too: 
the so-called ‘me-too drug’ above referred also pays off. 
Thus, for example, the allocation of research resources to extend mar-
ket control beyond the life of original patented drugs (‘ever greening’) diverts 
5  See P. Trouiller, P. Olliaro, E. Torreele, J. Orbinski, R. Laing & N. Ford, ‘Drug 
development for neglected diseases: a deficient market and a public health policy failure’. 
359 The Lancet 9324 (2002): 2188–2194.
6  D. Weatherall, ‘Problems for Biomedical Research at the Academia-Industrial 
Interface’, 9 Science and Engineering Ethics (2003): 43–48 and D. Packham & M. Tasker, 
‘Industry and the Academy–a Faustian Contract?’ 11 Industry and Higher Education 2 
(1997): 85–90.
7  See in particular P. Suber, Open Access (MIT Press 2012).
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scarce productive resources towards cumulative patents, which are generally 
socially inefficient.8
However, patent systems are 100% blind to this weak (or even lack of) 
inventiveness when it comes to granting protection to ‘invention’. As a result, 
many new drugs entering the market are equivalent to existing ones in terms 
of their chemical structures and therapeutic effects. Last but not least, all pat-
ented inventions are worked out by propertizing public scientific innovation 
resulting from very long-term public-funded research. 
2. Life and Death
Obviously, these phenomena disrupt the inner logic of current public law in-
centives (read legal monopolies) targeting breakthrough innovation. Society 
should not to put all its eggs in the basket of exclusive right regimes in order 
to deliver breakthrough inventions.9 Fortunately, as long as modern patents 
exist, there will also be alternative incentives to spur innovation; and here, 
there is still wiggle room to enter into major explorations. 
The critics basically argue that less burdensome mechanisms could 
obtain equivalent outcomes without incurring in the social burdens of mod-
ern patent systems. In consequence, many innovation experts are aiming to 
transform IP ecosystems for optimizing innovation through more effectively 
tailored rewards. In this regard, an increasing variety of policy substitutes 
and/or supplements to patent systems are already available. 
However, the transaction costs of obtaining legal reforms in this front-
line of knowledge-based capitalism have sky-rocketed, as the world is already 
covered by a thick membrane of rules and institutions inhibiting replace-
8  Any non-sponsored estimates of drug’s industry research budgets are rather 
striking when compared with their domestic sales and profits. See e.g D.W. Light & J. Lex-
chin, ‘Will Lower Drug Prices Jeopardize Research? A Policy Fact Sheet’, 4 The American 
Journal of Bioethics 1 (2004): W3–W6. For independent measurements of the contribu-
tion to R&D by the US pharmaceutical industry, see in particular, Research and Develop-
ment in Industry: 2000 (National Science Foundation 2003). For a global comparison see 
P. Barral, 20 Years of Pharmaceutical Research Results throughout the World: 1975-1994 
(Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Foundation 1996).
9  See E. Von Hippel, Democratizing innovation (2005), Y. Benkler, The Wealth 
of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (Yale University 
Press 2006) and C. Doctorov, Makers (2009).
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ment. In short, patent ecosystems are nowadays at the core of the matrix of 
global power-politics. 
In any case, there are alternatives available. The current debate over 
patents in this regard is focused on how to fine-tune patent systems in order 
to win them back for public interest and thus as long-term (legal) innovation 
infrastructure. 
However, there are also a number of innovation policy tools available 
which can be promoted irrespective of future policy evolution regarding this 
debate. The main tools consist of ‘push mechanisms’ to subsidize R&D costs 
(e.g. grants, equity participation, tax credits) and ‘pull mechanisms’, paying 
for the R&D output (e.g. advance purchase, prizes).10 
The WIPO Development Agenda is one of the venues in which reforms 
are being discussed. Part of these initiatives build upon the global policy ex-
periences in the health area over the last decade; one of them being the Global 
Forum for Health Research, founded in 1997 and convened annually to ad-
dress the 10/90 Gap in Health Research. 
In addition, WHO has made some serious improvements in health re-
search systems analysis, and its Advisory Committee on Health Research has 
already identified a number of priority global research initiatives.11 Finally, 
the International Conference on Health Research for Development (Bangkok 
2000) made health research visible at the core of the UN Development Agen-
da; and some developments are in the offing. 
Also importantly, the high-level WHO Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) delivered a widely 
recognized report in 2006 proposing some policy guidelines, including rec-
ommendations regarding alternative mechanisms to promote innovation. 
In this influential global report, for the first time in history, innovation was 
linked to access. 
The report’s definition of the term ‘innovation’ was defined as including 
‘delivery’ (access to results of innovation), and not only the standard ‘dis-
covery’ and ‘development’. Last but not least, for the CIPIH, patents tend 
to be only effective legal incentives for R&D projects addressing diseases in 
wealthy societies: 
Where the market has very limited purchasing power, as is the case for diseases affecting 
10  C. Correa. ‘Fostering R&D and promoting access to medicines’ op. cit.
11  See World Report on Knowledge for better health: Strengthening Health Sys-
tems (WHO 2004).
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millions of poor people in developing countries, patents are not a relevant factor or effec-
tive in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market…For developing countries 
where the demand is weak – not the need — there is little incentive to develop new or 
modified interventions appropriate to the disease burden and conditions of the country.12 
All in all, for the most authoritative commission in last decades, patents 
are considered to be only effective for profitable markets...
As an immediate result of these and other critical findings and determi-
nations, a World Health Assembly Resolution mandated the WHO in 2007 to 
encourage exploration on new incentive mechanisms.13
In short, the international patent system is unsuccessful in developing 
targeted medicines for diseases affecting those countries lacking substantial 
markets, as a logical outcome of non-affordability: patent-centred innovation 
is market-driven and thus highly dependent on the relative size of the target-
ed market. 
In this regard, it is already out of question that the international patent 
system set up in 1996 does not provide the proper incentives for R&D on pre-
vailing diseases which primarily affect the population of developing countries 
(neglected diseases). 
Patents systems do not stimulate R&D in situations where the average 
buyer of a potential product, whether individual consumer or public author-
ity, lacks sufficient purchasing power to pay for the expected profits margins 
required by the business model of the brand-name pharmaceutical industry. 
Thus, the structural incentive of earning patent-protected profits only 
promotes innovation in diseases of those societies where the monopoly pric-
es of brand-name medicines are affordable by strong public health systems 
(read procurement programmes) or, alternatively, a significant middle-class 
population. 
Hence, the combination of patents systems with large corporations car-
rying out R&D in profit-maximizing mode (read shareholder value) does only 
contribute to innovation in wealthy markets. 
The industry simply allocates most resources to the development of 
medicines that primarily affect wealthy societies. In technical term, the sys-
tem does not provide for incentives regarding R&D on neglected diseases and 
very neglected diseases. Diseases prevailing in developing countries are sci-
12  See CIPIH Final Report op. cit., p. 34 and p. 36.
13  See Resolution WHA 60.30 on Public Health, innovation and intellectual 
property (23 May 2007).
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entifically indexed as Type II (neglected diseases) and Type III diseases (very 
neglected diseases). 
In this regard, on the one hand, Type II diseases are incident in both 
rich and poor countries, but with a substantial proportion of the cases in the 
poor countries (e.g. HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis); on the other, Type III dis-
eases are those that overwhelmingly or exclusively occur in developing coun-
tries, such as African sleeping sickness (Trypanosomiasis), or African river 
blindness (Onchocerciasis).14 In essence, the lack of demand makes patent 
protection relatively relevant for Type II and relatively irrelevant for Type III 
diseases.15 
Thus, the international patent system fails to promote pharmaceutical 
innovation for neglected diseases primarily affecting the poor, such as malar-
ia, tuberculosis, meningococcal meningitis, trachoma (Chlamydia trachoma-
tis), Kala-azar (visceral leishmaniasis), Chagas’ disease (American trypanoso-
miasis) or sleeping sickness (African trypanosomiasis). 
Notwithstanding that basic research is being done on some of these 
diseases, patent-based business preferences are inhibiting both preclinical 
research and the entry of drug projects in the clinical development process. 
However, the problem goes far beyond having more new medicines in 
the pipeline, or bringing unprofitable abandoned drugs back into production: 
a portion of the medicines targeted at diseases causing mortality in develop-
ing countries is becoming increasingly ineffective. 
The catch phrase encapsulating the challenge is the so-called ‘10-90 
gap’: 10 percent of global health research resources are targeted at combat-
ing the most severe diseases affecting 90 percent of the world´s health prob-
lems.16 
Whether those are the exact numbers or not, there is a critical gap, thus 
proving that the mere globalization of patent systems has not precisely pro-
moted R&D benefiting all the peoples of the world.17 
14  See CIPIH Final Report, op. cit., pp. 28–29.
15  See C. Correa, ‘Fostering R&D and promoting access to medicines’, New ICTSD 
Series on New Opportunities through Innovation (2007).
16  Notwithstanding that the disease burden differs across countries, the 10/90 
gap is a useful concept for drawing attention to the fact that few resources are spent on 
diseases affecting the societies of developing countries. See ‘10/90 Reports on Health Re-
search’, Global Forum for Health Research Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents Under 
the Microscope (Oxfam 2000).
17  For the estimates which gave birth to this catchphrase see Health Research: 
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3. IP for π
On similar grounds, there are reasons for carefully rebalancing the interna-
tional patent system in order to promote open science.18 For centuries, the 
free flow of information was the hallmark of science. The human quest for 
science is based on openness19 and collaboration,20 in which scientists learn 
from their peers, in a networked process structurally based on collective 
cross-pollination and open imitation (scientific openness and collaboration). 
Inventors are not foreign to this ongoing social practice and, as a result, 
extensively borrow from the ideas and information produced by others; we all 
advance by drawing on pre-existing knowledge. Newton writing to Hooke in 
1676 is always agreeable to read and always helpful in framing the problem; 
‘if I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants’.21 
However, it is not easy to imagine ourselves standing on the shoulders 
of a scientific industrial complex, at least in order to see further. Probably 
we would not stand on its shoulders but under its feet. Proprietary-scientific 
knowledge is a serious game. 
Traditionally, the reward of peer reputation among scientists was di-
rectly related to the diffusion of knowledge, and thus endeavors were pollinat-
ed through communication of scientific research in journals, conferences, di-
alogues and conversations. That vision is thus at odds with the secrecy-based 
appropriation and commercialization of scientific knowledge through patent 
filing. 
Public universities have been major incubators of innovation in last 
centuries. In fact, the educational systems establishing the infrastructures 
that created modern science –in which patent-holding companies profit now-
adays– were set up by the taxpaying public. Added to this, public investment 
funded most of the basic research for key technologies predating the global 
revolution in proprietary knowledge.
Essential Link to Equity in Development (Commission on Health Research for Develop-
ment 1990).
18  See Keeping science open: the effects of intellectual property policy on the 
conduct of science, Royal Society (14th April 2003).
19  P. David, ‘Common Agency Contracting and the emergence of “open science” 
institutions’, 88 American Economic Review 2 (1998): 17.
20  R. Merton, Sociology of Science (University of Chicago Press 1973).
21  R. Merton, On the shoulders of giants: A Shandean Postcript (Free Press 
1965).
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However, intellectual property is deconstructing scientific innovation, 
by reversing the inner incentive structures of universities. In this regard, the 
old university ideal –that purporting knowledge as the common heritage of 
humankind– is currently undergoing a transformation.22 
The expansion of patent culture within universities, together with the 
scarce public resources available to them, are pushing for managerial strate-
gies rewarding university-originated patents, and thus for patent positions in 
applied science. 
Thus, the emerging model softly replicates the profit-oriented culture 
of corporate research departments and centers around the world. 
Patents and royalties do not yet represent a major source of university 
revenue generally, but public funding is in decline and not expected to recover 
at any time soon. Thus, the academic institutions are embracing patent-based 
strategies for obtaining alternative sources of revenue. 
By playing the patent game, universities emulate corporations. Howev-
er, by emulating these for-profit organizations, universities are turning pub-
lic goods into private ones. Like it or not, universities playing this game are 
recycling public information into proprietary knowledge; and by doing so, 
their scientists inevitably swap priorities from publishing in scientific jour-
nals (open/commons) to patent journals (proprietary/appropriation). 23
A clear example on the impact of patent-based academic entrepreneur-
ship is the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, allowing US universities to own patents in 
inventions developed with federal funds.24 
Originally, patents obtained with federal funds were transferred to the 
funding agencies, or simply entered the public domain. However, the Bayh-
Dole Act accelerated the expansion of patent culture among academic scien-
tists and institutions in the United States, by offering them a promised land 
of extra earnings and funding (royalties).
Certainly, university income obtained from the licensing of IP in pub-
licly funded technology (e.g. biotech) has expanded in some top US institu-
tions; although the rest is not profiting equally and, in fact, now face diffi-
culties using proprietary biotech research tools. Thus, the ‘best practices’ of 
22  For a critic see S. Zolla-Pazner, ‘The Professor, the University, and Industry’, 
268 Scientific American 3 (1994): 120.
23  P. Drahos, Information op. cit., p. 42.
24  See, in particular, H. Markel, ‘Patents, Profits, and the American People —The 
Bayh–Dole Act of 1980’, 369 New England Journal of Medicine (2013): 794–796.
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some top universities (e.g. Ivy League) are a false retribution-model for those 
others lacking their old corporate roots, ties and resources.
The entrepreneurial twists and turns of academic science mean that 
universities join and foster patent races by managing proprietary knowledge 
generated by their scholars along private sector lines. 
The rationale is evident. On one side, these institutions aim to increase 
licensing revenue to fill the vacuum of shrinking public funds. On the other, 
taking strategic patent positions is a rational decision to improve the bargain-
ing position (read offer/sell proprietary knowledge) in the negotiations of re-
search contracts, grants and long-term agreements with for-profit funders.
However, the payoff involved is not a free meal for all. In order to 
play the game more effectively, some universities are already conditioning 
staff promotion on obtaining patent applications and/or corporate research 
grants. 
Thus, as the structure of incentives within universities changes, re-
searchers become less motivated to explore research areas where there are 
no patent payoffs: that is to say, researchers have less incentive to pursue 
projects which do not promise commercial profits. 
Needless to say, many of those are basic science projects. Also inter-
estingly, most of what is currently patented by the public sector is applied 
science, and it generally flows to the private sector via licensing. 
4. Sponsorship 
Profit maximizing organizations embracing and expanding the global patent 
game, if possible, is something to be expected. On the contrary, universities 
replicating patent-based corporate behavior regarding science is not at all 
to be expected, and thus is a phenomenon of concern.25 In this regard, pub-
lic-public partnerships (ppps) in science should be carefully regulated in the 
general interest.
Not surprisingly, the profit calculations that companies commonly 
make on the payoffs of basic research are already present in academic re-
search, as academic research moves down the ladder of applied science in 
order to adapt itself to the patent game (narrow subjects and quick payoffs). 
25  See Anonymous, ‘Is the University-Industrial Complex Out of Control?’ 409 
Nature 119 (11 January 2001).
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In this regard, the scientists giving preference to projects with commer-
cial value tend to focus on producing those innovations corporations could 
be interested in buying (patenting) and selling (licensing). Obviously, these 
are not the breakthrough inventions that patent systems were reasonably 
thought to work for.26 
On the other hand, curiosity and independent exploration are how 
some of the most unpredictable yet beneficial results of science are discov-
ered. In principle, universities and academic researchers had different mis-
sions and incentives to those of directly controlled corporate research centers 
and researchers. However, and paraphrasing Drahos and Braithwaite, in a 
meeting of two research tribes, the public and the private, the public adopted 
the mores (the patent mores) of the private.27
Company profit maximization is the essential legal structure of incen-
tives embedded in modern corporate form and structure. Thus, it is hardly 
surprising that the appropriation of knowledge goes beyond scientific inven-
tions to also enter, through copyright, scientific diffusion itself. In this regard, 
paradoxically, universities are currently paying royalties to access the publi-
cations of their own scientists. 
In fact, at the end of the day, academic institutions pay significant license 
fees to publishers for publicly funded research which is written, edited and re-
viewed by their employees. Today, these items of knowledge are displayed in 
fee-based proprietary databases and journals. As a result, scientists make cop-
ies of their articles under permission of collective rights organizations (CROs) 
exercising delegated enforcement power by public law and publishers.28 
As public funding for universities declines, so heads and chairs feel 
the need to offer all type of services to profit-making organizations. By doing 
so, universities may compromise scientific principles,29 as the quest for pro-
prietary knowledge within universities –and the concomitant rise of corpo-
rate-sponsored university funding– may block freedom of scientific enquiry 
in some areas, and also critical scientific debate and questioning.
26  On the changing degree of inventiveness in scientific patent-based research 
see, in particular, D Hicks, T Breitzman, D Olivastro & K Hamilton, ‘The Changing Compo-
sition of Innovative Activity in the US – A Portrait Based on Patent Analysis’, 30 Research 
Policy (2001).
27  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit., p. 165.
28  S. Picciotto & D. Campbell. ‘Whose Molecule Is It Anyway? op. cit., p. 280
29  See, generally, T. Veblen, The higher learning in America: Memorandum on 
the conduct of universities by business men (B.W Buebsch 1918).
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On one hand, universities dependent on corporate funding facilitate 
the private sector’s setting public research agendas; on the other, unwelcome 
research outcomes can be inhibited or silenced. Reasonably, the communica-
tion of negative evidences and findings related to activities, products, goods, 
policies from corporate sponsors and funders seriously inhibits the regular 
flow of university finance. Putting it bluntly, this type of communication im-
plies the non-renewal of corporate research contracts and grants at best; and 
legal actions for breach of non-disclosure clauses in research contracts and 
agreements at worst, provided that information was sensitive for the compa-
ny interest. 
Adding to that, critical academic voices related to corporate practices 
can be silenced or mitigated from within by managerial and peer pressure. 
Thus, academic freedom is likely to suffer. 
Corporate funding of universities is not focused on obtaining philan-
thropic charm: corporate IP owners still depend heavily on the public sec-
tor and the public domain to sustain and expand profits and market share. 
Hence, companies forge links with universities because they are dependent 
on public science in all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals and 
biotech. 
Universities supply facilities and low-wage researchers, and corpora-
tions supply funding; as a result, patent-holding corporations expand or sus-
tain their competitive advantage and market-share by managing to redirect 
part of the publicly funded resources of basic science. Thus, the knowledge 
obtained from public-funded research under contract or grant is generally 
channeled to corporate patent portfolios, which is later charged again to the 
general public by the patent-holder or the patent licensee. 
Obviously, universities obtain some extra funding in the process (x 
amount). However, by compromising science, universities end up captured 
within the proprietary maze of knowledge-based capitalism. 
The appropriation logic is almost unbeatable: on one side, once public 
science has identified an opportunity at the taxpayer’s expense, corporations 
claim the whole fruit of that knowledge as private property; on the other, 
their patent-based partnerships offer some part of that fruit (IP) to universi-
ties (retribution). 
Therefore, in one way or another, patent-based partnerships between 
universities and corporations recycle public knowledge for private reward. 
Finally, commercialization of knowledge produced by university re-
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search has a non-egalitarian effect: by rewarding scholars for obtaining pat-
ents, research projects are redirected to prioritize the needs of those who have 
resources to pay for the IP bonus; thus not research on neglected diseases, for 
example. 
Hence, and regarding pharmaceuticals, scientific research is channeled 
towards the health needs of wealthy societies and individuals, not on the 
needs of have-nots, following the same pattern of corporate research centers. 
Scientific behavior changes when scientists become patent oriented. In 
this regard, some researchers who worked openly have moved to for-profit re-
search in secrecy, as the free flow of information is a major threat to profitable 
opportunities. The prospect of a new scientific paradigm based on research 
contracts papered with clauses of confidentiality is dispiriting.
 
129
8
SUPER-ASSETS
1. Legal monopolists
The practice and theory of information goods helps to conceptually frame 
the challenge of a strong global IP paradigm. Information goods are ‘non-ri-
valrous’; that is, the fact that one person uses them does not restrict others 
from using them as well. All the costs incurred in producing such goods are 
allocated to making the first copy; the development of these goods involves 
high initial ‘sunk costs’ but the ‘marginal cost’ of producing subsequent units 
is minimal;in fact it is close to zero.1 In short, additional revenue from ex-
ploitation is close to gross profit. 
Patents are ‘propertized’ information goods. Their rationale is conven-
tionally framed by explaining that they provide inventors with sufficient in-
centives to invest time and resources on innovation. Thus, a patent confers 
government-granted monopoly rights over an invention for a fixed period of 
time, by giving its holder control over the legal conditions of the invention to 
be produced and distributed (commercial exploitation) in goods and services. 
As innovation involves a high ratio of fixed to variable costs, the larger 
the market for the invention, the likelier it is that fixed costs will be recouped. 
However, under the international patent system perfected in 1996, protection 
is available in all jurisdictions in which the patent has been granted. 
Consequently, the patent-holder may decide on whatever fits her plans, 
whether to market inventions directly, to license them in some or all domestic 
territories (right to exploit invention), or even to leave the patent unworked. 
Thus, until patent protection ends, an ‘orderly marketplace’ of sequen-
tial windows of exploitation are produced on a global-scale either directly, 
through ownership, and/or indirectly, through vertical contract, all governed 
1  For the canonical explanation see K. Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Alloca-
tion of’ op. cit at 609–626. For an analysis within A2K theory see Y. Benkler, The Wealth 
of Networks op. cit.
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by the patent-holder. During that period, the patent-holder is allowed to con-
trol the commercial conditions both for accessing the invention (read royal-
ties for licensees) and the goods and services built on that invention (read 
monopoly price for consumers). 
Patent-holders, particularly large companies, can play out their ‘proper-
ty’ across multiple jurisdictions, maximizing global returns from their inven-
tions, by subdividing territories in potentially unlimited ‘windows’; ‘territories’ 
rather than ‘markets’, as the goods and services that are distributed using IP are 
controlled through the government-granted legal monopoly of patents.
From a capital-maximizing perspective –namely that which is embed-
ded in the corporate form and structure–, the patent game is based on the 
exploitation of a monopoly by supplying or authorizing the supply of pat-
ent-based goods and services in its country of origin as well as any other for-
eign territories. 
Hence, the business practice is based on subdividing or segregating 
territories into ‘windows’ of exploitation. However, by running this ‘orderly 
marketplace’, the plurality of domestic territories contributes to the inven-
tion’s potential total payout beyond any reasonable expectations.
In this regard, patent-based innovation would result in lower social 
costs (e.g. life-or-death products and services) if these inventions entered the 
global public domain, once the innovation (R&D) costs are amortized, and a 
premium has been obtained during the period of protection. However, the 
incentives structure of the international patent system currently fails to de-
couple world-scale patent-based profits and innovation costs on unconvinc-
ing grounds. 
Patents entail the artificial creation of scarcity by radical state inter-
vention.2 From centuries, the objects of property become capital through con-
tract. Property law constitutes the objects of property, and contract enables 
the exchange of those objects.3 The protection of both property and contract 
promotes economic development.4 However, once propriety and contract are 
assured, capital-holders have moved ahead, expanding the sphere of security 
and thus that of what can be ‘propertized’ and contracted.5 
2  See S. Picciotto & D. Campbell, ‘Whose Molecule Is It Anyway?’op. cit.
3  J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global business op. cit., p. 54.
4  D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge University Press 1990).
5  J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global business op. cit., p. 46.
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In this regard, the most important expansion of property is the inven-
tion of intangible rights, as these translate what emerges from human minds 
into property. Evidently, the idea of owning something that we cannot see 
or touch (e.g. ideas) transposes a significantly transformative idea to law. 
Hence, these property rights in intangibles have become an increasingly pow-
erful body of law, permeating social life and subjected to strong pressures for 
continuous ratcheting up of standards. 
Not surprisingly, the internationalization of IP is sometimes depicted 
as the foundation for a new form of capitalism: this ‘new’ capitalism focuses 
on the control of abstract objects (intangible assets), as the owners of this in-
tangible property can reach into the material world, through IP-based things 
(goods) and activities (services), and thus control vital resources.6
This critical process has resulted in the paroxysm that is patents. Irre-
spective of the term used to define its philosophical core (appropriation or 
propertization), its legal nature is that of a government-sponsored monopo-
ly and, in consequence, a quite visible hand in economic terms. As a result, 
the impregnation of proprietary cells with globally-traded goods and services 
currently allows optimal accumulation of capital.
Paradoxically, for mainstream observers, these knowledge monopo-
lies do not challenge the inner functioning of markets and competition: thus, 
public authorities can nurture monopoly and the market-economy all togeth-
er, within a ‘coherent’ economic policy vision for the entire world.
Economics professionals are among those doing their best to solve this 
paradox. Certainly, economists still have the idea of efficiency for somehow 
rationalizing the possibility of monopolizing knowledge and ideas,7 irrespec-
tive of their definition of efficiency. However, as ideas and knowledge are in-
herent to human nature, it is not easy to bridge knowledge propertization 
with economic efficiency. 8
Through the lens of profit maximization, knowledge appears to be the 
ideal object of propertization, since it is non-rivalrous in supply. As Braith-
waite and Drahos recalls, the same knowledge can be endlessly recycled to 
many generations, each one having to pay for use or access.9 
6  J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global business op. cit., p. 57.
7  M. Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics. Institutions, Expertise and 
Policy Change (University of North Carolina Press 1991).
8  For the classic argument that technology requires monopolies see J. Schum-
peter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy (Harper 1950) (chapter 8).
9  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit., p. 216.
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Hence, sustained pressure towards the ratcheting up of propertization 
makes sense for the purely rational economic actors; that is to say, proxy ve-
hicles (corporations) remotely-controlled through capital-markets. 
To paraphrase Drahos, TNC’s unity on the IP front is based on the deep 
ideology of hyper-effective IP protection, not on the specific rules; as this en-
ables them all to invest in turning knowledge from public good into a private 
good, and then set the terms of access accordingly.10 
Thus, the increasing accumulation of capital by the net beneficiaries 
(capital-holders acting through corporate proxy) allows them to ratchet up 
global standards by investing some surplus on manufacturing official consent 
(regulatory capture). 
Patents are public legal devices that both lock up knowledge and mo-
nopolize economy: in the world of public ideas that´s a two-for-one in the 
long run for those who have capital, and arguably a strike out for the have-
nots. In short, and again, the current expanding patent system is an ideal le-
gal vehicle for maximizing profits through the patent-holding corporate form 
and structure. 
In principle, it is not easy to devise a more efficient way of legally con-
centrating power over knowledge, society, market and competition in fewer 
–thus increasingly visible– private hands.
For mainstream thinking in this area in any case, the patent system 
may be equated with ‘progress’, whatever that is deemed to be, as long as the 
patent-holders keep delivering some type of innovation; currently, not neces-
sarily breakthrough innovation.
However, the granting to individuals of dominion over land and things 
conveys some type of imperium over others.11 Reasonably, granting domin-
ion over ideas conveys the greatest imperium of all, particularly if the inter-
mediate incumbent is a ‘nonhuman legal person’; in other words, an artificial 
profit-maximizer. 
As profit maximizing is the explicit functional nature of the corporate 
form, it is reasonable to be cautious when granting corporations proprietary 
control over knowledge and ideas. 
In short, and notwithstanding some –although not so many– break-
through inventions, proprietary knowledge is not the best platform for seeing 
further. 
10  P. Drahos, ‘“IP World”-Made by TNC Inc’ op. cit., p. 211.
11  M. Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ op. cit.
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2. Monopoly traders
There are currently several millions of patents in force around the world, and 
a further host of unexamined applications still pending. Their ownership and 
commercial exploitation is dominated by large companies incorporated in a 
small group of countries, and this has been the case since the first robust sta-
tistical data was made available in the 70s.12 
Reasonably, as Machlup argued half a century ago, ‘no economist, on the 
basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the patent 
system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss to society’.13 
In any case, however, patents do create wealth for net exporters of 
patent-based goods and services. Thus, there is transfer of wealth through 
the current international patent system by anulling the functioning of mar-
ket-based price mechanisms for the given proprietary technology. 
As there may be no legally allowed competitors for that (inven-
tion-based) product or service, society cannot benefit from the market-mech-
anism. Thus, the individual consumer cannot benefit from competition in 
markets. As a result, there is a double prize for the patent-holder, entering 
a world level-playing field of unexisting markets in relation to the particular 
invention, and thus a level-playing field characterized by the absence of com-
petition. 
Hence, the proprietor of an invention may decide that a corporation, 
SME, self-employed, employed, unemployed or a nonproductive individual 
should pay these or those royalties for gaining access to the given invention. 
Alternatively, she may simply exclude some, but not others, or even fail to 
allow access to knowledge to anyone. Thus, considerable power is granted by 
an official document. 
Without necessarily delving into the etymology of ‘royalty’ just to make 
a point, market and competition are at odds or in strong tension with this 
government-sponsored structure of incentives. 
12 See The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing 
Countries, (UNCTAD 1975) op. cit., p. 38–39.
13  See F. Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study of the Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, 85th Congress, Second Session, Study No. 15 (1958) at 79 and B. 
Hindley, The Economic Theory of Patents, Copyrights, and Registered Industrial De-
signs: Background Study to the Report on Intellectual and Industrial Property (Econom-
ic Council of Canada 1971).
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The architecture of the international patent system is built on modules; 
thus, virtually an infinite combination of IP rights-based contracting modes 
is available for the patent-holder to construct in multiple jurisdictions, as 
long as the invention commercially pays off. In other words, the patent-hold-
er is both a private regulator and controlling authority, until the patent term 
expires. 
However, the patent-holder may manage to obtain some extended play: 
for example, by not disclosing all the relevant information in the registered 
patent, by playing the card of data exclusivity, or by simply obtaining extra 
tranches of protection by promoting legal reform to extend patent scope, 
strength and term. 
The patent-holder acts as the global controlling authority over the fine 
intangible monopoly-asset: the IP code. As far as privilege is concerned, in-
fringers are outside the law; and their infringing goods can be disposed of out-
side the channels of commerce or, where constitutionally possible, destroyed. 
In this regard, the TRIPS agreement regulates enforcement procedures 
for enabling right holders to prevent, in cooperation with customs adminis-
trations, the release of infringing imports into free circulation. These provi-
sions are covered by Section 4 of its Part III on enforcement. 
Thus, TRIPS article 44 requires that the judicial authorities be empow-
ered to order injunctions, including the possibility of preventing imported in-
fringing goods from entering the domestic market. In addition, as mentioned 
above, article 46 also requires WTO Members to grant courts the authority to 
order infringing goods to be disposed of outside the channels of commerce 
or, ‘unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, de-
stroyed’. 
On the other hand, according to TRIPS article 51 (and accompanying 
specifications of its footnote 14), the goods subject to border enforcement 
procedures must include at least trademark counterfeiting or copyright pi-
racy on a commercial scale for importation and exportation. In addition, ac-
cording to article 61, the infringements of patent-related IP rights are open to 
criminal proceedings, and thus possibly to imprisonment and/or monetary 
fines in 159 jurisdictions. Last but not least, again, ‘in appropriate cases, rem-
edies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the 
infringing goods’.
The propertization logic of the international patent system, as a public 
legal device, is so autonomy-enhancing for corporations –its major players– 
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vis-à-vis society and economy alike that many large IP owners are currently 
involved in playing meta-games with IP rulemaking: that is to say, changing 
the public rules of the game while playing them. TRIPS+ rules are an egre-
gious example.14 
Understandably, any company holding a large portfolio of these pow-
er-assets will be eager to allocate resources for ensuring that this legal ecosys-
tem does not only continue its ‘business as usual’ but expands legal protection 
of intangible assets. 
By manufacturing legal monopolies in almost all state jurisdictions, 
the international patent system is a rent-transferring machine operating 
on a global scale. Subsequently, legal linkage (combination) to the world 
trade regime transforms incumbent (patent-holders) in trading monopo-
lists. Hence, a great deal of power is concentrated in the hands of the large 
repeat players.
The magic ring of IP law grants powerful qualities to the products and 
services based on proprietary technologies. The very existence and trading 
of these products and services depend on the IP owner’s authorization. As a 
result, nowadays, technology-driven companies heavily invest in proprietary 
knowledge in order to avoid seeing their products and services enter price-
based competition, as the IP rights lock-in profit increases by skipping mar-
ginal revenue: no market, no competition. 
Thus, firms use IP intensively to exclude markets as social mechanisms 
in which companies ‘compete’ by selling the best quality good at the lowest 
price possible.
A patent confers an exclusive right on its owner over the making and 
distribution of goods and services. Thus, this legal device grants the discre-
tionary power to authorize the trading of those goods and services by an-
choring them to a monopoly right. Hence, in practical terms, patent licenses 
are trading licenses; and those who control the granting of those voluntary 
licenses are trading monopolists in respect of that invention. 
Thus, by the very nature of the patent form, the legally-protected mo-
nopolist decides who is allowed to trade, and on what conditions; and the le-
gal monopoly can be registered in the patent offices of multiple jurisdictions.
Given this scenario, licensing policies and royalty-setting practices are 
thus critical issues for all, as they define the chance and opportunity for oth-
ers to produce, distribute, consume or trade a given IP-based good or service. 
14  See chapter 3.
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In short, the patent transforms its holder into the gatekeeper of every state 
territory in which the patent is granted. 
This legal device gives the holder power to (1) work out the patent her-
self, (2) grant exclusive licensing agreements, or even (3) allow license-based 
competition between fairly treated licensees; in any case, power to act at will 
over the invention. Thus, access to trading in and from each state jurisdiction 
that grants the patent is determined on purely private grounds and condi-
tions. 
The invention protected by patent and related IP assets is multi-ju-
risdictionally propertized, and therefore, a private issue regulated through 
chance and opportunity at the patent-holder’s behest. 
In granting the patent-holder legal control over all those processes, the 
noun describing the actual phenomenon is not ‘market power’: there is no 
market and competition in sight, as the holder legally opens or forecloses a 
variety of segmented and vertically controlled territories for the given inven-
tion under patent.
Patent rights lock up access to knowledge, allowing companies to have a 
common-and-control position on invention-based goods and services. Thus, 
once a large company obtains a critical breakthrough patent, a vertical infra-
structure can be developed around it by suppliers and distributors, organ-
izing world production and distribution through hub-and-spokes schemes 
based on licensing. 
Somehow, these legal schemes are thus a form of ‘knowledge sover-
eignty’ at will. Thus, it is no accident that patent management is governed by 
increasingly sophisticated practices and technicalities in the realm of expert 
legal communities.15 
In the brave new world of patent wars, companies collecting strong IP 
portfolios improve their capacity to legally block other patent-based competi-
tors in any given domestic society (legal claims, related injunctions, etc). 
Thus, information disclosure is not a priority for filing companies. Go-
ing through the instructions disclosed on patents rarely permits key scientific 
and technological inventions to be reproduced, as patent applications con-
tain deliberately incomplete and misleading data; or they have also been very 
broadly designed and drafted, in order to maximize coverage of sciences and 
15  For clever detailed analysis of this phenomenon see S. Picciotto, Regulating 
opt.cit. For a complete study on politics, patent offices and experts see P. Drahos, The 
Global opt.cit.
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technologies. Hence, the registration itself is often useless without access to 
undisclosed know-how.
On the other hand, the mixture of technicality and calculated ambigu-
ities that legal experts insert into their designs potentially turns them into 
hard core warfare: in this regard, patent walls erected over some technologi-
cal domains frequently deter competitors and researchers from entering the 
arena.
As corporate research departments are managed according to produc-
tivity criteria (read patent quotas), the contestability (legal validity) of pat-
ents is currently ‘downgrading’. However, testing validity in court requires 
money; and consequently, testing validity in a thick patent bundle or the en-
tangled patents governing a key technology, requires significant amounts of 
money. Thus, doubtful privileges remain unchallenged, crowding the lands of 
invention with legal minefields.
The major repeat players play the system best. For them, filing and ac-
quiring patents is not only a means of capitalizing each financial quarter, as 
it also provides a legal armor to secure a level-playing field for intercompa-
ny negotiation over proprietary technology (cross-licensing deals). Thus, by 
maintaining a strong patent portfolio the chances of neutralizing potential 
suits (mutual legal deterrence) are increased, while also securing some bar-
gaining power to solve IP-related conflicts between big and small players. 
As a result, tech companies protect themselves from patent-holding 
predators (the so-called patent trolls) by obtaining as many patents as pos-
sible in emerging technologies. Additionally, obtaining a license over other 
proprietary technologies in good conditions may require proprietary technol-
ogy exchange. Hence, here again the game gives larger players the advantage, 
if not actually excluding other contenders. 
Not surprising, the task of patent offices in governing these pow-
er-games in the public interest is not an easy one, as patent offices are gen-
erally overburdened by stockpiles of patent applications. In addition, many 
applications are packed with hyper-technicalities, indeterminate terms and 
some catch-in ideas for the invention. Thus, officials are often overwhelmed 
by their task of legal quality control.
Last but least, their work is obviously subject to litigation on appeal. In 
this regard, major players take patent offices to court more often than not, not 
only in order to obtain individual key patents but also for tightly marking ju-
dicial precedents over criteria of inventiveness, patentability, etc. Thus, large 
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repeat players do their best to fine-tune this clockwork system by working 
their way up the judicial ladder. 
Patent officials do their best, despite the current state of affairs. How-
ever, the patent productivity policy structurally entrenched in the ir activities 
forces them to adopt, like it or not, simple corporate-friendly positions, and 
thus to abandon their role as watchdog seeking and ensuring inventiveness. 
In this regard, patent offices have structural incentives to grant as many 
patents as possible, and thus to make as few inquiries as possible on inven-
tiveness, disclosure requirements, or validity of scope. 
Globalization requires reconsidering some traditional frameworks of 
both administrative and international law.16 Deterring regulatory capture re-
quires the Patent Offices to improve the deliberative quality of their adminis-
tration.17 In this sense, achieving an efficient balance in intellectual property 
rights requires representation, transparency and non-domination combined 
with institutionalized opportunities for thoughtful deliberation.18 
3. Combinations
The most challenging characteristic of current IP intercompany arrangements 
is that these are often vertically structured around world hub-and-spokes ex-
clusive licensing schemes. Thus, they are sometimes not uniquely based on 
old-school horizontal cross-licensing between global oligopolists but also on 
multi-jurisdictional exclusive licensing of domestic corporations. 
Hence, some brief notes on the history of international cartels are re-
quired before entering into these IP-based global contractual practices. In 
this way, the TRIPS rules promoted by some large pharmaceutical companies 
and other IP companies can be contextualized, along with the resulting rein-
forcement of these practices.19
During the first part of the 20th century, the big pharmaceutical indus-
tries obtained the ‘know-how’ from the chemical industries (cartel as tech-
16  See in particular A. Aman, ‘Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a 
New Administrative Law’, 49 UCLA law review (2002): 1687–1716 and A. Aman, The 
Democracy deficit: taming Globalization through law reform (NYU Press 2004).
17  See generally I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive regulation: transforming 
the deregulation debate (Oxford University Press 1992) (and chapter 3 in particular).
18  See in particular P. Drahos. The Global Governance of Knowledge op. cit.
19  See generally S. Picciotto. Regulating op. cit. (chapters 4 and 9).
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nique or method of industrial organization), who had the dubious honor of 
globalizing price fixing for one of the first time in contemporary history. It is 
not incidental that they were also responsible for the German chemical indus-
trial complex.20
To make a long story short, the first patent-based global chemical car-
tels of the early 20th century became a ‘business model’ for entire industries. 
During the 20s and 30s, as a result, 35 out of the 52 US antitrust proceed-
ings against international cartels involved patent exchange agreements.21 By 
1939, cartels were active in industries that accounted for 42% of world trade.22 
Many of these cartels were based on cross-licensing and patent pools.23 
In this context, for the chemical corporate pioneers, moving to the phar-
maceutical sector was a natural move to make, as chemicals compounds and 
chemical processes are instrumental for synthesizing drugs. This inter-sector 
pollination (or contamination) was critical for the evolution and development 
of business models in entire industries. 
Prior to World War 2, companies were already using patents for pro-
cesses, as well as copyright and trademarks, to protect drug inventions both 
in Germany and the USA, as the patentability of chemical compounds was 
still prohibited. Thus, between the two World Wars, IP began to be used stra-
tegically as a means of structuring and enforcing cartels on a variety of indus-
try sectors.24 
In a moment in which the market-economy was still taking form con-
ceptually –Sherman Act only dated back 1890–, IP allowed them to upgrade 
their autonomy in the economy. In particular, IP sidelined two key weakness-
es in traditional cartel activity; namely, (1) the illegality of such schemes and 
(2) free-rider problems (cheating) by cartel members. 
The discovery of antibiotics –notably penicillin in 1928– changed the 
landscape, by leading to the era of wonder drugs, after the War, and thus to 
expectation of exponential profits. 
Incidentally, the discovery of antibiotics –being substances natural-
20  F. Steckel, ‘Cartelization of the German Chemical Industry 1918–1925’, 19 
Journal European Economics History 2 (1990): 329–352.
21  See G. Stocking & M. Watkins, Cartels in Action (Twentieth Century Fund 
1947), p. 293.
22  See W. Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World (Columbia 
University Press 2003) at 25.
23  See S. Picciotto. Regulating op. cit. (p. 397).
24 See G. Stocking & M. Watkins, Cartels in Action op. cit., p. 4.
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ly occurring in nature– was non-patentable. Even in Germany, it was only 
possible to obtain protection for chemical processes, not for chemical com-
pounds. Hence, meta-game through legal subtlety had to overcome non-pa-
tentability in the US. 
Thus, patent lawyers and officials came to the rescue: as long as some 
significant process was transforming nature, substances isolated and purified 
by discovery were patentable. The argument went through and, as result, a 
first antibiotic cartel held prices stable in the US during the 50s.25 
After World War 2, the pharmaceutical industry had multiplied profits 
through the discovery and patenting of broad-spectrum antibiotics.26 By that 
time, only large corporations had the scale and scope to exploit the poten-
tial of emerging technologies through patents.27 The extra earnings gained 
through combining the payoff from patent reform (on patentability) and the 
anti-competitive know-how from the older chemical cartels allowed the in-
dustry to globally expand these anti-market business practices and culture.28 
By cartelizing production and distribution of pharmaceuticals around 
IP assets, in a relatively short period, a small group of German, Swiss, Brit-
ish and American companies globalized pharmaceutical business on IP cartel 
grounds. Those legal schemes (cartel + IP) anesthetized state and markets for 
two decades. 
However, in some years, the global expansion of this inter-corporate 
business model would begin to face the structural challenge of a blossoming 
generic manufacturing industry in developing countries. 
In particular, the Indian model of generic production (granting patents 
on processes but not on products) was giving birth to a highly competitive 
industry, able to deliver quality and cheap drugs. By reinvesting profits on 
cheaper (patentable) processes to make drugs, the technical capabilities of 
the industry boomed (reverse-engineering, etc). 
Partly as a result of that, pharmaceutical companies begun recruiting 
25  P. Drahos & J. Braithwaite, Information op. cit (chapter 2).
26  On the US innovation public policies and occupied Germany see J. Gimbel, 
Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in postwar Germany 
(Stanford University Press 1990).
27  See generally A. Chandler, Jr, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial 
Capitalism (Belknap Press 1990).
28  On pharmaceutical practices in developing countries see G. Gereffi, The Phar-
maceutical Industry and Dependency op. cit. and J. Braithwaite, Corporate Crime op. cit 
(chapter 5).
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collaborators among the IP related industrial sector at the outset of the pro-
ject for creating a new global IP regime within the multilateral trading sys-
tem; thus the TRIPS agreement erosed, as centerpiece of the current extreme 
IP paradigm. 
The equation of patent-based profit maximization is formed by two re-
lated variables. On one hand, the patent-holder exercises a government-spon-
sored monopoly, and thus the right of contracting out its exploitation through 
license in exchange for capital (royalties). On the other hand, the licensee has 
an agency relationship with the patent-holder to exact monopoly rents on 
the given domestic jurisdiction, or jurisdictions. By obtaining that license, 
the licensee is authorized to perform some activities over IP-based goods and 
services under the terms contained in the arrangement (agency contract or 
agreement). 
This second variable (the licensee) is as significant as the first (the li-
censor) with regard to the impact of IP on the functioning of domestic and 
global markets. By obtaining powerful legal rights from these licenses, licen-
sees are among the winners of the current international patent system. 
In practice, the capital-holder who obtains a license (licensee) from a 
patent-holder (licensor) exacts dominion from the proprietary code within 
any given good or service. On top of that, government-sponsored dominion 
is enforceable in all territories granting the patent, and that can technically 
account for 1 to 159 jurisdictions.
Therefore, in those cases in which the IP owner implements an exclu-
sive license policy, there will be one licensee in each domestic jurisdiction. 
Thus, the group of international exclusive licensees may range from a rela-
tively minor group of incumbents, depending on how many jurisdictions have 
registered the patent; again from one up to 159 licensees. 
An exclusive licensing arrangement is an agency contract working out 
a price for that territory, and preventing anyone other than the agent from 
importing any product or service built on proprietary technology. This also 
seriously applies for other agents that have been licensed with the same pro-
prietary technology in foreign territories. 
As a result, by obtaining a domestically-enforceable monopoly right 
in each given jurisdiction, this transnational elite of exclusive licensees may 
form a vertically operated anticompetitive arrangement, with the licensor at 
the apex. 
Obviously, licensees tend to inhibit non-license based parallel impor-
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tation, by taking to court exporting licensees from other countries, and thus 
preventing imported infringing goods from entering into domestic distribu-
tion channels. Added to this, notably, the legal conflicts, tensions and rela-
tionships between these global licensees are ultimately governed by the pat-
ent-holder licensor, and thus they may obtain formal or informal mediation 
(alternative dispute settlement) from this ruling global IP owner.
Arguably this does not have so much to do with the idea of competi-
tion. As far as we are concerned, the hard core example of exclusive rights 
is also particularly disquieting when essential technological innovations are 
involved, such as i.e. essential medicines. In these cases, closed and vertical 
distribution models involving the very few is thus open to question. 
Exclusive license-based arrangements are welfare-reducing. There are 
multiple complex cases within the current international patent system which 
would suggest reconsideration of the extreme IP approach to licensing. For 
example, even as individuals we are increasingly licensed by global compa-
nies to gain access to new essential technologies. In principle, therefore, in a 
global business model, based on non-exclusive licensing, the number of po-
tential licensees would range from 1 to all of us as potential end-users.
Notwithstanding that an essential universal license would be difficult 
to both implement and manage, and perhaps in the interim would be trans-
ferred by states to the public domain through CLs, the point to make is that 
the current system and thus patent offices would remain structurally neutral 
in the face of such possible development.
As has been explained, the patent-holder has the power to segment or 
partition access to a given invention in all territories in which a legal monop-
oly right has been granted. As a result of that decision, a small transnational 
group of capital-holders acquiring a piece of paper monopoly through con-
tract have –at the end of a chain in an n number of fiduciary forms– a full 
range of segmented and closed territories (state jurisdictions) from which to 
obtain rents. 
These licensees produce and distribute the proprietary-knowledge of 
others through nonmarket and noncompetitive drives; those of a legal mo-
nopolist trading on IP. Thus, these agents are allowed to export the goods 
and services based on that proprietary technology as long as such activity is 
allowed in the terms of the licensing contract. 
The economic driving force on both sides of the contractual relation-
ship is based on nonmarket and noncompetition-driven criteria. Interesting-
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ly, this driving force is not built on comparative advantage but on govern-
ment-sponsored ownership and contract over territorially-operated propri-
etary knowledge. 
Hence, analysis on the contract-side is highly illustrative in this regard. 
The licensor and exclusive licensees agree on terms and are thus part of a 
globally integrated distribution network of the given IP asset. 
Reasonably, the largest licensors are not supposed to operate as some 
sort of revived ‘merchant company’ cooperating with licensees to set up a 
‘shipping conference’ on ‘IP freights’; although sometimes this appear to be 
the case.
In any case, and leaving aside analysis on the pathologies of hard core 
global licensing, the IP rights holder and those licensees obtaining the pro-
duction and distribution rights over the ‘intellectual technology’ gain enor-
mous (sometimes exorbitant) power over society, the market and competi-
tors in general.
In essence, the contracting of a government-granted privilege over a 
meme or a knowledge cell in a given territory allows the exclusive licensee to 
control any ‘IP-pollinated’ goods and services, and thus its physical material-
ization and presence in that territory. 
Thus, the patent-holder technically controls the world legal ecosystem 
for the given invention, as she or he is allowed to exercise monopolistic con-
trol over production and distribution of goods and services based on that pro-
proprietary technology in any given territory.
Therefore, those inter-company contractual relationships constitute a 
second-level delegation of a government-granted monopoly allowing them to 
structurally exclude non-licensed competitors.
Unfortunately, when these hub-and-spokes contractual arrangements 
affect essential technologies, this legal monopoly-based leverage can put 
highly competitive and market-efficient companies out of business.
To summarize, the original monopoly source distorts the global func-
tioning of the market-economy mechanism through world vertical control 
over multi-state production and distribution. Therefore, provided there is a 
critical proprietary technology at stake, deep and stable licensing bonds pro-
duce maximum capital accumulation for the incumbents of this world legal 
game. 
Obviously, such a legal relation is detrimental to the competitiveness of 
non-licensed players. Needless to say, these could be more competitive pro-
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ducing and distributing those goods and services but licensors do not allow 
them to prove it. 
Reasonably, no government-granted monopoly should produce such a 
negative impact on inter-company competition. Putting competitive compa-
nies out of business as a result of IP licensing is not the wisest of ideas. Inev-
itably, these exclusive licensing schemes are collectively wealth-reducing, as 
they allow inter-corporate cooperation to secure safety-rents and thus keep 
the incumbents outside margin-based competition.
Designed by seasoned lawyers, many of these contractual mechanics 
could be technically framed as machinations devised to fix prices, in the tech-
nical sense of a price-fixing conspiracy of the Sherman Act. However, these 
world legal schemes are not automatically illegal as the international patent 
system, in principle, protects property (patents) and contracts (licensing) in 
all jurisdictions: 
Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and 
to conclude licensing contracts.29
A long-nurtured legitimizing legal chain protects the legality of these 
IP-based world transactions. That legal chain is the age old entanglement of 
property and contract. 
By combining the power-laws of property, contract and IP-linked 
world trade, capital-holders have obtained a global ground breaking legal 
device for accumulating capital. From an intellectual perspective, the so-
phistication of this elaborate piece of legal clockwork is remarkable. Thus, 
new lawyers entering large firms and legal boutiques as IP code-program-
mers will continue their playback on this great design for quite some time 
to come, perhaps with slight upgrades now and then. The power-rule was 
written a while ago. 
Today, patents rights and concomitant license agreements have grown 
up as a restriction over market-based prices, production, distribution and, 
obviously, trade. 
As a result, public authorities should consider reforming the rules of 
the game regarding IP propertization and contracting. In this sense, any ef-
fective global antitrust policy in this area should reasonably start horizontally, 
by establishing international automatic mandatory licensing in all business 
29  See TRIPS article 27.2.
VIRGIN LANDS OF INVENTION
145
sectors considered to be essential for society (e.g. pharmaceuticals, commu-
nications technologies, etc). 
For centuries, capitalism has advanced through property and contract. 
As mentioned, property is the position, contract the move; going forward 
relentlessly in a series of feedback moves. In this regard, the property-con-
tract ‘move’ makes IP (patents, know-how, trade secrets and trademarks) 
an optimum legal device to expand both individual and collective corporate 
autonomy in any given business sector through anti-competitive contractual 
practices. 
In essence, IP facilitates the combination of two vehicles that irregular-
ly maximize capital-holders’ autonomy through the legal forms of property 
and contract: public law-based monopolies (patent as property) and private 
law-based arrangements (licensing as contract). 
As a result, moving into intellectual property makes incredible sense 
for capital-holders as rational economic actors. By combining patent rights 
and subsequent license arrangements, their corporate proxies increase the 
capacity for circumventing antitrust laws. 
More often than not, both antitrust authorities and tribunals tend to 
leniently interpret these practices as mere exercises of property and contract. 
This is particularly the case with most global exclusive licensing frameworks. 
As they comprise ownership and contract, public authorities find them diffi-
cult to break up. 
In this regard, world patent-sharing agreements may obtain an equiv-
alent anti-competitive effect to the old-school of commodity cartels: that of 
controlling production, setting prices and dividing up territories. However, 
the IP game permits reframing, by moving from the legal label of anti-com-
petitive machinations to that of pure and neutral exercise of property rights. 
As a result, the extreme IP paradigm and its legal infrastructures solved 
the historical dual weakness of old-school commodity cartels: unenforceable 
legal action against free-riding and cheating. Noncompliance with the terms 
of the arrangement by a contracting party can now be framed by another con-
tracting parties as a simple infringement of IP, and thus be adjudicated in 
domestic courts or private international arbitration. 
In essence, public players tend to have difficulties acting against prop-
erty-based contractual relationships, and thus to reframe those transactions 
as anti-competitive practices. As a result, the move to a strong IP paradigm 
facilitates global second-generation cartels, which are more difficult to scan 
and bust.
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Public authorities tend to intervene with relative unease on private ar-
rangements based on property and contract. The difficulties multiply when 
the phenomenon internationalizes. The subtle legal line between ‘interna-
tional cartel’ and a mere disposal of property through contract plays to the 
advantage of legal technicians and corporate clients knowing the trade. 
Interestingly, international cartels are the only area in which antitrust 
authorities have a shared commitment of coordinating their domestic en-
forcement policies. Arguably, international cartels are the only easy thing to 
agree on between competition agencies from both developed and developing 
countries for some time to come: for antitrust experts and practitioners glob-
al cartelists are the contemporary pirates of the global market-economy in 
the making. 
In this regard, antitrust representatives and officials share a common 
culture and understanding on this critical issue. In fact, the most successful 
annual workshops within the inter-agency regulatory framework of the Inter-
national Competition Network (ICN)30 are those on international cartel-bust-
ing. Therefore, there is some critical policy space to explore there. 
As far as general arguments are concerned, that goes for both vertical 
(e.g. exclusive licensing) and horizontal (e.g. cross-licensing) global arrange-
ments based on IP. 
4. The origins 
Reasonably, the current business model of global pharmaceutical industries 
has to be portrayed within the perimeter of this type of legal combinations. 
But before addressing the model, however, it is important to take a brief look 
at the evolution of classical cartels, in order to contextualize where we all 
come from and thus where we stand at present. 
As Kronstein explains, these ‘private alliances of enterprises’ operating 
behind the windbreak of state power remove a market from the ordinary eco-
30  See M. Djelic & T.Kleiner, ‘The international competition network: Moving 
towards transnational governance’, Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics 
of Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2006) at 287–307, W. Kovacic & H. Hollman, 
‘The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role’ 20 Minnesota 
Journal of International Law (2011): 274-323 and W. Kovacic, H. Hollman & A. Rob-
ertson ‘Building Global Antitrust Standards: The ICN’s Practicable Approach’, Research 
Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012), pp. 89–109.
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nomic order and subject it to their own making.31 In this regard, cartels are 
ideal for explaining what the market-economy is not about. For that reason, 
it would be helpful to look back a little further. Thus, describing its long evo-
lution facilitates our understanding of the present time, as well as possible 
future developments.32 
Interestingly, since the final quarter of 19th century and beyond, there 
was a wide-spread perception among industrialists, policymakers and the 
economic professions alike that cartelization was an optimum tool for avoid-
ing overproduction and related crises in the mass-manufacturing industrial 
economy. 
However, these cooperative anti-market arrangements also attracted 
increasing popular criticism in that quarter, due to their impact on prices. 
Thus, the Sherman Act of 1890 was adopted as a catalyst for reducing corpo-
rate practices in line with what would later be called ‘market economy’.
Not incidentally, by that time, the market economy was an ongoing 
conceptual endeavor, thus originally also thought to be a sole national en-
deavor. Economic nationalism characterized that era, as at the time, econom-
ic globalism was only a political idea which was beginning to be connected for 
the first time, in positive terms, to world trade. 
Hence, the highly cartelized economy of the 19th century was subse-
quently subjected to a shaky restart. In line with the winds of popular oppo-
sition to concentration in key sectors of the US economy through trusts, the 
1890 Sherman Act catalyzed social disaffection and translated it into a new 
power-law. The power-law gave rise to an overarching prohibition framing 
the nascent market economy and its comparative law and politics:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal. 
That provision is a minimum common denominator in building a 
close-to-customary world-consensus on the proper functioning of mod-
ern-market economies; no more, and no less. 
In fact, quite significantly, this is one of the very few areas, along with 
anti-bribery, in which comparative law and politics of the market-economy 
31  See H. Kronstein, The Law of International Cartels (Cornell University Press 
1972), p. 4.
32  See in particular S. Picciotto, Regulating global op. cit (chapter 4).
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find some traces of criminal law and enforcement in white-collar corporate 
activity.
The 1890 Sherman Act did frame intercompany cooperation in radical-
ly negative legal terms, as the new legitimizing framework for the US econo-
my (read market > competition > efficiency) was impossible to reconcile with 
large inter-corporate cooperation such as cartelization (read no market > no 
competition > inefficiency). 
The power-idea was called market economy and thus its power-law was 
focused on the law of the land; thus, the land referred to in the constitution 
of the United States of America, no other. Hence, international cartels were 
not framed in negative terms either by economists, politicians or judges alike, 
as long as these had no effect on the US (ie. domestic prices). Therefore, the 
gate of international cartelization still remained open. In fact, the Webb-Po-
merene Act of 1918 legalized export cartels on these delicate economic policy 
lines. 
These particular policy developments within a US market economy in 
the making would later have serious consequences for the global industry’s 
move to IP cartelization in decades to come. 
In principle, as cartels are distorting instruments (dominium) for a 
market economy, corporations would not be able to enjoy new entries and 
attempts at this lethal combination. In order to allow the nurturing of a 
renovated economic paradigm, cartels became the new pirates within the 
conceptual framework of those who were legally constructing the new mar-
ket economy paradigm.33 Hence, the Sherman Act was partly responsible 
for solving that potential structural problem, by prohibiting intercompany 
cooperation. 
However, by acting tough in busting domestic intercompany arrange-
ments (particularly Samuel Dodd’s trusts), the century-old Sherman Act in-
directly promoted oligopoly formation. As long as companies were legally 
prohibited to agree on prices or production through contract, property could 
come to the rescue. 
As Picciotto explains, competition law, although born from a populist 
impulse to restrict oligopolistic economic power, largely became a means of 
legitimating it.34 
33  For global anti-cartel US and EU actions (citric acid, lysine and vitamins con-
spiracies) see, in particular, J.M.Connor, Global Price Fixing (Springer 2007).
34  See S. Picciotto. Regulating op. cit., p. 109.
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The Act indirectly transformed the entire US industrial landscape by 
offering large corporations a great upward shift (concentration), frequently 
referred to as ‘consolidation’ in corporate American English, as both a legiti-
mate and legal business strategy in the market economy. 
Thus, corporate integration took place on a large scale in the US through 
primitive forms of what we call today ‘mergers and acquisitions’. As a result, 
by the first decades of the 20th century, large corporations already pervaded 
most sectors of the US market economy, and would soon begin to export an 
oligopolized model of market economy beyond its borders. 
The structure of incentives embedded in the 31 words voted by US Con-
gress when passing article 1 of the Sherman Act, indirectly contributed to in-
dustrial concentration, as capital-holders moved to this new game. 
In technical terms, companies would be allowed to consolidate as long 
as they maximized consumer welfare (in the current legal sense of higher 
quality and lower prices). However, according to this bargain, advanced soci-
eties have incrementally oligopolized their market economies; and arguably, 
‘as long as’ may not last forever. 
The market structure of increasing sectors in advanced market econo-
mies is currently oligopolistic. Monopoly was precluded as a capital-enhanc-
ing vehicle, but oligopoly was allowed. Thus, this limit to capital accumu-
lation (or profit maximization) through higher-level market concentration 
could only be circumvented by expanding business activity to other jurisdic-
tions. In essence, controlling shareholders could raise the bar by playing the 
multi-jurisdictional game through their corporate proxies. 
It is no accident that this multi-jurisdictional game was often based on 
cartels, as international cartelization was still a viable legal device organiz-
ing business activity. As mentioned, the Webb-Pomerene Act legalized global 
cartels originated or joined by US companies, as long as they did not have a 
negative effect on the US market-economy in the making.35 
Only by the end of 30s, did the US antitrust authorities begin paying 
some attention to the distorting impact of international cartels on domestic 
economies. The change in public attitude under the Roosevelt administration 
was brought about, right after World War 2, by the US Antitrust Division 
led by the forceful Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold,36 when this 
35  See E. Hawley, The New Deal and the problem of monopoly: a study in eco-
nomic ambivalence (Princeton University Press1966).
36  See T. Arnold, The folcklore of capitalism (Beard Books 2000).
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agency began to pursue anti-global cartel enforcement actions having effects 
on the US market economy.37 
Inevitably, antitrust enforcement actions and their concomitant con-
sent decrees increased the cost of global cartelizing from the 40s, so US com-
panies began searching for new legal schemes to maximize corporate autono-
my in the interest of capital-holders; and there goes the move to IP. 
In any case, global companies did not only move to IP as a concomitant 
result of the activities of the US Antitrust Division, but also because agreeing 
to a productivity quota or a fixed price between two or more autonomous 
companies is always iuris et de iure invalid under antitrust law (read plainly 
illegal). Thus, free-riding and cheating between cartelists was not judicially 
enforceable. As a result, the legal clockwork mechanics of cartels had to be 
finely tuned to correct this limited incentives structure within the cartel form 
itself.
In sum, in order to nurture a more autonomy-enhancing vehicle, the 
public-private legal Rubicon between market-based competition and prop-
erty based-contracting had to be crossed; not an easy task in technical legal 
terms. 
Thus, US chemical industries and their American Chemical Association 
began to consider that optimum corporate autonomy for all incumbents was 
better obtained by moving cooperative activities to IP. 
Cooperation and monopoly appear to be an oxymoron, but they are not, 
as even the oligopolists have to agree with somebody on something; thus, 
better to choose who you agree with than indulging in infighting and leaving 
public authorities to enter the quarrel. 
Hence, it was not incidental that the first attempts were to benchmark 
the German chemical industrial complex. In fact, the key expert in that trade, 
and a highly influential individual in devising and developing a new legal cul-
ture of corporate patents was Edwin Prindle, former high rank patent official 
and chief of the Patent Committee of the American Chemical Association.38 
Interestingly, the inner power-logic of patents within the modern intercom-
pany monopoly-games is beautifully explained by this legal entrepreneur 
himself: 
37  For the prosecution of world cartels during World War 2 and after see generally 
W. Wells, Antitrust and op. cit.
38  See E. Prindle, ‘The marvelous performance of the American patent system’, 10 
Journal of the Patent Office Society (1927–28): 255 and 258.
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Patents are the best and most effective means of controlling competition. They occasion-
ally give absolute command of the market, enabling their owner to name the price without 
regard to cost of production. . . The power which a patentee has to dictate the conditions 
under which his monopoly may be exercised has been used to form trade agreements 
throughout practically entire industries, and if the purpose of the combination is primar-
ily to secure benefit from the patent monopoly, the combination is legitimate. Under such 
combinations there can be effective agreements as to prices maintained.39
The only legal flaw in his entire argumentation is that trade agreements 
were supposed to be inter-state agreements. Thus, the critical distinction be-
tween public and private law is wiped out. 
Certainly, that is exactly what is currently happening. In this regard, 
and notwithstanding any compromising interpretation, the terms of trade le-
galized by the current international patent system structurally promote mo-
nopoly-based inter-corporate agreements. 
As a result of this natural by-product of the current extreme IP para-
digm, capital-holders maximize autonomy vis-à-vis public authorities and so-
ciety at large, through a tactical legal merger of intra-corporate and inter-cor-
porate decision making (read property and contract, respectively) based on 
government-sponsored legal monopolies (read IP). 
In this sense, these advanced schemes are highly performing legal ve-
hicles for profit maximization through mixing corporate proxies. Hence, the 
boards and CEOs of some global IP companies (including pharmaceutical 
corporations) play out these strategies through variable combinations of con-
tract and property so that shareholders maximize profits. 
Arguably, this phenomenon has left public representatives out of things 
for some years. As the 8th round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations pro-
ceeded, from 1986 to 1994, and the Berlin Wall came down right in the mid-
dle of it (1989), it is not hard to see why people thought non-market economy 
capitalism was the only economic system remaining. 
However, and sidelining determinism, the market economy and the 
social state were and are still in existence. In this regard, the international 
patent system could have been written with a rather different rationale such 
as that of automatic mandatory licensing, for example. 
Therefore, there is work to do in breathing new power into the com-
bined social infrastructures of states and markets, by making them work bet-
ter together. Reasonably, market economies and social states are critical in-
39  See D. Noble, America by Design op. cit., p. 89.
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frastructures for globalizing a better world; and are thus a combined common 
good. 
Fortunately, the voices of those who valued the social state are present 
here and there in TRIPS; and equally fortunately, the voices of those who 
valued the market economy are everywhere in the GATT of 1994. For that 
reason, antitrust authorities still have the legal opportunity to amplify TRIPS 
inner flexibilities through article 40 and other antitrust related provisions of 
this agreement. 
In any case, an easy way for balancing extreme IP can be found not 
only in international antitrust law –particularly the old international law re-
garding cartels– but within the pro-trade technicalities of the GATT of 1994. 
Arguably, the current semi-constitutional functions of the WTO agreement 
allow the 2001 Doha Declaration to rebalance some TRIPS rules (thus IP) 
in relation to GATT rules (thus trade). In this regard, there are interpreta-
tive margins in the WTO regime, not only for mitigating extreme IP but for 
considering TRIPS as what it should be: a world legal ceiling with regard to 
health.40 
5. World properties 
Patents are certainly part of modern legal infrastructures of innovation. 
However, the current functioning of the international patent system has 
transformed them into global vehicles which keep prices up and compet-
itors out. 
While innovation is not an easy quality to measure, steady prices are, 
and that should be a warning for those who think that markets and competi-
tion are good inventions to be harvested in the public realm. 
Doing business as well as trying to get into business (potential en-
trants) in an IP world is becoming difficult for non-large players (economic 
diversity). 
Under the current international patent system, there is no such a thing 
as a ‘global market’ or ‘global markets’. Segmentation is the word: when every 
product and service with the imprimatur of IP code is controlled by the IP 
owner, the term `market´ does not apply to the transaction. 
We are dealing here with monopoly-privilege, legal enforcement, thus 
40  See chapter 5.4.
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courts, thus public law, thus jurisdiction, thus territory, and thus sovereignty: 
this is to say segmentation of 159 territories in which 158 potential monopoly 
privileges can be granted to one foreign IP owner. In short, the whole inter-
national patent system runs on legal monopoly code. 
Hence, by holding patents in multiple territories, companies have the 
enforceable prerogative to decide over the import or export of any good or 
service produced under their patent. Thus, the unique authorized ‘free trad-
er’ is the monopolist, as she is allowed to manage a world hub-and-spokes 
device, placing goods and services under the rules of property (patent) and 
contract (license).
In short, the genius of trade and traders –the traditional and centu-
ries-old merchants and trading entrepreneurs– is inhibited in the name of 
the so-called ‘value-added’ proprietary-knowledge. To a great extent, the 
global interdependence in all past millennia of the analog era was a by-prod-
uct of people moving things around the world, from one market-community 
to another. From January 1st 1996, the linkage of trade and IP equals to pri-
vate trade conditionality. In this sense, IP transactions across the world are 
based on a form of private trade conditionality. 
Understandably, the historical tensions over patents and trade are cen-
turies old, and they recur for good reason. Historically, the patent originated 
as a means of circumventing guild control of innovation.41 By doing so, how-
ever, patents became monopoly privileges, having a bearing on social and 
economic fundamentals.42 
In England, the policy battles between the English parliament and the 
Crown at the beginning of the 17th century over ‘letters patent’ was an expres-
sion of the severe social questioning regarding privilege-based monopolies in 
commerce and trade. As many of these monopolies had nothing to do with the 
protection of inventions, the Statute of Monopolies (25 May 1624) only left in 
place the protection of the latter.43 
Interestingly, the next English social movement questioning patents 
41  See S. Picciotto, Whose Molecule is it anyway? op. cit and F. Frager, ‘A history 
of intellectual property from 1545 to 1787’, 26 Journal of the Patent Office Society (1944): 
711–760.
42  E. Penrose, The Economics of International Patent System (John Hopkins 
University Press 1951), p. 2.
43  A. Christie & Ch. Dent, ‘“Generally inconvenient”: the 1624 Statute of Monop-
olies as political compromise’, Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia, Work-
ing Paper No. 4/10 (June 2010).
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as government-sponsored legal devices for promoting invention focused on 
their adverse effect on free trade and laissez-faire,44 during the 19th centu-
ry.45 
For centuries, national treatment (NT) regarding patent protection 
(read reciprocity) has been an issue in inter-state relations. The extent to 
which a state granted patent rights to foreigners was not fixed, as a public 
policy issue, and was even conditioned on occasion; thus, for example, requir-
ing the patent to be worked in the jurisdiction. 
Until the final decade of the last century, states bargained around 
the legal recognition of the rights of foreign patent holders through bilater-
al inter-state negotiations. Hence, NT has been historically bargained over 
through bilateral relations. 
As a result, IP-based protectionism has been used indistinctly by devel-
oped and developing countries alike throughout history. Thus, this form of 
protectionism is not circumscribed to developing countries. 
At the time of the first (German) global chemical industries, for exam-
ple, the United Kingdom reformed its patent law in 1919 to exclude patenta-
bility of chemical compounds (while leaving chemical processes patentable): 
the objective was to create incentives for its domestic industry to invent pro-
cesses for competing with the large German chemical industries. The exclu-
sion was applied between 1919 and 1954.46 
On the development side, the 1970 Patent Act of India granting pro-
tection to process patents, but not to product patents, was adopted with the 
aim of developing pharmaceutical local production, and thus to provide suf-
ficient incentives for domestic companies to invest in (patentable) cheaper 
processes for making drugs. Those companies honored the ‘cheap drugs for 
patentable processes’ deal.
However, under the current international patent system, the old IP-
based protectionism has been replaced: nowadays, trade in goods and servic-
44  F. Machlup & E. Penrose, ‘The patent controversy in the nineteenth century’ 
op. cit.
45  For the history of English patent laws see C. MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial 
Revolution: The English Patent System 1660-1800 (Cambridge University Press 1988) 
and H. Dutton, The Patent System and Inventive Activity during the Industrial Revolu-
tion 1750-1852 (Manchester University Press 1984).
46  J. Murmann & R. Landau, ‘On the making of competitive advantage: the de-
velopment of the chemical industries of Britain and Germany Since 1850’ Chemical and 
Long-term economic growth: insights from the chemical industry (1998), pp. 27–70.
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es built on a proprietary technology generally are multi-jurisdictionally reg-
ulated by monopoly traders, as world trade of goods and services using that 
technology depends on how the patent holder defines the licensing terms. 
Hence, the patent-holder will set the terms of trade (yes or no and in what 
conditions).
As a result, things (goods) and activities (services) chained to the invis-
ible IP traces cannot be traded freely by other entrepreneurs (parallel impor-
tation), as infringement of the terms of trade is enforced in the name of the IP 
owner through both private policing and custom inspections. 
IP also operates in world trade as a form of structural-PPM. Clearly, 
non-discrimination regarding PPM (Process and Production Methods) of im-
ported goods is the backbone of world trade. The multilateral trading system 
was underpinned by the fact that none of its participants would question the 
product and process methods (PPMs) of imported goods (read environmen-
tal and labor standards), in order to maximize world trade. 
That was both the explicit and implicit deal. By building on that, and 
notwithstanding its critics, the multilateral trading system considerably con-
tributed to world economic development for half a century. Thus, the multi-
lateral trading system moved ahead under a structural trade-off based on im-
porting and exporting goods without discriminating on PPM grounds, except 
for prison labor.47 
As the GATT of 1947 included developing countries among its 23 found-
ing Contracting Parties, the deal ensured that developed countries would not 
condition market access on compliance with process and production meth-
ods. In exchange, developing countries would open up their economies. 
Hence, trade was neutral towards PPMs. 
However, a form of global PPMs has been incorporated in the world 
trade system by linking IP to trade and subsequently interpreting TRIPs pro-
visions through the prism of extreme IP. 
Thus, this prism could be lessened by surgically rebalancing IP and 
trade in essential areas of technology (ie. world trade in pharmaceuticals). 
This could be done through WTO Members’ Ministerial Decisions (WTO arti-
cle IX:1), or even authoritative interpretations (WTO article IX:2). 
In this regard, the article IX of the WTO (Decision-Making) has already 
proved (read 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health) that it is 
the honorable heir of 1947 GATT article XXV (Joint Action of the Contracting 
47  See section (e) in article XX of GATT.
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Parties); a power-rule that made possible for the GATT regime to blossom in 
complicated times (read failure to ratify the Havana Charter). 
The WTO article IX is extremely powerful not only for rebalancing IP 
and trade to the benefit of wealth-enhancing global pharmaceuticals market 
(both generics and brand-name drugs) but also for restating the institutional 
leadership of the world trade regime itself in the post-TRIPS scenario. 
The functioning of the current international patent system suggests 
making reforms. Currently, as long as a patent has been granted in any given 
territories, the flow of trade in goods or services building on that invention 
is legally controlled by the will of those holding the official patent document. 
The customs enforce this control over trade with the help of private agents 
providing IP policing services and enforcement for large IP producers and 
distributors.
Hence, the terms of international trade are structurally reframed both 
by and through IP law; all issues related to market are controlled by the IP 
owner: market access and market exit, or more precisely, market entry and 
market reentry.
Interestingly, in the traditional non-IP conditioned global trade, there 
was basically one commonly used word: ‘market access’, as the rest was basi-
cally free will. That is to say, international free movement of goods. 
In the past, the import-export-import-export and n trade moves were 
simply the open nature of the trading opportunity: the value of openness; 
this is exactly what Pascal Lamy tried to put back on the global governance 
radar, by coining ‘trade in value-added’, and then quantifying it with the help 
of OECD.48 
Conversely, the rules of trade in goods and services based on IP are 
those of licensing arrangements. No other traders than the licensees are al-
lowed to enter the transaction. 
Those are the actual terms of trade; and they are all under the legally 
enforceable control of the IP owner. Hence, IP-related trade is a radically dif-
ferent ‘trade’ than that which gave rise to the so-called world trading system.49 
Therefore, traditional images of trade vanish; the image of trade un-
derstood as entrepreneurs acquiring things in one place on earth and selling 
them in another dissapears. The term ‘trade’, conventionally described as ac-
48  See OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added (OCDE, 1 January 2013).
49  R. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Clarendon Press 1956) at 31 and J. 
Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT op. cit.
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tivity of buying and selling, or exchanging, goods and/or services between 
people or countries by the Cambridge English Dictionary, does not describe 
this new type of trade in IP-based goods and services. 
As long as there are non-authorized traces of proprietary technology in 
a given good, the IP owner can interfere with the free movement of that good 
or service; no matter how many tariffs and non-tariffs barriers have been 
pulled down in the last half a century of GATT negotiating rounds. There will 
be no trade. 
The new trade barriers are all private, high and hard. As long as we 
climb the ladder of proprietary technologies and thus IP-based goods and 
services, less and less of the old trade will move things and activities across 
borders. 
We all know that free trade has winners and losers within the workforc-
es of the open market economies of the world. In a balance, it was basically 
agreed that international trade was a pragmatic wealth-enhancing option,50 
particularly looking back to the autarchies leading to recent Second World 
War.
However, the free traders of late 80s got a Trojan horse on board, on 
the last big wave of all past GATT MTN: the Uruguay Round. Quite surpris-
ingly, the board reached the shore in the spring of 15 April of 1994, and there 
was thus a happy ending at the Ministerial Meeting of Marrakech. 
Thus, the TRIPS agreement entering into force on 1 January of 1995 
soon began transforming world trade by linking IP compliance to trade. The 
text is, in its own terms, a magnificent regulatory capture by a relatively small 
group of corporations. Through that capture, the IP constituency and some 
key developed countries inhibited the wealth-enhancing mechanics of free 
trade in exchange for expanding world IP monopolies. 
The great fabric of world trade is in trouble for many reasons, but also 
in part as a result of this Faustian bargain entered into by the trade repre-
sentatives of developed countries with their IP constituencies. In fact, nowa-
days, by undoing the long walk of the old-school GATT diplomacy, these trade 
representatives are currently packaging and marketing bilateral trade-related 
deals door-to-door.51
50  J. Viner “Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter”, 25 Foreign Affairs 
(1947): 612–628.
51  For current prospects see, in particular, D. Gantz, Liberalizing international 
trade after Doha: multilateral, regional, and unilateral initiatives (Cambridge University 
Press 2013).
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Arguably, in the IP area, as long as developed countries embrace the 
special interest of the strong IP hard-liners, developing countries will not eas-
ily follow. Last but not least, the E7 economies have increasing economic and 
political leverage to step-off by offering alternative models in their bilateral 
and regional trade deals. 
Nowadays, large IP owners have absolute legal control over the move-
ment across borders of IP goods and services. Not surprisingly, the old world 
trading system is somehow upside down; this is not to say that it was an ideal 
system, but the linkage of IP to trade is troubling. The case of access to med-
icines in the developing world analysed in previous pages is a clear example. 
While antitrust authorities of developed countries are paying increased 
attention to IP-originated battles on high technology standard setting, they 
do little to promote price-based world competition in order to facilitate access 
to essential technologies in the developing world (e.g. access to medicines). In 
this regard, IP restraints world market interoperability in similar ways to the 
manner in which it distorts communication interoperability in world techno-
logical standard setting. 
After all, the two fields (world trade and technology standards) are cap-
tured by the very same intellectual legal technology; ‘Intellectual property’: 
a legal technology in its own terms and indeed a fine invention of the mind. 
Economic interdependence requires world interoperability. However, 
a critical legal infrastructure of interoperability for a world-market economy 
has been thwarted by the advent of the international patent system. 
Developed countries are shooting themselves in the foot by pushing for 
an extreme IP paradigm that does not recover workforces or taxation but un-
plugs the welfare-enhancing economics of world trade. 
Reasonably, the current model does not help advanced economies to 
recover from deindustrialization, nor does it facilitate trade-based growth in 
developing and least-developing economies. However, it certainly benefits 
the shareholders of the so-called ‘knowledge-based companies’ that are pro-
moting this proprietary-knowledge model for the world economy. 
Interestingly, those IP-intensive companies are structurally charac-
terized by having very scarce workforces and a low tax-paying performance 
compared to the industrial sector as a whole. It is no surprise that, they also 
have the highest earnings. 
Making world trade channels dependent on IP compliance is a good 
deal for the shareholding individuals controlling IP-based corporate proxies. 
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However, it is also a bad deal for the have-nots and middle classes in the de-
veloping and developed world. 
Virtually all economics textbooks explain why monopolies are socially 
inefficient. With IP hyper-protection in the offing, the explanatory frame for a 
global market-economy in the making blurs. Arguably, something is missing 
in our so-called ‘knowledge-based societies’ when information and knowl-
edge are transformed into world legal monopolies. 
Over the last century, markets, competition and efficiency have pro-
vided a framework for explaining, and imagining our world, but two of these 
three pillars are now being eroded in entire key economic sectors, if not ac-
tually wiped out, purely as a result of international IP enforcement. Hence, 
we are leaving efficiency, whatever info-econometrics deems that to be, to its 
own devices.52
Lately, trade ministers from developing countries have been pushing 
the fast-forward IP button. In the meantime, antitrust authorities reduce 
some distortions here and there in this area while Parliaments face the hur-
dle of seeing technocratic regulatory networks run right through them, both 
domestically and globally.53
Therefore, a highly technical legal issue such as the so-called paragraph 
6 issue epitomizes the imbalance of the global IP paradigm. In this regard, the 
ongoing governance of access to affordable medicines in the developing world 
by our state and market elites illustrates a policy misjudgment.
Free trade is part of the solution for access to drugs in the developing 
world. However, by linking IP to trade, the leverage of global trade, competi-
tion and markets to push prices down have been legally annulled.
It is reasonable to assume that a more meaningful paradigm is need-
ed. Bringing back meaning to IP requires not only efficient public-sponsored 
rules and institutions on licensing, but also free trade, stronger markets and 
competition. 
52  For an assesment on the global dissemination of economic expertise see Y. 
Dezalay & B. Garth. ‘National Usages for a “Global Science: the dissemination of New Eco-
nomic Paradigms as a Strategy for the Reproduction of Governing Elites’, Global Science 
and national sovereignty: studies in historical sociology of science (Routledge 2009), pp. 
143–167.
53  See generally, S. Picciotto, Regulating op. cit.
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CAPITAL LEGAL GAMES
1. Terms of Trade 
For centuries, capitalism has advanced through property and contract. As 
mentioned above, property is the position, contract the move; going forward 
relentlessly in a series of feedback moves. 
Public authority in stable societies currently exercises its power over 
some contractual relationships, by establishing ex ante limits in public law, 
and thus annulling contracts ex post through judicial review, or correcting 
them through regulatory agency proceedings (e.g. antitrust consent decrees). 
Except within the structural context of social crises, public authorities 
do not normally involve themselves in matters of extensive property accumu-
lation. Consequently, property often comes to the rescue of private individ-
uals as a legal safe haven within which to build autonomy, particularly when 
public policies reduce contractual autonomy.
Naturally, as capital is power, the new forms of private power exercised 
through capital tend to gradually self-legalize; and public power follows suit, 
in order to catch up with it, re-regulating to recover collective control over 
those new forms. Thus, a variety of appropriation rituals are endlessly seen to 
shore up social life, propertizing activities and things through the assembly of 
new legally enforceable vehicles and forms. 
The mechanics are simple: in order to maximize autonomy, capi-
tal-holders invest in autonomy-enhancing legal vehicles to prevent public 
power from interfering in accumulation, and thus make regular moves to re-
main outside the confines of public law, by keeping one legal step ahead. 
Using autonomy-enhancing legal vehicles, capital-holders induce 
hands-off public policies (or pro-capital-holder policies) regarding accumu-
lation. Thus, the backbone of the political community is anaesthetized with 
regular doses of corporate legal creativity in the benefit of capital-holders; 
when the effect wears off, the public authorities react, and the game goes 
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on, but the capital-holder is ahead of the community´s next catching up 
manoeuvre. 
This is how the old property-contract move functions regarding the in-
ter-play between contemporary public authorities and capital-holders. Need-
less to say, those moves have been consented to and later validated by public 
power. 
Inventions of the mind are limitless. The inventions of the legal mind 
are also limitless. Thus, by ‘proprietizing’ knowledge and ideas, an extended 
game play is obtained in the age-old cat-and-mouse game between public au-
thorities and the capital-holding individuals. 
The representative of the corporation makes a legal point in the name 
of the shareholders: IP is ours; the corporate form is the proprietor of all in-
tellectual output of its employees; those were the terms of contract with our 
scientists and authors. 
That legal standpoint is certainly correct since today’s advanced socie-
ties have accepted that the labour force can be traded as a commodity. How-
ever, intellectual propriety was originally a government-sponsored privilege 
granted to both the actual individual inventor and author, not to corporations.
In principle, scientists and the artists have for centuries represented 
the mind and spirit of society. Arguably, these people are the heirs of those 
who first painted images in caves, transmitting shared symbols and ideas 
inter-generationally, thus laying the foundations of our first communities.1 
Thus, it would reasonable to be argued that the industrial appropriation of 
human genius by corporate proxies is too excessive. 
The transfer of invention to a large, globally-operated corporation al-
lows capital-holding individuals to appropriate the most essential human 
creations. From there, IP becomes a world commodity, which corporations 
trade at will, through globally operated oligopolies in the hands of controlling 
shareholders. 
However, by appropriating the very ‘essence’ of those who push the 
boundaries of the social system, allowing it to dream (artists) and see further 
(scientists), something radical is taking place.
Interestingly, the current IP measures basically align the two critical 
legal codes (patents and copyright) within standard generational time frames 
(20–30 years):
1  See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/310.
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– Patent: 7300 days (20 years)
– Copyright: 18250 days (50 years)
In a way, developed countries and IP constituencies have done the job 
of a non-existent international bureau of IP weights and measures by estab-
lishing these time frames. In any case, the legal term ‘at least’ (and also ‘no 
less’) in the TRIPS table of IP ‘weights and measures’ is a power-term of its 
own, as it implies that IP time frames are not still universally fixed, and thus 
can be bargained up. 2
As mentioned in previous pages, some private and public high level 
technicians still perceive TRIPS, not as an international legal ceiling, but as 
a floor. As a result, for these extreme IP advocates, those very time-limits or 
any other issue within the scope, strength and length of IP is not fixed, and 
thus they are counting on multiple and unremitting negotiations to come (i.e: 
the so-called TRIPS+ treaties).3 
Following the demise of the non-democratic (and totalitarian) regimes 
of the 20th century, the global consensus held that no monopoly could be a 
good thing. Most of us continue to consider that the extreme accumulation of 
power in the hands of a few individuals (whether public or private) is bad for 
society; in essence, because there is no reining in or balancing of those indi-
viduals’ wishes, and therefore neither is there any constraint on what emerg-
es from their minds and spirits. 
Reasonably, one important question which requires serious attention is 
why we are giving 7300 days of monopoly protection to scientific inventions. 
After all, no scientific data-driven deliberative process has taken place. 
The world standard of IP time frames was decided rather liberally by 
159 state representatives, who simply assumed that 7300 days was an ap-
propriate time frame; a figure reached by adding 1095 days to the 1861-1994 
patent terms in the United States.
Interestingly, the intangible proprietary code indexed in the IP portfo-
lios of modern corporations comprises liquid and tradable assets, which are 
increasingly fit for standardized measurement, indexing and trading. Added 
to this, IP assets themselves are also a tradable commodity, the value of which 
is publicly disclosed through mandatory financial information anchored to 
company shares.
2  See chapter 3.
3  On IP legal ceilings see chapter 5.4.
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In the past, most of a company’s value was its monetary, tangible and 
fixed assets. Nowadays, these assets are to a great extent replaced in impor-
tance by patented technology, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and oth-
er intangible ‘assets’. In this regard, IP intangible assets have become the 
dominant assets in many global corporations. Thus, these IP ‘assets’ are in-
creasingly moving at the core of corporate market value, and that intangible 
value is reflected in their stock prices. 
Beginning in the mid 90s, IP assets moved to the core of the ‘compet-
itive advantage’ of companies.4As a result, the trading of IP based-company 
shares transforms the patent issue into a (financial) market issue. In con-
sequence, capital markets ironically come to legitimize these legal monop-
olies. 
Again, the K-10 and 10-Q like forms of the world securities markets 
do index and measure IP for the world-marketing of industrially produced 
proprietary technologies. In this regard, the productivity performance of in-
dustrialized proprietary intangibles provides critical material information 
for financial markets.
The so-called ‘IP assets’ thus have a bearing on capitalization of non-
IP productive sectors. In consequence, a call-effect makes many public-
ly-owned companies shift their business model, or elements thereof, to IP 
mode. Thus IP mode promotes further IP mode in the current stage of IP 
inflation. Hence, measuring the extent to which IP impacts on world eco-
nomic productivity is an issue which demands serious economic analysis 
and social consideration. 
Inevitably, investor expectations of financial performance of IP compa-
nies increased as soon as the world trading regime began conditioning trade 
to compliance with global IP standards, and IP owners were thus able to ver-
tically enforce standardized IP in 159 potential jurisdictions of the world. As 
explained above, the linkage of the international patent system (TRIPS) with 
the original legal infrastructures of world trade (GATT) produces incredible 
incentives for capital-holders to aggressively move their investment to IP 
stock and trading.
Ironically, as information is what allows developed capital markets to 
work efficiently, the above mentioned new financial materiality automatical-
ly shifted the economic preferences of capital-holders (and their institutional 
4  R. Parr, Royalty Rates for Licensing Intellectual Property (John Williams & 
Sons 2007), p. 22.
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vehicles) trading in securities markets. Thus, the TRIPS agreement produced 
two basic transformations on the critical world regimes of trade and finance: 
(1) As for world trade, the IP linkage adapted world trade to monopoly trading, as the 
world market was suddenly partitioned or segmented along the lines of domestic IP rights.
(2) As for financial markets, the IP linkage transformed these multi-jurisdictional legal 
monopolies into new tradable world properties and thus these markets further increased 
capitalization of both IP sectors and companies. 
Hence, financial markets re-embedded these monopoly assets into a 
market-mechanism and thus somehow ‘certified’ them as market-driven as-
sets. Nowadays, both systems (world trade and financial markets) are techni-
cally trading on these new intangible assets. 
Therefore, the combined structure of incentives within (1) the interna-
tional patent system, (2) IP conditioned world trade, and (3) world capital 
markets are transforming our economic and social ecosystems by producing a 
new global property. There is no great dark hand behind this transformation, 
but the simple result of handing control over our lives to these legal specula-
tive forms of global corporate capitalism.5 
These forms differ in two essential ways from traditional tangible proper-
ties. On one hand, this is a global property of limitless production. On the other 
hand, nowadays, the standardized IP minting presses of the world (Patent Offic-
es) are monopoly-making machines, managed according to productivity inputs. 
Needless to say, proprietary knowledge is the contemporary optimum 
form of property, as not only can it be limitlessly produced, but also easily 
distributed through world contractual relationships.
2. Oligopoly decoding 
Capitalism is not the natural driving force of market and states. The mechan-
ics of states and those of markets are the inner mechanics of advanced so-
cieties, and they function under an opposite logic. Currently, markets and 
states are collectively institutionalized virtues. On the contrary, capitalism is 
an aggregation of individual faults. The measure of capitalism is a measure of 
individual accumulated power vis-à-vis society at large.
The inner principles and ideals within states and markets are socially 
5  See generally, S. Picciotto, Regulating op. cit.
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valuable for people in inter-generational terms. We may not ‘love’ them, but 
we know that it is right that they are in place, so that society basically func-
tions for all in our everyday lives. 
As the principles and ideals within states and markets are socially per-
ceived as valuable for all, their loose prescriptions rooted in the commons 
tend to be voluntarily and collectively enforced by citizens themselves in their 
interpersonal relationships. States and markets are both the basic legal infra-
structures of society, private and public:
Markets and states are generally honored social codes, rooted in a long 
collective history whose principles and ideals are complementary, but at the 
same time distinct; and thus, they are required to be continuously balanced 
through deliberative processes. 
Rationally speaking, that is what is lacking, globally. Societies based on 
any form of social state and market economy are socially and economically 
efficient. 
On one hand, the basic principles and ideals of contemporary states are 
democracy and human rights, which provide (in multiple forms) the safety 
nets of education, health care and social security, as a means of producing so-
cial cohesion and thus social efficiency. On the other, the basic principles and 
ideals of contemporary markets are competition and freedom of movement 
of persons, goods and services (people, things and activities), as means for 
producing economic efficiency. 
State and market elites (high level public officials and corporate man-
agers) should reasonably work together to find ways of enforcing these ideals 
and principles, both domestically and worldwide. 
Perhaps we can develop a common ground for building a better world, 
by leaving both the moralist utopia and the apology of realpolitik out of the 
practices of international law.6 However, in order to do that, we have to be 
result-oriented and stick to specifics. In other words, and to paraphrase Sol 
Picciotto, the challenge is to design international institutions and rules which 
can help to ensure that the increasing international contacts, flow and oppor-
tunities empower ordinary people.7 
The markets and states in advanced societies defeated the totalitari-
6  See M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia; The Structure of International 
Legal Argument (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 1989).
7  S. Picciotto. ‘What rules for the global economy’, Regulating international busi-
ness: beyond liberalization (MacMillan 1999), p. 5.
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an conception of social and individual life such as communism, and could 
certainly do the same with capitalism. However, winning over capitalism re-
quires expanding effective markets and states to the international; thus mak-
ing these social mechanisms work for all the peoples of the world.
On the contrary, domestic and world oligopolies are capital-cumulative 
driven, and thus structurally anti-market and anti-state. Corporate capital-
ism is deeply rooted in oligopoly and monopoly culture as vehicles of capital 
accumulation, often merging private and public decisionmaking (eg: pub-
lic-private regulatory partnerships) in the benefit of the wealthy few.
Oligopolies (weak market, weak competition) and monopolies (no 
market, no competition) are both the main trades of large individual capi-
tal-holders, with a differential performance on accumulation rates. English 
dictionaries tend to have entries both for the noun ‘monopoly’ and the action 
of transforming markets and competition into monopolies (ie ‘to monopo-
lize’). They also have an entry for oligopoly as a state of limited competition, 
in which a market is shared by a small number of producers or sellers. 
However, interestingly, there is no entry for the actions leading to 
transform markets and competition into a weak-market economy. Following 
the usage of written language, oligopolization is placed in brackets when writ-
ing in non-technical fields. Thus, even today it is still not a standard current 
term for something that precisely defines corporate globalization in multiple 
sectors. 
The people of Pompeii did not initially react sensibly at the smoke 
pouring down the hill. They did not know what was going on as they had no 
understanding of the implications of that smoke. World oligopolization is a 
smoke column signaling, in a way, an artificial eruption. 
Reasonably, a deliberative process regarding oligopolization should 
take place. Those domestic corporations that succeed in oligopolizing in a 
given business sector are those who are first in the line in global capital ac-
cumulation. Having reached the position of oligopoly in that sector, most of 
these companies (particularly if they are publicly traded) move on together to 
the following second level playing field:
a) domestic diversification, as a way of circumventing domestic anti-
trust, and
b) peer-pressure on domestic authorities to facilitate the globalization 
of their domestic oligopolies.
Monopolization is a black letter illegal term in all jurisdictions of the 
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world8. Thus, publicly traded corporations throughout the world (read prof-
it-maximizing corporations) increase their size and leverage on state and 
markets by bargaining around that crucial domestic legal prohibition. 
By doing so, these legal proxies remotelly-controlled by controlling 
shareholders are expanding to a global market-economy still in the making, 
and thus governed by weak international antitrust enforcement. 
As mentioned, a meta-game consists of changing the rules, while the 
game is actually being played. Thus, those controlling share-holders and cor-
porate echelons who make the Faustian bargain of cheating to get more, tend 
to become involved in capital-intensive legal creativity and aggressive regu-
latory capture.9 
In this regard, it is easier and safer to cheat by reframing things as 
something different, through law reform. The case of IP is paramount, for the 
reasons explored in the foregoing pages. 
Those individuals playing meta-game with state and market regulation 
always release disruptive power; this not only has an adverse effect on the 
regulated business sector of their special interest, but it often transforms eco-
nomic and social fundamentals. 
By changing economic fundamentals, these individuals go beyond 
touching a core business: they touch all core businesses and sectors of econo-
my and society. By changing social fundamentals, these people not only stick 
their hands into others’ pockets; their fingers touch the lives of everyone. 
However, traditional monopoly cannot be obtained through mar-
ket-based competition because it is plainly illegal. Therefore, reaching the 
monopoly ‘premium’ (as the final stage of capital accumulation) is only pos-
sible by playing the illegitimate game of re-engineering the legal system at 
large. Therefore, the transformative dimension of the meta-game produced 
by linking IP to trade (contrary to the advice of the old GATT diplomacy) is 
not easy to match in comparative legal terms. A more autonomy-enhancing 
vehicle than IP is conceptually difficult to dream up. Basically, everything 
that can be inoculated with traces of IP can be monopolistically traded 
worldwide. 
8  See chapter 8.3.
9  For the classic example of legal creativity in this regard see, in particular, M. 
van Ittersum, Profits and Principle: Hugo Grotius, natural rights theories and the rise 
of Dutch power in the East Indies, 1595-1615, Brill Studies in Intellectual History (Brill 
2006).
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Obviously, some of the companies that managed to make IP trade-con-
ditioned and worldwide-enforceable were already oligopolies in their domes-
tic markets prior to 1996. However, by using states as proxies to structurally 
transform intellectual property – and thus the so-called international patent 
system–, these companies transform themselves into world legal monopo-
lists.
The resulting long-term disruptions in the social fabric go beyond tech-
nology. Extreme IP disrupts markets, competition, states, society, economy, 
science, art, and thus the individual and social life of each one of us.
3. Into extreme IP
 
Extreme IP is a world redistributive system based on the propertization of 
knowledge in all areas of social life. Extreme IP allows the shareholders of 
corporate proxies operating multi-jurisdictionally to industrially appropriate 
knowledge, capital and thus common wealth.
As a result of international legal reengineering (TRIPS rules), multi-
ple global companies nowadays trade in legal monopoly code, and thus have 
vertically organized the global distribution of all their IP assets. The roller 
coaster advances by converting a combination of vehicles, institutions and 
processes into a new IP paradigm.
This paradigm will increase the current high disparities in global wealth 
distribution. Upward (or down-top) redistribution is widening inequality in 
real-time within south and north and between south and north; and south 
and north are everywhere. 
From a perspective of social and economic world-policy, the issue can 
be framed as a simple question: to what extent are poor societies to be allowed 
to free-ride on the proprietary inventions of large patent-holding companies? 
The answer is as much as possible. 
Poor societies should be allowed to free-ride to the greatest extent, if 
social development is a priority for the practitioners of global governance. 
Reasonably, poor societies should be helped to build up and strengthen their 
own domestic markets and states, based on a generous free-riding ticket for 
scientific innovation, together with redistribution from the wealthy societies 
of both West and East. 
For almost half a century pre-TRIPS GATT law managed to reduce 
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trade tariffs to almost irrelevant levels. By doing so, world wealth was in-
creased and redistributed to developing countries. Inevitably, it is distort-
ing to see how those world trade tariffs have been now replaced by world 
license-fees.
Furthermore, it is unfair to force their societies to play by the rules, 
when many in wealthy societies played without any rules during the first stag-
es of their industrial development.10 Obviously, these and other such ‘appro-
priations’ can certainly be tracked far back in our long history: cumulative in-
novation has been the game, and it is based on several millennia of free-riding 
social imitation. 
In this regard, from a purely developmental angle, it is difficult to ques-
tion that free access to affordable medicines has a stronger positive impact on 
development than securing high standards of patent protection and enforce-
ment of pharmaceuticals; if people die of AIDs there will be no development 
whatsoever. For this reason, developing countries should free ride on innova-
tion, extensively, by conditioning degrees of patent protection to measurable 
stages and degrees of development. 
However, the issue does not only affect developing societies and their 
citizens. In this regard, the citizens of wealthy societies should not deceive 
themselves by playing solitaire on this issue, as any improvement to their 
quality of life based on IP will be directly dependent on the evolution of their 
purchasing power.
On the other hand, the productivity of these industries consists of prop-
ertizing intangibles in order to exercise legal monopolies. Thus, these compa-
nies tend to keep IP rights and outsource global production and distribution, 
so there is not much workforce around these industries in their countries of 
incorporation. 
In addition, profits from their intangibles are easily and ritually shift-
ed to low tax jurisdictions. In this regard, transfer pricing problems are per-
vasive,11 as the intangibility of their assets facilitates movement of income 
through tax havens and offshore financial centers of the world.12 Therefore, 
the mantra of protecting innovation through IP for the good of society should 
10  D. Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American 
Industrial Power (Yale University Press 2004).
11  See S. Picciotto, International Business Taxation (Quorum Books 1992).
12  See J. Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation 
(Cornell University Press 2006).
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also stick to measurable economic and social results in both developing and 
developed societies.
The ‘knowledge-based society’ is certainly a very catchy term encap-
sulating the greatest tautology on earth: knowledge is the essence of the ag-
gregated us. Society is the cumulation of many inter-generational endeavors 
aiming at offering a good life for all. For it be so, there has to be an opportu-
nity to keep on moving ahead, rubbing sticks to make fire and progressing to 
the starship. 
In this regard, it would be reasonable for our upward-collective mobil-
ity to be as information commons-oriented as possible. After all, human soci-
ety differs from a primate society in terms of structural collective innovation 
and inter-generational knowledge-sharing. This is precisely what is being in-
hibited by the current extreme IP paradigm.
We have invented an innovation model based on reprocessing and 
repackaging centuries of scientific research output as propriety-knowledge 
(read propertizing the information and intellectual commons) to trade on it 
through top-down license-based legal relationships.
An increasing corpus of critical analysis has already highlighted the 
risks to society of pursuing the extreme IP paradigm to nowhere. 
The first TRIPS corporate raiders did not probably expect to create a 
global transformation of ‘intangible productivity’ in entire world industries. 
However, the move to extreme IP is no longer the mere move of global com-
panies in the proprietary-technology sector, as businesses from many other 
sectors are also moving to extreme IP. 
This structure of incentives is now embedded across the board of mul-
tiple business sectors to the benefit of those capital-intensive companies able 
to invest in pipelines, marketing and lobbying to exact fixable rents through 
autonomous price setting.
Free price systems were said to be an essential part of the market-econ-
omy. However, now goods or services have been somehow i-podded; they are 
Made of IP and thus no longer Made in. As a result, world patent-holders 
determine mandatory prices worldwide for proprietary technologies.
Meta-gaming is a relentless re-engineering of the social fabric, allowing 
large capital-holders to bargain upwards within the infrastructures of society 
at large. Thus, the power of these large capital-holders to do good or bad is 
incommensurate within any previous measure of ancient and modern pow-
er, including those individuals at the head of old dynastic Empires. The rea-
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son is self-evident, namely the proxy corporate form and structure operating 
globally; one of the most beautifully perfected organizational machines in the 
whole history of mankind; able to exert influence, and thus change for good 
or bad, over the two hemispheres. 
In this regard, corporations are somehow like the unmanned systems 
of capital-holders: large capital-holders use proxy corporations to ‘play’ capi-
tal accumulation through them, with no responsibility whatsoever, as if doing 
things ‘through’ these new Leviathans were pure digital game playing; which 
it is not. Extreme IP has to be read in this light, as a move in the interest of 
those capital-holders who are remote-controlling IP-based corporations. 
4. Virgin lands 
The systemic alternative to global corporate capitalism is a well-proven le-
gal infrastructure with two main drivers: states and markets, or market and 
states. In this regard, the professionals working within each of these realms 
share common and complementary values. 
Market-economy mechanisms –such as competition and efficien-
cy– and social-state mechanisms –such as democracy and human rights– 
cross-pollinate each other by introducing checks and balances in the social 
fabric, thus preventing a large concentration of power in the hands of any 
individual. 
The debates on the coherence of global economic governance and in-
ternational law are a basic expression of the need to build states and markets 
in a coherent global policy framework; somehow, part of that original project 
got lost in translation, beginning with the two systems of San Francisco, and 
Bretton Woods.13 
The legal technological infrastructures of societies are markets and 
states. After all, these two organizational forms are the natural heirs of the 
ancestral shelter and barter exchange, respectively, and thus provide the in-
ner legal foundations for any past and present human community. Nowa-
days, we need somehow to bring them together globally, in order to prevent 
large capital-holders from aggressive bargaining within markets and states 
worldwide. 
Extreme IP is one of those by-products. In this context, current phar-
13  P. Zapatero, Searching for coherence in global economic op. cit.
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maceuticals legal protection is merely an example or an extremely unreason-
able legal situation produced by those individuals who will economically ben-
efit from it, namely the controlling shareholders of major global companies. 
Access to medicines in the developing world requires constructing a 
thriving competitive global market trading in both generics and brand-name 
drugs. However, in order to do that, both states and markets have to deliver: 
the former, by building health infraestructures and a global pharmaceutical 
marketplace targeting the enforcement of right to health, and the latter by en-
gaging in margin-cutting competition to deliver the cheapest essential drugs 
possible in that marketplace.
In recent decades, competitive industries from some developing coun-
tries such as Brazil and notably India, efficiently developed generic copies of 
drugs and distributed them at marginal cost prices in their local markets, but 
also exported them to others. 
Before the pre-TRIPS era, these countries did free-ride on patent pro-
tection in order to provide incentives for local entrepreneurs to join and in-
vest in the sector. Thus, generic industries became progressively more effi-
cient in reverse-engineering technologies, and thus managed to copy complex 
pharmaceutical inventions, without the need to rely on the traditionally in-
complete data disclosure of the kind registered in patent offices. As a result, 
a highly competitive generic industry blossomed and now provides access to 
affordable drugs for millions of people. 
However, this move to generic production and distribution challenged 
the profit-making expectations of global brand-name companies and thus 
posed a threat for their bottom line. The challenge was not so much to divert 
potential profits from those local markets, as not that many developing coun-
tries enjoy significant manufacturing capacity. The challenge was the forma-
tion itself of a world pharmaceutical market, as monopoly rights are at odds 
with market-structures.
As a result, the industries fought back the formation of global mar-
ket-structures in their sectors by packaging a new discourse around promot-
ing scientific innovation and protecting their ‘technology-exporting societies’ 
from ‘pirates’. 
With regard to generics, that meant giving a battering to global distri-
bution of generic products and thus world trade in generics, by capturing a 
critical hub of international trade law (read WTO TRIPS agreement). Howev-
er, by doing so, the IP crusades touched social and economic fundamentals. 
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Boards and CEOs are basically proxies of controlling shareholders, op-
erating through quarterly earnings and phone calls. Thus, the boards of di-
rectors and CEOs of major brand-name pharmaceutical companies perceived 
that the profitability of their business would be at risk if the cheaper-for-all 
generic drugs business model expanded its reach and clout to affluent socie-
ties. 
Thus, the US pharmaceutical industry and some other industries, such 
as entertainment, software and others, pursued an historical quest to stand-
ardize world patent protection, and related IP forms, through multilateral 
hard-law; and surprisingly they managed it! 
In order for them to obtain word-scale fixed rents on their monopoly 
products, patent products and processes also needed to be protected world-
scale. The IP agenda of these global corporations during the GATT Uruguay 
Round focused on (1) upgrading the legal qualities and level of protection of 
the IP forms and (2) controlling world trade flows on goods and services pro-
duced under proprietary knowledge and thus avoiding unauthorized trade 
transactions.
World generics competition was thus inhibited by obtaining two ba-
sic legal outcomes: (1) domestic standardized mandatory protection or both 
product and process patents, and (2) protection of other instrumental IP 
forms (e.g. trademarks and trade secrets). 
By succeeding, not only world trade in goods and services based on 
imitation or copy was precluded: the worldwide access to their proprietary 
technologies would be determined by the licensor and the licensee (thus 
property and contract). Hence, IP goods and services using proprietary tech-
nologies could be vertically distributed worldwide through hub-and-spokes 
pipelines.
As a result, nowadays, large patent-holding companies compete for le-
gal monopoly on new inventions and, once they have obtained the patent, a 
wide variety of companies compete for a license, worldwide. The resulting 
legal scheme mixes all autonomy-enhancing tools (legal monopoly, anticom-
petitive arrangements and oligopoly) into one killer compound, for eliminat-
ing markets and thus precluding price-based competition.
That state of affairs is unreasonable. In any case, and sticking to the 
global poor, developing countries should not be required to pay back the cost 
of innovation in developed countries, as the social cost of patent protection in 
these societies is not correlated to that innovation. 
VIRGIN LANDS OF INVENTION
175
In this regard, it is unreasonable to demand rents from developing 
countries if social and economic development is still an important world pol-
icy issue. The investment in drug innovation is already recouped with a gen-
erous premium in the wealthy markets of the developed world, in part thanks 
to public funding of health-care and health-related pharmaceutical research. 
Developing countries without manufacturing capacity rely on world 
generics markets to access essential generic drugs but also to bargain with 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies to obtain the best prices. Their mar-
ket structure requires pricing drugs very close to the marginal cost of pro-
duction. However, those companies targeting the global poor as consumers 
have to outcompete others on very low margins, combined with large outputs. 
Only the brave (producer, distributor and trader) survive in such markets. 
In this regard, the pharmaceutical industry has still not adapted its 
business model to the reality of our world of global poverty. On the contrary, 
it pursues an unrealistic business model, by means of domestic and world 
law reform. In essence, large brand-name companies have managed to block 
key global sources of generics through legal linkage of trade to IP. As a result, 
world trade flows in generics under compulsory licensing are not common.
The 2001 Doha Declaration on access to medicines already allows de-
veloping countries to play ball with TRIPS flexibilities and win more matches 
in this global policy area.14 However, it will not be easy.
Reasonably, large brand-name companies could have obtained a less 
socially distorting global regime by simply obtaining a global flat fee license 
(GFFLs) for health-technologies. In this regard, a GDP-based GFFL on access 
to proprietary-technology would certainly have had a positive effect on devel-
oping countries. 
After all, drug sales data reveals uniformity in the fraction of domes-
tic’s GDPs spent on health care R&D, regardless of population’s per capita 
income. Thus, some informed observers and experts are already proposing 
that countries be released from the IP obligations in the health area, once that 
GDP fraction is reached.15
However, instead of adapting to the diversity of markets and demands, 
the global pharmaceutical industry pushed for the negotiation of TRIPS 
14  J. Love, ‘What the 2001 Doha Declaration Changed?, Knowledge Ecology In-
ternational (16 September 2011).
15  See J. Love & T. Hubbard, ‘Paying for Public Goods”, Code: Collaborative 
Ownership and the Digital Economy (MIT Press 2005): 207–229.
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agreement as well as for other TRIPS+ schemes.16 Needless to say within 
these complex networks, corporate free-riding and capture often blur the 
public interest.17
Inevitably, any weak commitment among high ranking state and market 
elites towards the principles and ideals of markets and states reinforces the 
leverage of large capital-holders on their day-to-day operational decisions. In 
this regard, it is reasonable to assume that common good-oriented solutions 
would be easier to develop by taking the core ideals of the market-economy 
and the social-state as the starting point (together in same weight) of any 
policy design. 
The corporate proxies of large capital-holders are 100% coherent, and 
have increasing resources at their disposal in order to wrap economic de-
terminism in technical discourses on so-called economic freedom, economic 
efficiency, big is good, knowledge-based competition, extreme IP, etc.
Unfortunately, the current loopholes in our global policy framework 
produce a somewhat indulgent attitude among the state and market elites 
towards capital-holders. As a result, the essential battles over ideas are being 
partly replaced by technical (but not-principle driven) collaboration between 
these technocracies. By doing so, some of these experts are eroding the com-
mon values of their professions: that is to say, the principles and ideals em-
bedded within the market and the state.
Sometimes, some of these state and market professionals mistake tech-
nocracy for neutrality. However, technicalities and techniques are never neu-
tral, as they always operate on assumptions. Paradoxically, a gross manifesta-
tion of this phenomenon is how public-private partnerships rule domestic and 
international economic regulation. The TRIPS agreement analysed in these 
pages is a paramount example, as it is already hard entrenched world law. 
The global chess-board politics of the pharmaceutical industry in this 
regard, and the casual way it deals with life and death –still without sufficient 
commitment– is a clear example in itself of how the incentive structures of 
capitalism play ‘winner takes all’ games for large capital-holders at the ex-
pense of states and markets and, thus, at the expense of us all. 
IP itself is an invention; that is to say intellectual legal technology. The 
real paradox of patents is, in this regard, inventing proprietary inventions. 
Patents are government-sponsored legal monopolies disciplining mar-
16  See above (chapter 3).
17  See generally S. Picciotto, Regulating op. cit.
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kets. As such, patents provide a powerful tool for limiting competition, by 
segmenting / partitioning world’s jurisdictions and thus annulling markets 
and inhibiting competition. IP is often used by global companies nowadays 
‘to exclude markets’ from functioning. By doing so, firms intensively use that 
IP ‘not to compete in markets’.
By linking IP to trade, a global structural change was devised in global 
industrial organization. The impregnation of proprietary cells with global-
ly-traded goods and services currently allows optimal accumulation of capital 
through the corporate form and structure. As a result, big industries are pipe-
lining ‘intangible productivity’ towards the monopoly-granting machines of 
Patent Offices. 
In fact, the logic of intangible propertization appears to be relentless 
as IP expansion to the biotechnology sector strongly suggests, for example. 
Exclusive rights regimes for intangibles always offer great new meta-games to 
invent. Thus, evidently, the reach of patents over biotechnology is far greater 
than those based on chemical technologies, and thus creates a radically dif-
ferent level-playing field for world propertization of both natural and human 
life.
As a result, in recent decades patent-focused biotech has become a crit-
ical field for propertizing the human environment (seeds, plants, animal vari-
eties, living organisms and genes) as well as our own nature (human genes), 
and thus the very ecosystem of human life. 
Propertization of intangibles is limitless in conquering things and ac-
tivities, even life itself. Thus, in keeping with our inventive nature, intellectual 
propertization games are up-scaling to run deep and high. 
Nowadays, current discussions over patents focus on how to fine-tune 
the international patent system in order to win it back for public interest and 
thus provide a viable (legal) innovation infrastructure for the world. 
Law and lawyers play a key part in creating the concepts and institu-
tional forms of capitalism.18 Extreme IP is one of those concepts and institu-
tional forms. As these pages attempt to explain, the extreme version of cur-
18  See S. Picciotto, Regulating corporate capitalism (Oxford University Press 2010), 
generally, and also Y. Dezalay, ‘Between the State, Law, and the Market: The Social and Pro-
fessional Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena’, International 
Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Clarendon Press 1996) at 59–87 and Y. Dezalay 
& B. Garth, ‘Law, Lawyers, and Empire ‘, The Cambridge History of Law in America. The 
Twentieth Century and After (1920-) (Cambridge University Press 2008), pp. 718–758.
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rent IP exclusive rights regimes produces severe social costs and is thus a bad 
world policy option. 
Automatic licensing based on compensatory liability regimes (compen-
satory liability regimes) would be an easy alternative for avoiding the social 
costs of government-sponsored artificial excludability / exclusivity in critical 
scientific and technological areas.19 Both developing and developed societies 
alike would benefit from that less-invasive approach to IP protection. 
Moving from excludability / exclusivity to remuneration rights could 
correct the socially distorting effects of extreme IP regarding technological 
and scientific proprietary-knowledge.20 As explained by David Campbell and 
Sol Picciotto, the simple solution would be to recast IP as ‘rights to compen-
sation’ rather than ‘rights to exclude’, and thus opt for automatic licensing: 
‘This would mean essentially that users would have an automatic license, al-
though the innovator would be entitled to appropriate compensation, rather 
than a right to exclude backed by the potential of injunctions and swingeing 
damages’.21
There is a strong case to make for global automatic mandatory licens-
ing based on FRAND terms in all technological and scientific areas.22 Public 
authorities, and particularly antitrust authorities, can and should contribute 
to promoting innovation through a policy mix, based on long-term mitigation 
of exclusive rights regimes, and long-term securing of open architectures. 
The intensive natural use of science and technology by our species sug-
gests that the international patent system should be adapted to an easy-and-
cheap-to-license mandatory approach to patents: human collective upward 
mobility is based on science and technology, and thus should reasonably be 
kept as information commons-oriented as possible. 
After all, society for humans differs from a society for primates in terms 
of structural collective innovation and inter-generational knowledge-shar-
ing; and this is precisely what the current extreme IP paradigm is inhibiting. 
Hence, there is a strong case for reregulating or recalibrating exclusive rights 
regimes through the prism of science. 
19  See generally S. Picciotto & D. Campbell, Whose Molecule is it anyway? op. cit. 
20  J. Reichman, ‘Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Sub-
patentable Innovation’, Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Innovation 
Policy for the Information Society (Oxford University Press 2001), pp. 23–53.
21  See S. Picciotto, Regulating op. cit (chapter 9, section 4) and S. Picciotto & D. 
Campbell, Whose Molecule is it anyway? op. cit, p. 301.
22  FRAND: fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
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Incentiving innovation would advise public authorities to do things 
right, rather than arbitrarily. Reasonably, we should treat the actual struc-
ture of incentives as an issue with which the scientific community should be 
involved, so that states can deliver mandatory basic equations for IP weights 
and measures in the short-term. 
In this regard, a basic equation is needed to calculate automatic man-
datory licensing rates for at least essential scientific and technological inven-
tions. Constructing and enforcing a flat fee equation would avoid the high 
transaction costs incurred by all companies when dealing with global proprie-
tary-knowledge. That equation could be easily added as a third section to arti-
cle 27 or a WTO General Council Decision, by stating as follows, for example:
The WTO Members shall upgrade on a biannual basis a list of automatic compulsory li-
censes for essential scientific and technological inventions through formal consultation 
with the WIPO, the ITU and the WHO. The right holder of any of these essential patents 
will be remunerated with a fair and reasonable royalty based on the following equation: 
[...]. 23
Alternatively, such regulatory solution could also be pursued through 
international cooperation by antitrust authorities without the need to add 
any provision to TRIPS, as such antitrust policy is TRIPS compatible. In this 
regard, the antitrust authorities from the country of origin of the patent hold-
er could issue permanent consent decrees if these patent holders do not auto-
matically facilitate FRAND licensing based on that equation. 
In short, the IP-based innovation infrastructures should move towards 
mandatory automatic licenses in order to reduce transaction costs in global 
innovation markets, and thus to pursue the common good. 
In this regard, it should be reasonable not only to release LDCs and 
the developing countries from their IP pharmaceutical obligations –as long 
as they are underdeveloped– but to seriously promote long-term technology 
transfer towards these societies. 
In the meantime, the TRIPS rules, together with the 2001 Doha Dec-
laration should reasonably be taken as a world legal ceiling for stronger IP 
protection as well as the international legal foundation to promote global 
market formation (instead of world market segmentation) both in generics 
and brand-name pharmaceuticals. 
To sum up these pages, the world legal infrastructures for innovation 
23  See TRIPS article 27 (Rights conferred).
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should be upgraded by pursuing world-market formation, automatic manda-
tory licensing schemes in all essential scientific and technological sectors, as 
well as strong cooperation on antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive 
world inter-company arrangements in the IP area. 
Extreme IP is not a good path for society to obtain social and economic 
progress. People are knowledgeable; as a group, we will keep that condition 
as long as we primarily feed our minds and spirits through non-proprietary, 
open access, open source and, thus, the knowledge and information com-
mons. 
The painting on the cover of this book hangs in El Prado; one of the 
most comprehensive and complete European art galleries. Crossing the Styx 
is the title of this piece by the Flemish painter Joachim Patinir. Dated 1520, 
the painting eloquently depicts the passing from life to death; there we have 
Charon taking us to the other side. 
Access to essential medicines should not be a problem for anybody: its 
real-world costs are life-costs, and as death suggests, life is incommensurate. 
Drugs are science, and the product of science should be available to everyone. 
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